Abstract
One might expect a robust theory of human dignity in the writings of cosmopolitan thinkers. Cosmopolitans are thinkers who express an abiding interest in the variety of cultures and lifestyles within the human family.
This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.
Buying options
Notes
- 1.
Other U. N. examples in which dignity is basic are: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966); Declaration on the Rights of the Mentally Retarded (1971); Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1976); Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989); UN covenants may be found on the internet. In print see The United Nations Document Index vol. 5 (New York: United Nations, 2002–2003) published by the United Nations; also, Leland M. Goodrich, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents, 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).
Examples of dignity as basic in the constitutions of nation-states are: Nigeria (1999); South Africa (1996); Switzerland (1999); Finland (2000); Kingdom of Thailand (2007). Dignity (in the English translation) appears only in a sentence pronouncing “the uniformity and dignity of the socialist legal system.” The “Preamble” to The Constitution of Cuba (1992) claims that “… only under socialism and communism … can full dignity of the human being be attained.” National constitutions are online. They are printed in Constitutions of the Countries of the World, A. P. Blaustein and G. H. Flanz editors, 20 vols. (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1971–2010).
- 2.
Dr. Martin Luther King’s remarkable “Letter from a Birmingham Jail” contains the “dream of a positive peace where all men will respect the dignity and worth of human personality.” Available at: https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/king-papers/documents/letter-birmingham-jail: 10; “… solid rock of human dignity ….: 11.
- 3.
Rebecca Dresser, “Human Dignity and the Seriously Ill Patient,” in Human Dignity and Bioethics. Essays Commissioned by the President’s Council on Bioethics, edited by Adam Schulman and Thomas W. Merrill (Washington, DC: US Independent Agencies and Commissions, March, 2008).
- 4.
Daniel Dennett, “How to Protect Human Dignity from Science,” in Human Dignity and Bioethics, 39–59.
- 5.
John Ladd, “Translator’s Introduction,” in The Metaphysical Elements of Justice. Part I of the Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Co., 1999), xv.
- 6.
Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Lewis White Beck translator (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, Library of Liberal Arts, 1959), 66–67. Background to this remark is Kant’s self-defeating argument against determinism. This argument is not a proof that determinism is false, but rather the claim that, if we do live in a deterministic world, then what you think, say, or do is determined by natural causality. That entails that the determinist could not evoke the power of reason to support his/her determinism. What the determinist or anyone else should happen to claim would be the contingent product of natural causality and not the product of reasoning or logical force.
- 7.
The rule-constructing process begins with the understanding in the transcendental analytic section of The Critique of Pure Reason, which shows that concepts are rules, i.e., “horse” refers to all possible sensory configurations of a certain type.
- 8.
Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 54. It is difficult to see how utilitarians could make sense of human dignity on their own terms. They claim that pleasures and preferential satisfactions are scalable, but human beings per se are outside the scale, and as Kant says, create such scales.
- 9.
Avishai Margalit, “Human Dignity Between Kitsch and Deification,” The Hedgehog Review: Dignity and Justice, 9 (2007): 7–19.
- 10.
Margalit, “Human Dignity … , 18.
- 11.
Jonathan Glover cites the dignity-effacing tactic of the British to instill in the Indian population a sense of their own inferiority. At one point Indians in one town were made to crawl rather than walk. Jonathan Glover, Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001), 23. Steiner describes the Nazi will-breaking technique for destroying Jewish pride in their traditions of scholarship, intelligence, and order. With feigned urgency Jews were lined up and forced at gunpoint to run some distance in the hot sun and without water, from point A to point B, and then back to point A, and then run the same maddening race again, over and over again. Jean-Francois Steiner, Treblinka, Helen Weaver translator (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967), 22ff.
- 12.
Jeffrie Murphy, “The Elusive Nature of Human Dignity,” The Hedgehog Review: 20–31.
- 13.
