Abstract
This chapter envisages the impact of regulation on fintech and its effects on the credit-transformation processes, which find direct execution though algorithms and software. It focuses also on the possibility of high-tech regulation and supervision over operational forms that allow capital to circulate from subjects in surplus to others in deficit. In conclusion, the chapter suggests that regulators should be arbiters influencing the shape finance is assuming because of fintech, more than the influencer leading finance to higher standards of technological efficiency.
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Notes
- 1.
It refers to FSB 2020 “Global Monitoring Report on Non-Bank Financial Intermediation 2019”, which highlighted that interconnectedness between banks and OFIs through credit and funding relationships has been largely unchanged since 2016. See also FSB, 2017 “Artificial intelligence and machine learning in financial services. Market developments and financial stability implications”, 1 November.
- 2.
See Nemitz, P. F. 2018 “Constitutional Democracy and Technology in the age of Artificial Intelligence” Royal Society Philosophical Transactions.
- 3.
It is also worth recalling that information and data have been already investigated as both ‘raw material’ and ‘finished goods’ of the ICT industry, so the analysis had to recall that the current rules seem to be not yet able to drive the high-tech automatic mechanisms of collection and production of information and data towards the best outcome for the common welfare. Indeed, the understanding did not conclude that the aforesaid rules are suitable for the proper functioning of algorithms and software as cognitive functions of artificial intelligence, provided that big data and artificial intelligence combine themselves without the possibility of supervising their compliance with the liberal, illuminist, social, democratic evolution of the individual rights.
- 4.
It is worth recalling the considerations of Barcellona E. 2019 “Control enhancing mechanisms e governance della società a responsabilità limitata: quali limiti all’autonomia privata?” in Orizzonti del diritto commerciale, p. 61 ff.
- 5.
It refers to ESMA 2019 “Report. Licensing of FinTech business models” 12 July.
In addition, see Arner, D. W. and Barberis, J. N.and Buckley, R. P. 2016 “FinTech, RegTech and the Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation”, University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law Re-search Paper No. 2016/035; Berríos, M. R. 2013 “The Relationship between Bank Credit Risk and Profitability and Liquidity” The International Journal of Business and Finance Research.
- 6.
It refers to Banca d’Italia 2017 “FinTech In Italia. Indagine conoscitiva sull’adozione delle innovazioni tecnologiche applicate ai servizi finanziari”, Roma; Bank of England, Quarterly Bulletin 2019 Q1, “Embracing the promise of fintech”.
- 7.
It refers to IMF’s analysis made by Taylor, R. C. and Wilson, C. and Holttinen, E. and Anastasiia M. 2020 “Institutional Arrangements for Fintech Regulation and Supervision”, 10 January.
- 8.
It refers to EBA 2020a “Discussion Paper on the future changes to the EU-wide stress test”, 22 January.
- 9.
As anticipated in Chap. 3, the development of fintech activities within the shadow banking system poses new challenges for supervising and monetary authorities. Hence, the relevant concluding remarks on the impact of fintech refer to the perspective of ‘regtech’ and ‘suptech’. Regardless of the choice to postpone these topics until the following chapter on the evolution of supervision, it is worth highlighting now that the use of algorithms will boost the capacity of public authorities to develop a software to be used for compliance and reporting requirements, able to drive the business analytics of the supervised entity (so-called regtech tools) and verify if this soft-ware has been properly installed and run by the supervised entity (so-called suptech tools).
- 10.
It is worth recalling the approach of Weber, M. 1998 “Scritti Politici” (Italian ed.), p. 56 ff.
- 11.
All the above is in line with the current analysis of Alpa, G. 2019 “Fintech: un laboratorio per i giuristi” Contratto e impresa, 2019, p. 377; Barbagallo C. 2019 “Fintech: ruolo dell’Autorità di Vigilanza in un mercato che cambia” Bancaria, p. 10 ff.
- 12.
In particular, it refers to ESMA 2018 “Developments in RegTech and SupTech”, Paris, 27 November, ESMA71-99-1070.
- 13.
It refers to the concept of ECB 2006 “Identifying large and complex banking groups for financial stability assessment”, Financial Stability Review, December 2006.
- 14.
It is worth recalling Corpus Iuris, Istitutiones, I, I, 4; Digesto, I, I, I, 2.
- 15.
