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Article 50 [Implementation of the Freedom of Establishment]

(ex-Article 44 TEC)

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Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – A Commentary

Part of the book series: Springer Commentaries on International and European Law ((SCIEL))

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Abstract

Article 50 TFEU empowers the Commission, Council and Parliament to act, by means of directives, with a view to attaining freedom of establishment as regards a “particular activity”. It is the “activity” that is the focus. Hence, the harmonising directives will treat a particular economic activity, such as professional (e.g. medical or legal or architectural) practice, financial service provision and so on.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Parliament/Council Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional qualifications, O.J. L 255/22 (2005).

  2. 2.

    Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. (ECJ 9 March 1999); Case C-208/00, Überseering (ECJ 5 November 2002).

  3. 3.

    Council Regulation (EEC) No 2137/85 on the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG), O.J. L 199/1 (1985).

  4. 4.

    Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 on the Statute for a European company (SE), O.J. L 294/1 (2001) and Council Directive 2001/86/EC supplementing the Statute for a European company with regard to the involvement of employees, O.J. L 294/22 (2001).

  5. 5.

    Council Regulation (EC) No 1435/2003 on the Statute for a European Cooperative Society (SCE), O.J. L 207/1 (2003) and Council Directive 2003/72/EC of 22 July 2003 supplementing the Statute for a European Cooperative Society with regard to the involvement of employees, O.J. L 207/25 (203).

  6. 6.

    Parliament/Council Directive 2007/36/EC on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies, O.J. L 184/17 (2007).

  7. 7.

    Generally, see Parliament/Council Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional qualifications, O.J. L 255/22 (2005).

  8. 8.

    Jung, in Becker et al. (2019), Article 50 AEUV para 8.

  9. 9.

    Truchot, in Pingel (2010), Article 44 CE para 5.

  10. 10.

    Parliament/Council Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, O.J. L 158/77 (2004).

  11. 11.

    Case C-302/97, Konle v Austria (ECJ 1 June 1999) para 22.

  12. 12.

    Case 305/87, Commission v Greece (Opinion of AG Jacobs of 30 May 1989) para 8; see also Case C-370/05, Festersen (ECJ 25 January 2007) para 22; Joined Cases C-515/99, C-519/99 to C-524/99 and C-526/99 to C-540/99, Reisch and others v Bürgermeister der Landeshauptstadt Salzburg (ECJ 5 March 2002).

  13. 13.

    Recital 2 of Parliament/Council Directive 2014/17/EU on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property, O.J. L 60/24 (2014).

  14. 14.

    Case C-208/00, Überseering (ECJ 5 November 2002).

  15. 15.

    See Case C-79/85, Segers v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor Bank (ECJ 1 July 1986).

  16. 16.

    Case C-143/87, Stanton v Inasti (ECJ 7 July 1988).

  17. 17.

    See Corapi and De Donno (2006), p. 1027 et seq.

  18. 18.

    Sørensen (2014), p. 95.

  19. 19.

    Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 on the Statute for a European company (SE), O.J. L 294/1 (2001).

  20. 20.

    Contaldi, in Tizzano (2014), Articolo 50 TFUE, p. 729.

  21. 21.

    To clarify further see Draetta and Pocar (2002).

  22. 22.

    See generally, Andenas and Wooldridge (2009) and Dine et al. (2006). For analysis of the harmonisation of laws and the integration process with reference to company law, see inter alia: Deakin (2000), Cremers (2013), Deakin (2006), Andreadakis (2008), Wymeersch (2001) and Shuannge (2013). See also: European Commission, Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union – A Plan to move Forward, COM(2003) 284 final; European Company Law Experts, Response to the European Commission’s Consultation on the Future of the European Company Law, May 2012. Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2075034; Reflection Group, Report of the Reflection Group on the Future of European Company Law, Brussels, 5 April 2011.

  23. 23.

    Recital 17 of Council Directive 2001/86/EC supplementing the Statute for a European company with regard to the involvement of employees, O.J. L 294/22 (2001).

  24. 24.

    Participation in a supervisory board (under a two-tier system) or management board (under a one-tier system), consultation and information through a body representing employees, or a collectively agreed solution akin to these.