Ibid., 23. Also, see Morris Cohen’s essay, “The Dark Side of Religion,” in The Faith of a Liberal. Selected Essays, in Morris R. Cohen (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1946), 337–361.
- 14.
Murphy, The Hedgehog Review, 24–25; Citing Robert Nozick, The Examined Life: Philosophical Meditations (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 237–239.
- 15.
Socrates notes in the Crito that two wrongs do not make a right. If this is correct, then even someone like Hitler or Charles Manson could be the victim of evil-doing, and from this it follows that evildoers too have dignity as persons. Moreover, if animals can be victims of evil-doing, then animals too have dignity.
- 16.
Murphy, The Hedgehog Review, 28.
- 17.
Raimond Gaita, A Common Humanity: Thinking About Love and Truth and Justice (London and New York: Routledge, 2000). Gaita learned of the conduct of Judge Landau from reading Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem. Primo Levi was the source for the care given the dying boy.
- 18.
Ibid., 5.
- 19.
Raimond Gaita, Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception, 2nd ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 337.
- 20.
Sian Miles, Simone Weil: An Anthology (New York: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986), 5; Miles quotes from Simone Weil, Waiting on God, Emma Craufurd translator (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1951).
- 21.
Gaita, Good and Evil, xviii, quoting Simone Weil’s Science, Necessity and the Love of God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 81.
- 22.
Ibid. Quoting from Weil’s “Forms of the Implicit Love of God,” in Simone Weil, Waiting on God, Emma Craufurd translator (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1951), 143.
- 23.
Cited by Lucinda Vardey, Mother Teresa: A Simple Path (New York: Ballantine Books, 1995), xxxi.
- 24.
The nuns and volunteers have for themselves only one pair of sandals, a bucket, a metal plate, a few utensils, and sparse bedding. They work to alleviate people of the five sufferings: physical, mental, emotional, financial, and spiritual. They are not Christian proselytizers, but encourage each afflicted person to seek his/her spiritual relief, whatever it may be.
- 25.
Gaita, Good and Evil, 155; A Common Humanity, xviii.
- 26.
Miles, Simone Weil: An Anthology, 51.
- 27.
Ibid.
- 28.
Gaita, Good and Evil, xv.
- 29.
On self-hatred see Carl Goldberg’s analysis of negative personal identity in his Speaking with the Devil: A Dialogue with Evil (New York: Viking Press, 1996); Also, Eric Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1992); Robert K. Ressler and Thomas Schachtman, Whoever Fights Monsters: My Twenty Years Tracking Serial Killers for the FBI (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993); and Gaita’s Good and Evil, 336.
- 30.
Ibid.
- 31.
Amartya Sen, “Equality of What?” in Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1, edited by S. McMurrin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
- 32.
Martha C. Nussbaum, The Frontiers of Justice. Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Cambridge, MA and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2006).
- 33.
Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 14.
- 34.
She states that there are three types of capabilities, basic, internal, and combined. Basic capabilities are innate, and develop rather rapidly. They are necessary for having “more advanced” capabilities. Seeing, hearing, and language-recognition are examples. Internal capabilities are developed states of a person, mature states ready to be acted upon if one chooses. She offers examples of sexual functioning, language use, religious freedom, and freedom of speech. Combined capabilities are internal capabilities and those external conditions necessary for their functioning. A person in a nondemocratic regime may have the internal capacity to appraise public officials and vote accordingly, but the regime may not allow the exercise of this capability. However, it is clear that all capacities require something external in order to be developed. Even the most basic capabilities require that someone establish the meaning of the world for the child.
- 35.
Nussbaum, Frontiers, 76–78; Women, 78–80.
- 36.
Nussbaum, Frontiers, 181.
- 37.
Ibid., 166.
- 38.
