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Examination of Defense Method for Tor User Specific Purpose Attacks by Dummy User Attached Communication

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Web, Artificial Intelligence and Network Applications (WAINA 2020)

Abstract

In recent years, the anonymous communication system Tor that prevents the user’s access destination website from being specified has become widespread. However, attack methods for anonymity are gradually evolving. As one of the attack methods, there is a “web fingerprint attack” that identifies the Web site accessed by the user from the characteristics of the flowing packets. Therefore, in this paper, we examine a defense method against fingerprint attack against Tor. We devised a method to rewrite the “user fingerprint information” in the access history of legitimate users by analyzing the Tor Hidden Service packet and accessing the target site and dummy site simultaneously using approximate routing with multiple Tor browsers did. This “dummy user generated noise” shows that the effect of fingerprint attack can be reduced.

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Correspondence to Motoharu Takahashi .

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Takahashi, M., Narita, M., Inomata, T., Sugino, E. (2020). Examination of Defense Method for Tor User Specific Purpose Attacks by Dummy User Attached Communication. In: Barolli, L., Amato, F., Moscato, F., Enokido, T., Takizawa, M. (eds) Web, Artificial Intelligence and Network Applications. WAINA 2020. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 1150. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44038-1_68

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