Abstract
For Freud, the question of where psychoanalysis stands in relation to religion, science, and philosophy was clear: as a continuation of the project of Enlightenment, psychoanalysis was on the side of science, usually allied with philosophy, and almost always against religion. Freud’s medical education included study in the newly developing synthesis of biology and physics associated with the Berlin Physicalist Society lead by Herman Helmholtz and Ernst Brücke. Helmholtz’s dynamic theory of energy as subject to displacement and transformation but fundamentally indestructible would be key to Freud’s account of “libido” and his early understanding of the dynamic relationship of conscious and unconscious aspects of mind. Freud fully expected that in time all of the discoveries of psychoanalysis would be corroborated and established on a quantitative foundation, as modern science unfolded from the “Copernican Turn” represented above all by Galileo’s mathematization of astronomy and physics. Freud also explicitly connected psychoanalysis with the “second Copernican Turn” announced by Kant’s critical philosophy, which, on the one hand, bracketed both theological and Rationalist beliefs in knowledge through revelation or pure reason, and on the other, criticized Empiricist attempts to define knowledge in terms of direct perception. Like Kant, Freud insisted that science needed to take the fact of subjectivity into account, but whereas for Kant this meant describing the transcendental structure of the subject, for Freud the subject is always a singular conjunction of individual and phylogenetic history. As a modern science, psychoanalysis would take its cue from Nietzsche and Darwin, and expand in parallel with developments in modern physics and biology as well as research in the social and cultural sciences.
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Notes
- 1.
See my essay “The Freudian Things: Construction and the Archaeological Metaphor” (Reinhard 1995).
- 2.
- 3.
Lacan comments, that although Saussure characterizes the signifier as arbitrary, “it would have been better to qualify the signifier with the category of contingency” (Lacan 1998, p.40).
- 4.
Lacan already locates the function of the mathematical variable in “the ambiguity of substance and subject” in Aristotle’s concept of the subject: “The hupokeimenon is perfectly isolated by him insofar as, logically, it is nothing other than that which mathematical logic was able to isolate later in the function of the variable, that is, that which can only be designated by a predicative proposition” (Lacan 2006), p. 348. My translation.
- 5.
Lacan is probably referring to Socrates’ description of the earth: “Well then, my friend, in the first place it is said that the earth, looked at from above, looks like those spherical balls made up of 12 pieces of leather; it is multi-colored, and of these colors those used by our painters give us an indication; up there the whole earth has these colors, but much brighter and purer than these; one part is sea-green and of marvelous beauty, another is golden, another is white, whiter than chalk or snow.” Plato (1997), p. 94.
- 6.
See Chapter 4 on “Conservation of Energy,” p. 1–8.
- 7.
Session of December 8, 1965. My translation.
- 8.
Session of Dec. 8, 1965 (my translation).
- 9.
To make matters even more complicated, Lacan also asserts that psychoanalysis is an anti-philosophy, insofar as modes of unconscious thinking that it addresses are excluded from the fundamental assumptions of philosophy. If philosophy is first of all “love of truth,” for Lacan truth is something that can only be “half-said” and that tells us nothing about the real. As Lacan argues in his extraordinarily dense essay, “L’Étourdit,” the knowledge that psychoanalysis pursues does not operate according to Aristotle’s principle of non-contradiction and the distinction between “sense” and “nonsense”; rather, psychoanalytic knowledge involves a third mode of meaning that Lacan calls ab-sense. Moreover the “object” proper to psychoanalytic ab-sense, what Lacan calls the objet a, exceeds the classical philosophical distinction between subject and object; like the particles of contemporary physics, it can only be viewed indirectly, by “looking awry.”
- 10.
Lacan makes this distinction, among other places, in Lacan (1978), p.207.
- 11.
The “pass” is a process in Lacanian schools whereby it is affirmed that a psychoanalytic act has happened. This can be the signal that an analysand has “passed” into the position of analyst. See Eric Laurent’s essay, “The Pass and the Guarantee in the School.”
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Reinhard, K. (2021). Psychoanalysis and the Monotheistic Origins of Modern Science. In: Eckel, M.D., Speight, C.A., DuJardin, T. (eds) The Future of the Philosophy of Religion. Boston Studies in Philosophy, Religion and Public Life, vol 8. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44606-2_15
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