Abstract
In this article we discuss the so-called cantilever argument, used by Joseph Carens to establish a human right to global freedom of movement. First of all, we criticise Carens’s classification of the argument as both an “analogy” and a “logical extension”. Comparing the cantilever argument with Carens’s popular feudalism analogy suggests understanding it solely as an extension, but certainly not as a “logical” one. Finally, we sketch out whether, by means of the cantilever, he succeeds in shifting the burden of proof to the opponents of such a human right.
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Notes
- 1.
This reconstruction is intended to be as close as possible to the way Carens presents his argument in The Ethics of Immigration. In order to be a complete argument, a third premise needs to be added: “(P3) There are good reasons that justify treating national freedom of movement as a human right”. Furthermore, it has to be considered more intensely, if the argument in this form might still be facing the is-ought-problem (see Cohon 2018, chapter 5).
- 2.
- 3.
For more detailed insight, the reader may refer to Carens’s reply to the challenges (EoI, 240–245 and 255–287) and also to Andreas Cassee’s seminal Globale Bewegungsfreiheit, which offers a short characterisation and comment on the different attempts to justify what Cassee calls the “standard view” (Cassee 2016, part I, 21–167).
- 4.
A branch obviously is a part of a tree. Nevertheless “branches” and “trees” can be regarded as different entities.
- 5.
Given that Carens understands his various arguments for global freedom of movement as not being in a hierarchical order to (and dependent of) each other, it may also be possible to choose option (a).
- 6.
Of course, in the case of the Earth and Mars it is possible to say that both come from the same domain of reality (“planets of our solar system”). However, different domains of reality only do not occur if the supposedly same domain is identical with either the source domain (S) or the target domain (T). Thus, Thomas Reid’s argument can be interpreted as a typical analogy because neither Earth nor Mars are identical with the domain “planets of our solar system”.
- 7.
See (P2) in 1.
- 8.
On the significance of the commentary literature see Kästle-Lamparter 2016.
- 9.
Hoesch concedes that there is a global right of free movement in the sense that every restriction on immigration has to be justified; but he tries to show that the special force that comes with attributing a right to be a human right only applies to national freedom of movement.
- 10.
We thank Nadine Mooren, James Banwell, Joseph Carens, Andreas Cassee, Matthias Hoesch, Nicolas Kleinschmidt, and Reinold Schmücker for their very helpful comments on several versions of this paper.
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Düring, J., Luft, C. (2020). Carens’s Cantilever Argument: Global Freedom of Movement, Logical Necessity and the Burden of Proof. In: Hoesch, M., Mooren, N. (eds) Joseph Carens: Between Aliens and Citizens. Münster Lectures in Philosophy, vol 6. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44476-1_10
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