Skip to main content

Abstract

During the crisis, the actions of the European Central Bank (ECB) were of immediate political significance for the entire EU and its legitimacy. The chapter first reviews the reforms of the EU’s economic governance framework, focusing on the new, broader, financial, and fiscal architecture post 2010. Secondly, it evaluates whether the observed financial market-driven austerity was connected or not to the traditional mechanisms of political legitimacy and accountability in the EU multi-level system. The chapter seeks to identify possible weaknesses in the EU’s crisis governance, if not able to explain the rise of populism in Europe on their own, at least building fertile ground for it, by exacerbating existing tensions.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

eBook
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 99.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    The following list paraphrases Macchiarelli (2016).

  2. 2.

    The following section substantially relies on Wiesner (2019b, c).

  3. 3.

    Finland (53), the UK (51), Slovenia (48), Malta (46), and Spain (44) were the countries with the highest implementation scores. In Luxembourg (23), Slovakia (29), Hungary (29), Germany (29), and Bulgaria (30), implementation was lowest.

  4. 4.

    It is increasingly accepted that the direction in which Europe is moving is that of creating a European Monetary Fund (EMF), in the shape of a reformed ESM. The European Commission has in fact recently made a proposal for transforming the ESM, currently an intergovernmental institution, into an EMF under EU law. See https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/635556/EPRS_BRI(2019)635556_EN.pdf.

  5. 5.

    The European Central Bank is accountable to the European Parliament and this a legal requirement according to the EU Treaties. In practice, this accountability takes mainly the form of a quarterly Monetary Dialogue between the president of the ECB and the European Parliament Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) Committee (see Chap. 5 for an evaluation).

References

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Corrado Macchiarelli .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2020 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Macchiarelli, C., Monti, M., Wiesner, C., Diessner, S. (2020). The EU’s Crisis Governance Versus Populism. In: The European Central Bank between the Financial Crisis and Populisms. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44348-1_3

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44348-1_3

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-44347-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-44348-1

  • eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics