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Social Cognition and Autism Spectrum Disorders: From Mindreading to Narratives

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Cognitive Semiotics

Part of the book series: Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology ((PEPRPHPS,volume 24))

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Abstract

In this chapter I will work on the crucial role of semiotic narratives for social cognition. I will try to stress the key position that a semiotic theory of narrativity can occupy in explaining our capacity of attributing meaning to the others’ actions and understanding, through semiotic interactions analysis, social cognition’s impairments like Autism Spectrum Disorders in infants. I will be inspired by Shaun Gallagher and Daniel Hutto’s (2008) Narrative Practice Hypothesis (NPH) and I will try to develop the Narrative Practice Hypothesis using insights from the semio-tic tradition. Indeed, according to Hutto (2008, 2009), narratives are “representational artefacts”. However, a distinction between narratives and narrativity can be introduced and while narratives can be thought of as representational artefacts (Gallagher and Hutto 2019), semiotic narrativity cannot, since it is neither an artefact, and much less a representational one. In this chapter, I will outline what semiotic narrativity is and what its role can be for social cognition and Autism Spectrum Disorders.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    On the “performative function” of narratives, thought as “experience with” and irreducible both to representations and to the “experience of” something, see Matteucci 2019: 76–9.

  2. 2.

    For an overview, Clements and Perner 1994, Ellis 2009.

  3. 3.

    Low and Wang (2011) extended to infant data the original idea on mindreading in primates by Povinelli and Vonk (2004): no single behavioral experiment has been designed that can be uniquely explained by a mindreading account rather than behavioral rules. Shortly said, there are no experimental protocols intended to test mindreading capacities that could not also in principle be explained by the use of purely behavioral, non-mentalistic rules.

  4. 4.

    See also Povinelli and Vonk (2004) and, for the so called “Povinelli’s problem”, Lurz et al. (2014) and Andrews (2015: chap. 6).

  5. 5.

    See infra, § 8.

  6. 6.

    Here is the general scenario of those experiments: (1) Agent puts toy in A, or sees toy put in A. (2) Infant sees that the agent can see where the toy is. (3) The toy is shifted from A to B, but the agent is not in a position to see this. (4) Infant sees that the agent couldn’t see the shift. (5) When the agent still looks in B, there is a violation of the expectation of the infant. Infants’ looking time and places are recorded through eye-tracking techniques.

  7. 7.

    In their 2017 version of the experiment (with apes), Buttelmann et al. (2017) set up a second experiment in an “ignorance control condition” (the actor didn’t know which box contained the object), demonstrating that apes were not responding based on a rule like “whenever someone is ignorant about where his object is, he will be looking for it”. One of the main results of the Buttelmann et al. (2017)‘s study is that apes behaved exactly like infants in the Buttelmann et al. (2009)‘s experiments.

  8. 8.

    Of course, as we have usually done in this book, we do not use the term “content” in terms of truth-conditions, but in a semiotic sense.

  9. 9.

    Cf. Fusaroli et al. (2013). For a new perspective on embodiment, see Pennisi and Falzone 2017.

  10. 10.

    Hutto makes an important departure from classical theories of mind explicitly excluding prediction from it and concentrating only on explanation based on reasons.

  11. 11.

    Cf. Lorusso et al. (2012). See also Herman (2003: 165).

  12. 12.

    Cf. Danto 1985: 238. See also Mink 1978 and Talmy 2000. This fits perfectly well with Laura’s example in Gallagher and Hutto (2008: 26–8).

  13. 13.

    See Robichaud (2003: 39).

  14. 14.

    Gallagher and Hutto (2019) define narratives as “a special kind of representational artefacts” in order to i) distinguish narratives from action, ii) derive them from embodied experience and iii) avoid pan-narrativism. Summing up, according to enactivism, narrativity is derived from experience, while, according to cognitive semiotics, it shapes experience.

  15. 15.

    Cf. Greimas (1983). See also Lorusso et al. (2012).

  16. 16.

    The bibliography on this particular topic blends with the whole semiotic tradition and I believe that this is one of the most important discoveries of the whole discipline. However, a clear introduction can be found in Bertrand (2000) (chaps. 4 and 5). Of course, Greimas (1970, 1983) is the main developer of this idea.

  17. 17.

    See our NeMo European Project: https://site.unibo.it/nemoproject/en

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    Claudio Paolucci

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Paolucci, C. (2021). Social Cognition and Autism Spectrum Disorders: From Mindreading to Narratives. In: Cognitive Semiotics. Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology, vol 24. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42986-7_4

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