Nussbaum, Frontiers, 182. Nussbaum confirmed the intuitive importance of items on the list through a detailed, in-person discussion with women in India. See Women … , xvi. Different societies may support the realization of these capabilities in different ways according to their histories. One can imagine that one society offers health insurance, another society offers free neighborhood clinics, yet another village is administered by itinerant doctors and nurses. All in all, the capabilities provide a “moral core” of a political conception, and this moral core is free-standing, independent of any metaphysical or religious or other comprehensive conception.
- 39.
Nussbaum, Women, 91.
- 40.
Ibid., 72.
- 41.
Ibid., 302–303.
- 42.
Ibid., 2.
- 43.
Ibid., 73.
- 44.
Ibid., 74.
- 45.
Ibid., 161. Kantian dignity is rejected because the idea of a person as an end-in-itself is tied to his rationalism and would therefore exclude “people with mental impairments” (171). Respect and dignity must be “recast” to extricate them from Kantian rationalism (177).
- 46.
Ibid., 171.
- 47.
Amartya Sen, “Capability and Well-Being,” in The Quality of Life, edited by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 43. An alternative to capabilities would be to distinguish basic biological needs, cultural needs, and instrumental needs. Health would be one of the basic biological needs; ability to critically develop a plan for life would be cultural; having pots to cook with would be instrumental.
- 48.
After all the major impetus behind capabilities theory in both Sen and Nussbaum is personal freedom.
- 49.
Dignity and nobleness, are not synonymous. Dignity is something possessed by virtue of a relation to something else, whereas noble refers to behavior which may only be manifested by a being with dignity.
- 50.
Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac with Essays on Conservation from Round River (New York: Ballantine Books, 1966), 102–103. Alexander Wilson, writing in American Ornithology early in the 1800s states in a similar vein that ivory billed woodpeckers (alas, now extinct) “have dignity” as they soar above their homes high up in giant cypress trees. Cited by Edward O. Wilson, The Future of Life (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 2002), 104.
- 51.
Nussbaum, Women … , 72–73.
- 52.
Aurel Kolnai asks whether dignity has “a categorial status of its own … bordering on the ethical and the aesthetical .…” “Dignity,” Philosophy 51 (1976): 255.
- 53.
By “transcendence” is meant abandonment of a former state in obtaining a new, qualitatively superior state at or approximating a difference in kind.
- 54.
David Hume, Essays: Moral, Political and Literary, Eugene F. Miller editor (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1985), 80–86.
- 55.
Some of these conditions: (1) atomic elements necessary for chemical replication; (2) a stable, external source of energy; (3) water; and (4) absence of crushing gravity, lethal radiation or prohibitive cold or heat; a source of energy such as solar, chemical, or lightning.
- 56.
Richard E. Michod, “Population Biology of the First Replicators: On the Origin of Genotype, Phenotype, and Organism,” American Zoologist, 23 (1983): 5–14.
- 57.
This is proto-intentionality, directedness outward. See W. Tecumseh Fitch, “Nano-Intentionality—A Defense of Intrinsic Intentionality,” Biology and Philosophy, 23 (2008): 157–177.
- 58.
See the relevant chapters in David P. Clark and Nanette J. Pazderik, Molecular Biology, 2nd ed. (Waltham, MA: Elsevier Academic Cell, 2012); Also, see John Baez’s short overview of subcellular ‘life’ on the web, http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/subcellular.html#Viruses. Whether these entities, such as viruses, viroids, virusoids, plasmids, are “alive” or not is problematic.
- 59.
William James, The Principles of Psychology, Vol. I. (New York: Dover Publications, 1950), 8. This is James’ position on knowledge of other minds as well. See Michael DeArmey, “William James and Other Minds,” Southern Journal of Philosophy, XX (1982): 325–336.
- 60.
Mark Bedau, “Goal-Directed Systems and the Good,” The Monist, 75 (1992): 34–51. For a classic discussion of body ‘hydraulics’ and other internal functions see Walter. B. Canon, The Wisdom of the Body. Revised edition (New York: W. W. Norton, 1963).
- 61.
