Israel and the Non-Proliferation Regime—Israel is fully committed to non-proliferation of nuclear weaponss, and to participation in international efforts to prevent their spread. Israel thus recognizes the value of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and supported its adoption in 1968 in the UN General Assembly. However, a global regime like the NPT has limited relevance in the Middle East. Its weakness in the Middle East, has been demonstrated by four cases of violations of the Treaty’s basic obligations, namely by Iraq, Libya, Syria and Iran. Syria’s use of chemical weapons is a recent use by a Middle Eastern country of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Based on the poor track record of NPT compliance in the region, Israel does not see NPT membership as a goal in and of itself, but rather, as potential means for enhancing security for all states. In this regard, Israel does not believe that NPT membership serves or would enhance its national security.

Israel’s long held vision of a more secure and peaceful Middle East, requires that all regional states engage in a process in direct and sustained dialogue to address the broad range of regional security challenges in the Middle East.

Such a dialogue, based on the widely accepted principle of consensus, can only emanate from within the region, and address in an inclusive manner, the threat perceptions of all regional parties with a view to enhance and improve their security. Direct contact, combined with trust and confidence building, is an essential basis for the creation of a new security paradigm in a region that is increasingly fraught with wars, conflicts, disintegration of national territories and human suffering. However, this noble idea is unfortunately detached from the volatile regional realities.

It is clear that the prerequisite for regional discussions on establishment of a mutually, effectively, and verifiable zone free of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), is mutual recognition. Mutual recognition do not currently exist in the Middle East, where the majority of Arab States, as well as the Islamic Republic of Iran, do not even recognize the existence of the State of Israel, and some even openly and explicitly threaten to destroy it.

Anti-Israel Initiatives, like the one in New York (November 2019), will only succeed in undermining the real regional security challenges, including those in the nonproliferation realm. Israel hope that the day would come where the Arab group will become interested in creating a constructive work plan to promote confidence and security in the region and not in singling out Israel and play into the hands of Iran.

Israeli Perspective on the Non-Proliferation Challenges—Israel cope with many non-proliferation challenges. The major challenge relates to Iran’s persistent strategic aspirations to acquire nuclear weaponss, coupled with it ballistic missile program, terror support, and destabilizing regional behavior.

Iran’s threats to expand its nuclear program are a blatant attempt to extort the international community. The recent revelations of Iranian undeclared activities require a clear and collective message to be sent to Iran—the world will not accept Iran’s continued reprehensible conduct in the nuclear realm.

The information revealed by Israel in the nuclear archive clearly proves that Iran continued its activities related to the development of a military nuclear weaponss program. These activities included the protection, preservation and massive concealment of capabilities, information, undeclared activities and nuclear materials.

Iran continues to deceive the international community, while failing to provide clear and honest information regarding its nuclear program, as part of its CSA and safeguards commitments. These are not activities, which indicate a civilian nuclear program. These activities clearly indicate that a nuclear weaponss program existed, is being maintained, and can be restored in the future.

The second challenge concerns Syria’s nuclear program. This is an unfinished business, since the IAEA’s investigation has never been exhausted due to lack of cooperation from Syria. As is well known, Syria built jointly with the DPRK a clandestine nuclear reactor, which was revealed and destroyed in 2007. Had this nuclear reactor been completed and operated, it would have been ideally-suited to produce plutonium for nuclear weaponss purposes. Needless to say, the construction of such a reactor was done in blatant violation of Syria’s NPT safeguards obligations, as it should have been declared to the IAEA.

The third non-proliferation challenge concerns potential proliferation from the DPRK to the Middle East. After its cooperation with Syria to build a secret nuclear reactor, Israel is concerned about future potential cooperation in the nuclear domain and other weapons of mass destruction with state and non-state actors in our region.

The forth challenge in Israel’s perspective concerns nuclear energy in the Middle East. In recent years there is a growing interest in the construction of nuclear research and power reactors in our region. Israel does not object to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the Middle East, (conditioned upon):

  • As long as its guaranteed exclusive use for peaceful purposes.

  • Complete respect by countries that would like to embark on a nuclear energy program for relevant international non-proliferation obligations and commitments. Joining the Additional Protocol is a prerequisite for the supply of nuclear technology to new countries.

  • Associated fuel cycle technologies, which are the proliferation risk, must be avoided. The suppliers should avoid the sale of any such technologies to new countries. Second, regional countries themselves must commit not to build or purchase such technologies as a condition for the supply of nuclear reactors.

  • Certain nuclear reactors should be supplied as a “black box”, according to the build-own-operate model. By certain reactors we mean those that are more proliferation resistant (light water, low enrichment fueled reactors). In order to sustain a black box model, the supplier has to guarantee a life-time fuel supply. It is also necessary to agree in advance on solutions for spent fuel take-back.

  • Finally, the buyer country must commit to adopt and implement international standards for nuclear safety and security, including emergency preparedness and response.

One of the major non-proliferation challenge in Israel’s view generally concerns the presence and active involvement of non-state actors in our region, which pose a potential nuclear security threat for the region. Non-state actors already pose a direct threat to Israel’s national security, having been a victim of terrorist and rocket attacks against civilian population. Regional non-state actors enjoy state support as they are actively supported, funded and trained mainly by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Additionally, they possess a large number of rockets and missiles, which cover the entire territory of the State of Israel. Non-state actors’ interest in getting access to non-conventional weapons is a serious threat and challenge in Israel’s view. For its part, Israel has taken comprehensive measures to reduce the risk of theft or sabotage in its nuclear centers, as well as radiological materials used in medicine, industry and other sectors.

