Communication: Signs and Languages

Abstract

I believe that the operationalization process demonstrates the validity of Bateson’s assumption that knowledge comes from the perception of differences, which in turn allows for the perception of “objects” (technical descriptions) and the formation of “concepts” (technical definitions). Both “technical” descriptions and definitions are constructions of thought; that is, they are conceivable as emerging phenomena produced by the cognitive system. This chapter considers the communication process, where “communicating” means “making commonly available”, through a process of transmission, various thought content. Apart from telepathic transmissions, a set of signs seems indispensable; in fact, they represent the essence of every communication process. Following Bateson’s assumption, we can define a “sign” as any difference that is “observable” (or assumed) in relation to any “observed” (or assumed) relative uniformity (or regularity).

The following questions are addressed in this final chapter: What are signs (Sect. 4.1)? How can they serve as indicators of A’s thought content? What are the properties that enable B to elicit the thought content of A? How do signs acquire meaning and become languages (Sect. 4.2)? In particular, the chapter examines the process whereby languages are named, formed, and used and the application of Bateson’s theory to the problem of factual truth (Sect. 4.3) while offering some initial indication of the formation of laws and theories in science (Sect. 4.4).

The operationalization process suggests some developments that could be the subject of interesting investigations. The conclusion (Sect. 4.5) proposes some lines of development for further study:

• Cognition in people without some sense organs

• Nonverbal language

• Cognition and language in animals

• The Turing test and the Searle Chinese Room

• Emotions as dimensional states in the cognition process

In contradistinction to the classical problem of scientific inquiry that postulates first a description-invariant “objective world” (as if there were such a thing) and then attempts to write its description, now we are challenged to develop a description-invariant “subjective world”, that is, a world which includes the observer: This is the problem (von Foester 2003 , p. 248).

Proposition 5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.

Proposition 7. What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.

(Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus 1922 )

The linguistic sign, as defined, has two primordial characteristics. In enunciating them, I am also positing the basic principles of any study of this type.

Principle I: The Arbitrary Nature of the Sign

The bond between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary. Since I mean by sign the whole that results from the associating of the signifier with the signified, I can simply say: the linguistic sign is arbitrary (Ferdinand de Saussure 1916 , p. 67).

Principle II: The Linear Nature of the Signifier

The signifier, being auditory, is unfolded solely in time, from which it gets the following characteristics: (a) it represents a span, and (b) the span is measurable in a single dimension; it is a line (ibidem, p. 70).