  25. 25.

    As to the various phases in the evolution of company law harmonisation, and a summary of these measures see Gorriz (2016), pp. 1–14.

  26. 26.

    Halbhuber (2001).

  27. 27.

    See Joined Cases C-20/90, Karella and Karellas (ECJ 30 May 1991); Case C-441/93, Pafitis and Others v. TKE and Others (ECJ 12 March 1996); Case C-367/96, Kefalas and Others v. Elliniko Dimosio and Others (ECJ 12 May 1998).

  28. 28.

    Case C-441/93, Pafitis and Others v. TKE and Others (ECJ 12 March 1996); Case C-373/97, Diamantis v Elleniki Dimosio and Others (ECJ 23 March 2000).

  29. 29.

    While in some cases permitting the general meeting to authorise the management to actually take them, as long as this was within certain quantitative parameters set out by the company statutes or by the general meeting itself.

  30. 30.

    The Draft Fifth Directive was originally submitted by the Commission to the Council on 9 October 1972: Proposal for a Fifth Directive on the Structure of the public company, O.J. C 131/49 (1972). An amended proposal for a Fifth Directive was submitted by the Commission to the Council on 12 August 1983: The Structure of Public Limited Companies: Amended Proposal for a Fifth Directive, O.J. C 240 2 (1983). A further draft was produced in 1991, COM(91) 372 final, as amended by O.J. C 7/4 (1991) and O.J. C 321/9 (1991).

  31. 31.

    See the proposed amendment to the Shareholder Rights Directive, COM(2014) 213, and Directive 2017/828.

  32. 32.

    Reference is made to Gorriz (2016), pp. 1–14 for a comprehensive overview of some main measures adopted.

  33. 33.

    Indeed, it is possible that there will now be too much focus on this aspect. See ➔ para 60 et seq.

  34. 34.

    The Reflection Group of Experts avoided this in its Report of 2011, saying: “It is noted, of course, that ‘interest of the company’ may have a different legal meaning and connotation in the various legal systems and jurisdictions. In this framework of a higher-level review, a legal definition is not envisaged. In the current text the term ‘interest of the company’ is therefore used and should be understood in a general way.” Reflection Group, Report of the Reflection Group on the Future of European Company Law, Brussels, 5 April 2011, p. 38 fn. 84.

  35. 35.

    Reflection Group, Report of the Reflection Group on the Future of European Company Law, Brussels, 5 April 2011, p. 78.

  36. 36.

    See for example, Bohlhoff and Budde (1984).

  37. 37.

    See Gorriz (2016), pp. 1–14.

  38. 38.

    This commentary must for reasons of space focus on what the author sees as the core issues to be addressed in the near to medium term.

  39. 39.

    Santoro and Strauss (2013).

  40. 40.

    See Hopt (2000). See Commission Communication, Action Plan: European Company Law and corporate governance – a modern legal framework for more engaged shareholders and sustainable companies, COM(2012) 740 final; see the Commission’s analysis of the causes of the crisis including failures of corporate governance in and beyond the financial sector, at p. 3 et seq. See also High Level Group of Company Law Experts, A Modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe: A Consultative Document of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts. Available at https://www.eerstekamer.nl/eu/documenteu/a_modern_regulatory_framework_for/f=/vgklizzpd9we.pdf, and see Johnstone (2009).

  41. 41.

    According to the Deloitte Millennial Survey (2016), millennials continued to express positive views of business, and their opinions regarding businesses’ motivations and ethics had shown “stark improvement” in this survey. However, much scepticism remains, driven by the majority-held belief that businesses have no ambition beyond profit. Apparently almost nine in 10 (87 percent) believe that “the success of a business should be measured in terms of more than just its financial performance.” This is a widely held belief.

  42. 42.

    Generally see French (2012), pp. 26–38; Andenas and Wooldridge (2009), Chapter 2; Drury and Xuereb (1991); Cahn and Donald (2010); Charreaux (2004).

  43. 43.

    See generally, French (2012), pp. 29–38.

  44. 44.

    I myself use this notion in the sense of the company as a going concern, and the word “enterprise” in this sense.

  45. 45.