Ibid., 46.
- 62.
Kolnai, 256.
- 63.
Paul Taylor, Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986). I have supplemented Taylor’s theory with need fulfillment/nonfulfillment, which I consider preferable to the language of “capabilities” in Nussbaum’s writings.
Let’s imagine that humans and other life forms are now extinct. Amid the objects left in this lifeless world is an antique wooden clock on a shelf in a storage facility. A tremor causes a can of wood preservative to fall off the shelf. It bounces on a lower shelf, popping the lid off, and the wood preservative drains on the clock. This was good for the clock. Does this mean the clock has a good of its own, and therefore should respected if we reintroduce humans back into the world? And what about stalactites and stalagmites? They can be harmed by tremors and benefited by mineral rich moisture. This difficulty can be resolved by positing that something has a good of its own only if it has parts that function to serve its own good. Clocks and stalactites have no movements which can be rightly described as striving to fulfill needs.
- 64.
Adolf Portmann, Animals as Social Beings (New York: Harper & Row, 1961).
- 65.
Daniel Dennett, “True Believers; the Intentional Strategy and Why It Works,” in Scientific Explanation, edited by A. F. Heath (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1981), 53–75.
- 66.
Melanie Steinkus, “Dennett’s Intentional Strategy Applied to Animals,” Res Cogitans, 6 (2015): 29–35.
- 67.
Raimond Gaita, Good and Evil, 116–118. These claims are certainly misguided. Telic animals certainly have different personalities. Animals occupy contrary positions in human societies. On the one hand they are merely property, on the other hand laws protect them from human cruelty. Be that as it may, surely Gaita forgets that there are countless human beings for whom no biography could be written other than citing repetitive daily routines and common relationships.
- 68.
Nussbaum, Frontiers, 326.
- 69.
Ibid., 325.
- 70.
Ibid., 325. This was reaffirmed by the High Court of Madras in which Indian Supreme Court Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer was cited as holding that maltreatment of animals goes against the teachings of “… the Vedas, the Bible, the Koran, the Buddha and Mahavire and the Supreme miracle … humanism cannot be halved by denying it to prehuman brethren …. all life is too divinely integral to admit of unnatural dichotomy as man and animal. …” Cited online in K. Madhaven vs. The District Collector on 4 September, 2008. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/757246/.
- 71.
Two examples of the all-too tragic nature of animal life. For weeks I watched a female wood thrush fly back and forth to feed and care for her hungry brood. Then one morning a small boy walked by, pellet gun in hand, holding the mother wood thrush upside down by her spindly legs, while nearby the poor hatchlings called out for her. The proud smile on the boy’s triumphant face was in sharp contrast with the distressed chirping of the now dying hatchlings.
An even more heartbreaking example is this from amateur naturalist and children’s storybook writer Thorton Burgess. For years Burgess had been observing the New England heath hen (Tympanuchus cupido):
The female hens nested on a protected portion of Martha’s Vineyard, and were flourishing there until a fire wiped out all the hens, who would not budge from their nests. After the fire only six males survived. The next spring these six returned to the field where they had for untold generations gathered for their courtship ritual. The year after that, only four returned, but those four birds went through all courting rituals as ardently as if the bright admiring eyes of love were in truth watching every move. In 1929 the four had been reduced to one, a heartbreaking picture of utter loneliness .… [he] emerge[d] from the thick cover of scrub oak .…The display, dance and call were repeated many times .… It was a shear, stark tragedy watching that lone bird displaying all his charms, calling for a mate after the manner of his race down through thousands of years …. Thorton W. Burgess, Now I Remember (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1960), 180.
- 72.
Frans de Waal, The Age of Empathy. Nature’s Lessons for a Kinder Society (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2009), 52.
- 73.
Waal, 54.
- 74.
Adolf Portmann did pioneering work in biosemiotics and biosemantics. See Karel Kleisner, “The Semantic Morphology of Adolf Portmann: A Starting Point for the Biosemiotics of Organic Form?” Biosemiotics, 1 (2008): 207–219.