Israeli Perspective on Nuclear Security—Today, more than ever, nuclear security and safety must be at the forefront of global concern. Threats to nuclear security and safety know no boundaries. In light of these destabilizing elements, we cannot ignore the repeated and explicit threats made by Iran and its proxies to attack Israel’s nuclear sites.

These outrageous threats require Israel to take action and continue to protect and defend its nuclear facilities. These facilities are constantly upgraded and reinforced, in line with IAEA safety guidelines, in order to withstand any attack.

Israel strongly encourages regional cooperation in this context. Israel has repeatedly expressed its willingness to collaborate with all of its neighbors on safety and security issues. Israel is committed to act jointly with all states in its region for the shared goal of promoting and strengthening nuclear security. Israel supports the 2016 NSS Joint Statement on Sustaining Action to Strengthen Global Nuclear security. We also joined the Nuclear security Contact Group, aiming towards facilitating cooperation and engagement on nuclear security, following the conclusion of the NSS process.

A further key aspect of this goal is the development of technologies the make nuclear materials safer, and assists in responding to an incident of nuclear terrorism.

In this regard, Israel has established a national forensics laboratory, which takes part in the global effort to promote the science and applications of nuclear forensics. This laboratory collaborates with the parties to the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. The Israel National Laboratory for Nuclear Forensics aims to assist in investigation of criminal events and emergencies involving radioactive or nuclear materials.

The laboratory uses a variety of techniques to characterize materials, including nuclear counting, analytical chemistry, radiation measurements, and various radiography techniques. The main roles of the laboratory are:

  • Characterization of the radioactive or nuclear material in order to determine its production site, production date, intended use, and the route from production site to the crime scene;

  • Assisting the police in handling “classic” forensic evidence contaminated with radioactive material;

  • The laboratory operates in collaboration with the Division of Identification and Forensic Science (DIFS) of the Israel Police and with Israel’s emergency response organizations, as well as with the world’s leading nuclear forensic laboratories.

Israel is a country, which faces explicit terrorist threats, including the launching of rockets at its civilian population and nuclear research centers, is deeply aware of the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism. Israel is ready to assist and contribute to any international effort to curtail it. Israel’s highly developed technology, bilateral collaborations, and active participation in IAEA training and professional programs maintain Israel at the first line of defense against such threat.

Israel continues to follow closely IAEA guidance, regarding the security of nuclear facilities, and the protections of materials used in nuclear research and applications. Israel has ratified the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM), and has fulfilled its commitments, including the submission of a report on its national legislative implementation of the Convention, as required by Article 14. The international community can rest assure that Israel upholds the highest standard of physical protection measures in its nuclear centers, in accordance with international standards and obligations, as well as national legislation and best practices. Israel has also signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Periodic national preparedness and response exercises are conducted, with the participation of international observers and partners.

Israel’s national representatives regularly engaged in IAEA Incident and Emergency Center exercises. Moreover, Israel has joined the IAEA Response and Assistance Network as part of its commitment to global and regional collaboration. Israel continues to contribute both financially and in kind to the IAEA’s Division of Nuclear security, by providing radiation detector systems to IAEA member states.

Israeli Perspective on Nuclear Safety—An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Integrated Nuclear safety Assessment of Research Reactors (INSARR), mission held in Israel few years ago. The purpose of the mission was to conduct a peer-review of the safety of the IRR-1 Reactor, located in the Soreq Nuclear Research Center (SNRC). The mission included IAEA safety experts as well as international experts in the field of nuclear safety from five countries. The INSARR is a peer review of the safety of research reactors that is conducted based on the IAEA safety standards. Israel’s decision to invite the IAEA mission is part of international efforts, led by the IAEA, to study and apply the lessons learned from the March 2011 nuclear accident in Fukushima, Japan. The IAEA peer review team noted the strengthening of the national regulatory system to enhance independence and the efforts of the operator to enhance reactor safety. The team also noted areas of good practices and provided the Israel Atomic Energy Commission with recommendations and suggestions for further safety improvements. “By requesting this mission, Israel has made a strong statement about their commitment to nuclear safety and to continuous improvement,” INSARR Team Leader, James Lyons, said.

Along with other IAEA Member States, the State of Israel dedicates considerable resources to upholding and strengthening nuclear safety. The Government of Israel affirmed the independent status of the Nuclear Licensing and Safety Office. Furthermore, Israel established a Nuclear Safety Committee, which is a public committee made up of former public figures and security, and reports directly and annually to the prime minister.

Israel also maintains cooperation with several leading countries in the field of nuclear safety. Israel is actively participate in four IAEA’s safety standards committees: nuclear safety (NUSSC); radiation safety (RASSC); the safety of radioactive waste (WASSC); the safe transport of radioactive material (TRANSSC) and above all in the Commission on Safety Standards (CSS) which oversees the IAEA safety standards program.

Though it considers the chances for radiation emission from its nuclear centers as very low, Israel conducts national preparedness exercises and has put in place a contingency plan for such a scenario.

This article could not be completed without the quote from Salvador De Madariaga:

The trouble with disarmament was (and still is) that the problem is tackling upside down and at the wrong end…Nations don’t distrust each other because they are armed; they are armed because they distrust each other. And therefore to want disarmament before a minimum of common agreement on fundamentals is as absurd as to want people to go undressed in winter. Let the winter be warm, and they will undress readily enough without committees to tell them so.