    See Charreaux (2004): “(T)he corporate governance theories have evolved towards more complex models involving all stakeholders and attributing greater importance to the productive/cognitive aspects of value-creation. This evolution, influenced by theories of the firm, leads to the considering of human capital as being more and more significant…. This growing complexity…has a better explanatory power. The recent developments result in a better understanding of the functioning and the evolution of the corporate governance systems, as much on the micro level as the macro level, in particular outside the Anglo-Saxon world.”

  46. 46.

    For a global overview of the application of these concepts in the context of directors’ duties, see Paolini (2014). For a discussion from the Anglo-Saxon perspective, with broader comment on the position in the common law world and in Europe, see also French (2012). See further, Drury and Xuereb (1991) and Andenas and Wooldridge (2009).

  47. 47.

    Bloomfield (2013), p. 384.

  48. 48.

    Bloomfield (2013), p. 386.

  49. 49.

    Yet, for Bloomfield, not knowing where to stop in identifying the relevant stakeholder interests posed a dilemma. For him, “(I)f companies observe their legal obligations for the development of their business in a sustainable fashion – in other words having appropriate and effective regard to minimising the external costs of their business that are borne by other stakeholders – they have gone as far as they need or should go in discharging any form of social obligation. It is the failure of the conventional definition of corporate governance to underline this ethical obligation that has partly led to the confusion over the fuzzy concept of corporate social responsibility” (p. 385).

  50. 50.

    Sir Alan Cadbury himself would later say that Corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance between economic and social goals and between individual and communal goals…the aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, corporations and society (Cadbury 1999).

  51. 51.

    Section 172 (1) of the UK Companies Act 2006 provides that: A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to—

    (a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, (b) the interests of the company’s employees, (c) the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, customers and others, (d) the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the environment, (e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct, and (f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company.

  52. 52.

    See generally Hill (2014), pp. 33–43.

  53. 53.

    French (2012), p. 484 et seq.

  54. 54.

    As mooted in the proposal for a revised Shareholder Rights Directive.

  55. 55.

    See for example, Keay (2008), p. 698.

  56. 56.

    See for example, the Report of the Reflection Group on the Future of EU Company Law (Brussels 5 April 2011. Available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1851654); the Commission Green Paper on The EU Corporate Governance Framework, COM(2011) 164 final (available at https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/3eed7997-d40b-4984-8080-31d7c4e91fb2/language-en); the Commission Consultation on the Future of European Company Law (20 February 2012. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/growth/content/consultation-future-european-company-law_en).

  57. 57.

    See Baums and Kruger Anderson (2008). See the webpage of the Aarhus University Department of Law. Available at http://law.au.dk/en/research/projects/european-model-company-act-emca/. See Kruger Andersen (2018).

  58. 58.

    COM(2012) 740 final. See generally, Geens and Hopt (2010).

  59. 59.

    International Finance Group, The EU Approach to Corporate Governance, 2008, p. 3.

  60. 60.

    Deloitte Millennial Survey (2016).

  61. 61.

    And they are. See for example, Craig and De Burca (2015), pp. 632–635.

  62. 62.

    Available at corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/01/26/eu-commission-proposes-action-plan-for-corporate-governance/.

  63. 63.

    Directive 2007/36/EC, O.J. L 184/17 (2007).

  64. 64.

    It is argued in this commentary that the concept of the ‘group interest’, and rules that secure it, must be accompanied by the proper articulation—and a common view of—the functions and duties of directors and shareholders in order that it may work effectively and fairly to direct group management down the appropriate path. In its Action Plan, the Commission reported that its consultation exercise had revealed that “the idea of a comprehensive legal EU framework covering groups of companies was met with caution.” COM(2012) 740 final, p. 15. Yet it remains unclear how one can hope to define the “group interest” without working on the scope and content of board and shareholder powers and duties.

  65. 65.

    The Explanatory Memorandum in the Proposal for a revision of the Shareholder Rights Directive (COM(2014) 213 final) reads as follows: “The financial crisis has revealed that shareholders in many cases supported managers’ excessive short-term risk taking. Moreover, there is clear evidence that the current level of ‘monitoring’ of investee companies and engagement by institutional investors and asset managers is sub-optimal. Institutional investors and their asset managers do not sufficiently focus on the real (long-term) performance of companies, but often on share-price movements and the structure of capital market indexes, which leads to suboptimal return for the end beneficiaries of institutional investors and puts short-term pressure on companies.