- 75.
Marc Bekoff and Jessica Pierce, Wild Justice, The Moral Lives of Animals (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 59–60.
- 76.
Stephen T. Emlen and Sandral Vehrencamp, “Cooperative Breeding Strategies Among Birds,” in Perspectives in Ornithology, Alan H. Brush and George A. Clark, Jr. (Cambridge, London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 94ff.
- 77.
See Marc Bekoff, The Emotional Lives of Animals (Novato, CA: New World Library, 2007). Also, Mark Rowlands, Can Animals Be Moral? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 200.
- 78.
Waal, 52–54 and 78–79; Also, see Dan Zahavi, Self-Awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1999).
- 79.
Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex, 2nd ed. (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1898), 103.
- 80.
Ibid., 107.
- 81.
Ibid., 101.
- 82.
Ibid.
- 83.
Peter Kropotkin, Mutual Aid, a Factor in Evolution (London: William Heinemann, 1910).
- 84.
Robert Axelrod has shown that in certain cases cooperation increases the chances for survival and well-being over noncooperative strategies for a species. Once started, cooperation tends to grow. It “can get started by even a small cluster of individuals who are prepared to reciprocate cooperation … it can protect itself from invasion by uncooperative strategies.” The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 173.
In Unto Others, The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), Elliot Sober and David Sloan Wilson, examine altruism from the standpoint of the biologist, who is not concerned with motivation but only the survival value of behavior in which the helping agent risks something in helping another. They defend the position that nature selects both individuals (faster running zebras over slower zebras) and groups (monkeys with sentinels prosper better than monkeys without sentinels). Mark Rowlands cites interesting example of three different alarm calls among velvet monkeys (200). Sober and Wilson point out that if a group is a mixture of altruists and egoists, then the egoists will benefit from altruistic behavior, multiply and displace the altruists. On the other hand, groups of only altruists outperform mixed groups, which is turn outperform groups of selfish individuals (6 vs. 3 vs. 0). Sober and Wilson cite a controlled experiment with guppies. Guppies preferred as companions those guppies which had functioned to inspect whether a predator was hungry. See L. A. Dugatkin and M. Alfieri, “Guppies and the Tit for Tat Strategy: Preference Based on Past Interaction,” Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 28 (1991): 243–246.
- 85.
In 1963 and 1964 W. D. Hamilton published articles claiming that altruism exists only in cases involving kin. This became known as “kinship selection.” Subsequent research has shown that kinship selection is not universal. For example, in studies of elephant groups in Amboseli National Part, care/helpfulness was found to exist among unrelated individuals. In times of stress elephants give each other reassuring gestures. They bunch up and encircle their young when threatened. One researcher found that “While kinship explained some of the variability in affiliative relationships, the amount to time two animals spent within 5 m of each other was actually a better predictor of how often they engaged in social rubbing or greeted each other after being separated ….” Elizabeth A. Archie, Cynthia J. Moss, and Susan C. Alberts, “Friends and Relations: Kinship and the Nature of Female Elephant Social Relationships,” in The Amboseli Elephants. A Long-Term Perspective on a Long-Lived Mammal, edited by Cynthia J. Moss, Harvey Croze, and Phyllis C. Lee (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2011), 243. J. Baird Callicott has pointed out to me that while all altruistic behavior may have originated with kin, natural selection may have favored larger groups with affiliations transcending kinship. For an extensive discussion of biological ethics see J. Baird Callicott, Thinking Like a Planet: The Land Ethic and the Earth Ethic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
- 86.
Donald Davidson, “Rational Animals,” in Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, edited by E. LePore and B. McLaughlin (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), 475.
- 87.
Rowlands, 54.
- 88.
