Abstract
As suggested by Goran Sonesson (2012: 208) in a seminal article, “cognitive semiotics has been invented many times during the last decades”. Cognitive semiotics can indeed be many things, and there are many ways to “invent” it. Some of these things and ways are de facto. Other things and other ways are de iure. I will not proceed to create a new invention. Rather, in this book I will try to clarify the articulation between what cognitive semiotics is de facto and what, in my perspective, should be able to be de iure.
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Notes
- 1.
“4e cognition” refers to a turn inside cognitive sciences and theory of mind that thinks of cognition being as embodied, extended, embedded and enacted. For an overview, see Rowlands 2010.
- 2.
A very important exception is Material Engagement Theory (Malafouris 2013), which explicitly refers to a semiotic perspective on cognition. More on that in this very same chapter.
- 3.
- 4.
Sonesson (2019) does not agree with El-Hani et al. (2009)’s interpretation, since, according to Sonnesson’s point of view, “animal mimicry, as well as phenomena of the human Lifeworld comparable to it, are in a sense the opposite of signs. It has often been observed, not only within speech act philosophy, but also by the semiotician Luis Prieto, that a sign can only function as such once it is recognized to be a sign. Animal mimicry, camouflage, and the like, in contrast, only work as such, to the extent that they are not perceived as signs”. I will come back to this important debate in a future work.
- 5.
Indeed, in his response to some of my solicitations at a conference on A Theory of Semiotics. Eco talked about the “theory of misguided inference” and he said that, although he no longer corrected the definition of “theory of lies” because of its enormous success, he believed that the idea of semiotic features should be extended to that of “error”, namely to cases where someone is wrong and does not deliberately lie. The classic example is Ptolemy. When he said that earth stays still at the center of the universe he was not lying, but he was wrong. Or, and this is the example given by Eco (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gSEEYdM7k9A), when a well-known Italian philosopher translates an English passage saying that “bees take bananas with sticks” he is not lying, but he is simply mistakenly translating “apes” with “bees”, since the Italian word for “bee” is “ape”. On this topic, see Gramigna 2020.
- 6.
I owe this idea to Paolo Leonardi (personal communication), even if Paolo used it in order to argue that truth has to be considered more important than falsity, since telling a lie is parasitic upon telling the truth.
- 7.
As it can be seen, “actant” is a neutral term in Greimas’ theory, which does not distinguish between subjects and anything else which causes something to happen (this distinction would be rather be in the “thematic roles”). In this way, Greimas does not even need to talk of “material agency”, since agency can be material from the very beginning.
- 8.
“Sense Making: The active adaptive engagement of an autonomous system with its environment in terms of the differential virtual implications for its ongoing form of life. The basic, most general form of all cognitive and affective activity manifested experientially as a structure of caring.” (Di Paolo et al. 2018, Glossary).
- 9.
“Participatory Sense Making: “Sense-making in the context of a social interaction as it is affected by coordination patterns, breakdowns, and recoveries undergone during social encounters. Participatory sense-making is how people understand each other and how they understand and act on the world together.” (Di Paolo et al. 2018; Glossary).
- 10.
See Lawrence 1991: 99–106.
- 11.
See Bacon 1993.
- 12.
But the true concrete activation of the Encyclopaedia idea in Eco is to be found in his novels according to the principle “whereof one cannot theorize, one must narrate” (see Paolucci 2017a).
- 13.
See Deleuze 1981: 157.
- 14.
- 15.
- 16.
See Fontanille 2004: 214.
- 17.
In Eco the semiotic ratio (1975) is a relationship between type and token. I cannot follow Eco on this point, as the type/token distinction seems to work virtually exclusively for the expression plane of verbal language and similar semiotic systems, while it would not appear to be adequate for taking account of what happens, for example, for visual or syncretic languages, where the existence of a type of expression is much more doubtful. Moreover, a type/token ratio would not seem to adequately describe what happens on the content plane. I would argue that ratio takes shape primarily between singularities, in the establishment of a commensurability relation.
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Paolucci, C. (2021). Cognitive Semiotics. Radical Enactivism, Pragmatism and Material Engagement. In: Cognitive Semiotics. Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology, vol 24. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42986-7_1
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