    Short-termism appears to be rooted in a misalignment of interests between asset owners and asset managers. Even though large asset owners tend to have long-term interests as their liabilities are long-term, for the selection and evaluation of asset managers they often rely on benchmarks, such as market indexes. Moreover, the performance of the asset manager is often evaluated on a quarterly basis. As a result, many asset managers’ main concern has become their short term performance relative to a benchmark or to other asset managers. Short-term incentives turn focus and resources away from making investments based on the fundamentals (strategy, performance and governance) and longer term perspectives, from evaluating the real value and longer-term value creative capacity of companies and increasing the value of the equity investments through shareholder engagement.”

  66. 66.

    Xuereb (1988a).

  67. 67.

    It is said that this is also the approach of the Commission. See Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, Martin Lipton, European Commission Proposes to Moderate Short-termism and Reduce Activist Attacks posted on Monday, April 14, 2014. Available at http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/european-commission/. Another interpretation of the Commission’s position is that it puts the long-term interests of the company first and foremost but the Commission declared in its paper that “(T)he initiatives in the area of corporate governance do not aim at altering the current approach, but ensure, by encouraging proper interaction between companies, their shareholders and other stakeholders, that this approach becomes more efficient.”. It would be a mistake, then, to read too much into what the Commission has proposed.

  68. 68.

    See especially, Xuereb (1988a).

  69. 69.

    See Strine (2010, 2014) and Xuereb (1985, 1986, 1987, 1988b, 1991).

  70. 70.

    All cited internet sources in this comment have been accessed on 9 December 2019.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Malta, Msida, Malta

    Peter G. Xuereb

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty for Economics, Law and Social Science, University of Erfurt, Erfurt, Germany

    Hermann-Josef Blanke

  2. Università degli Studi di Teramo, Teramo, Italy

    Stelio Mangiameli

List of Cases

List of Cases

  • ECJ 01.07.1986, C-79/85, Segers v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereninging voor Bank, ECLI:EU:C:1986:308 [cit. in para 18]

  • ECJ 07.07.1988, C-143/87, Stanton v Inasti, ECLI:EU:C:1988:378 [cit. in para 18]

  • ECJ 30.05.1989, C-305/87, Commission v Greece, ECLI:EU:C:1989:146 [cit. in para 15]

  • ECJ 30.05.1991, C-19/90 to C-20/90, Karella and Karellas, ECLI:EU:C:1991:229 [cit. in 29]

  • ECJ 12.03.1996, C-441/93, Panagis Pafitis and Others v Trapeza Kentrikis Ellados A.E. and Others, ECLI:EU:C:1996:9 [cit. in para 29]

  • ECJ 12.05.1998, C-367/96, Alexandros Kefalas and Others v Elliniko Dimosio (Greek State) and Organismos Oikonomikis Anasygkrotisis Epicheiriseon AE (OAE), ECLI:EU:C:1998:222 [cit. in para 29]

  • ECJ 01.06.1999, C-302/97, Konle v Austria, ECLI:EU:C:1999:271 [cit. in para 15]

  • ECJ 23.03.2000, C-373/97, Dionysios Diamantis v Elliniko Dimosio (Greek State) and Organismos Ikonomikis Anasygkrotisis Epicheiriseon AE (OAE), EU:C:2000:150 [cit. para 29]

  • ECJ 05.03.2002, C-515/99, C-519/99 to C-524/99 and C-526/99 to C-540/99, Reisch and others v Bürgermeister der Landeshauptstadt Salzburg, ECLI:EU:C:2002:135 [cit. in para 13]

  • ECJ 25.01.2007, C-370/05, Festersen, ECLI:EU:C:2007:59; [cit. in para 15]

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Xuereb, P.G. (2021). Article 50 [Implementation of the Freedom of Establishment]. In: Blanke, HJ., Mangiameli, S. (eds) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – A Commentary. Springer Commentaries on International and European Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43511-0_51

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