A plausible view is that animals develop universals from repeated encounters, e.g., lots of particular trees and the animal acquires the universal, “tree.” Not that it “has” a mental representation of a general tree (whatever that might be), but that a perceived particular is taken as a particular type.
- 89.
James. J. Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (New York: Psychology Press Taylor and Francis Group, 1986). J. J. Gibson describes the perceptual field for animals and humans alike as first and foremost a three- dimensional, geometrical “layout” with a collateral appraisal of what the environment “affords.”
- 90.
Joel Feinberg, “Autonomy,” in The Inner Citadel. Essays on Individual Autonomy, edited by John Christman (New York and Oxford, 1989), 27–53.
- 91.
The Principles of Psychology, Volume 1, 298–299.
- 92.
Sees Alfred R. Mele, Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
- 93.
William James, The Principles of Psychology, 2 vols. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1890), 1, 459. James says “The mind can always intend, and know when it intends, to think of the Same.”
- 94.
G. F. Kroustov, “Formation and Highest Frontier of the Implemental Activity of Anthropoids,” reprinted in Phillip V. Tobias, The Brain in Hominid Evolution (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1971), 123. He says “… the decisive step of using a tool to make a tool was impossible for the ape under these experimental conditions.” The neural basis for the epoche may be inhibition of some neural processes by other neural processes. See Bjorn Albrecht et al., “Response Inhibition Deficits in Externalizing Child Psychiatric Disorders: An ERP-Study with the Stop-Task,” Behavioral and Brain Functions, 1 (2005): 22. This is an online journal: www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com. Behavioral inhibition may be separated into three interrelated processes called “inhibition of the initial prepotent response to an event,” “‘stopping of an ongoing response,” and “interference control.”
- 95.
Peter Gảrdenfors cites with approval A. M. Glenberg’s theory of detached representations: “The suppression of information coming in from reality … [is] Probably performed by the frontal lobe of the brain where planning, fantasizing, and executive control functions take place.” We can, Gảardenfors says, “quarantine” reality. Peter Gảrdenfors, How Homo Became Sapiens: On the Evolution of Thinking (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 2003), quoting A. M. Glenberg, “What Memory Is For,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 20 (1997): 1–19. It is probable that there are two selective pressures in hominid evolution that created the ability to bracket. Selective pressure directed hominids not only in the manufacture of tools but also to ‘mind-reading’ among interacting members of a group struggling to cooperate in dividing up tasks. Mark Rowlands notes that this latter also opens the door to deception, for him a characteristic of primates. See his The Philosopher and the Wolf, Lessons from the Wild on Love, Death and Happiness (New York: Pegasus Books), 75ff.
- 96.
Cited in Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, 2 vols. (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1935), 2, 369. Hubert Dreyfus would find favor in James as a proponent of “pluralistic realism.” Dreyfus says “I want to be a plural realist .… There are a lot of different descriptions of reality, and several of them … can get it right .…” “Starting Points: An Interview with Hubert Dreyfus,” The Harvard Review of Philosophy, XIII (1) (2005): 146.
- 97.
No doubt Hitler and Manson enjoyed receiving compliments. Manson seems delighted in communicating to people how wicked he is, as is clear from prison interviews. As for Kant, in the Metaphysics of Morals (210) he states that one “cannot deny all respect to even a vicious man as a human being.” On the same page Kant states that even a vicious person “… can never lose entirely his predisposition to do good.”
- 98.
Carl Goldberg, The Evil We Do. The Psychoanalysis of Destructive People (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2000), 68.
- 99.
Ibid., 82.
- 100.
Peter Singer, “A Utilitarian Defense of Animal Liberation,” reprinted in Environmental Ethics, 6th ed. Louis Pojman and Paul Pojman editors (Boston: Wadsworth, 2012), 71–80.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2020 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
DeArmey, M.H. (2020). Cosmopolitanism and Dignity. In: Cosmopolitanism and the Evils of the World. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42978-2_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42978-2_3
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-42977-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-42978-2
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)