It remarks Bauguess, S. W. 2017 “The Role of Big Data, Machine Learning, and AI in Assessing Risks: A Regulatory Perspective” SEC Keynote Address: OpRisk North America who highlighted that SEC has made recent and rapid advancements with analytic programs that harness the power of big data (a.k.a “SupTech”). This is driving SEC surveillance programs and allowing innovations in many market risk-assessment initiatives. These remarks are intended to highlight many of the promises—but also the limitations—of machine learning, big data and AI in market regulation.
See also EBA 2018 “The EBA’s fintech roadmap. Conclusions from the consultation on the EBA’s approach to financial technology (fintech)”. 15 March.
- 16.
On this point, see Gambaro, A. 2019 “Interessi diffusi, interessi collettivi e gli incerti confini tra diritto pubblico e diritto privato” Rivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile, p. 779 ff.; Alpa, G. 2018 “Diritti, libertà fondamentali e disciplina del contratto: modelli a confronto”, Giustizia civile, p. 5 ff.
- 17.
In addition, in refers to Tsang, C. Y. 2019 “From Industry Sandbox to Supervisory Control Box: Rethinking the Role of Regulators in the Era of FinTech” Journal of Law, Technology and Policy who proposes that the proper use of supervisory technology (suptech) allows regulators to turn current initiatives such as industry sandboxes into the supervisory control boxes to effectively regulate fintech-era collaborations and shift current practices into a new paradigm of technology-enabled regulation.
- 18.
It is worth considering the ‘Conjecture of Kate Bush’, whose conclusion states that if π (Pi) is a normal number, it has in it any sequence of numbers, any string, any sentence. Even this endnote, all the endnotes of this book and this book itself may be included in Pi. Hence, algorithms and software may exploit this and other characteristics of math and calculation to support negotiations, business analytics and, in general, the conduct of the firm.
- 19.
It is in line with the analysis of Capriglione, F. 2018 “Non luoghi. Sovranità, sovranismi. Alcune considerazioni” Rivista Trimestrale di Diritto dell’Economia, p. 5 ff.
- 20.
It recalls Auer, R. 2019 “Embedded Supervision: How to Build Regulation into Blockchain Finance” BIS Working Paper No. 811 on the case for embedded supervision: a regulatory framework that provides for compliance in tokenized markets to be automatically monitored by reading the market’s ledger, thus reducing the need for firms to actively collect, verify and deliver data.
- 21.
In particular, see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Sound Practices Implications of fintech developments for banks and bank supervisors, February 2018.
- 22.
It is worth highlighting that supervisory agencies initiate and organize their suptech activities in several ways. Applications used for data collection tend to be management-initiated projects, while those used for data analytics usually start out as research questions, but in a few cases may also be suggested by supervision units. A number of supervisory agencies, particularly those active in exploring data analytics applications, have recently created dedicated units. A few others leverage their existing research units. Supervisory agencies also use both internal and external resources in developing suptech applications. In addition, some are partnering with academic institutions, particularly in the area of data analytics, to keep track of the latest developments and learn how to build state-of-the art algorithms; see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Sound Practices Implications of fintech developments for banks and bank supervisors, February 2018, p. 1.
- 23.
See Recital 16 Directive (EU) 2018/1972 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code.
- 24.
It refers to Acquisti, A. and Taylor, c. R. and Wagman, L. 2016 “The Economics of Privacy” Journal of Economic Literature on connections among diverse streams of theoretical and empirical research on the economics of privacy. The authors focus on the economic value and consequences of protecting and disclosing personal information, and on consumers’ understanding and decisions regarding the trade-offs associated with the privacy and the sharing of personal data. This highlights how the economic analysis of privacy evolved over time, as advancements in information technology raised increasingly nuanced and complex issues associated with the protection and sharing of personal information.
See also Agostino R. M., 218 “Big data e nuovi beni tra modelli organizzativi e controllo dell impresa” Rivista di diritto dell’impresa, p. 58 ff.
- 25.
In addition, it recalls Brummer, C. J. 2011 “How International Financial Law Works (and How it Doesn’t)” Georgetown Law Journal who presents an alternative theory for understanding the purpose, operation and limitations of international financial law, by positing that international financial regulation, though formally “soft,” is a unique species of cross-border cooperation bolstered by reputational, market and institutional mechanisms that have been largely overlooked by theorists. As a result, it is more coercive than classical theories of international law predict; see also Posner, R. 2008 “How Judges Think”, Harvard, explaining the nine intellectual approaches to judging that he identified.
- 26.
Let us recall a set of authors that shows our approach to expectations, see Keynes, J. M. 1936 “The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money”; Friedman M. 1968 “The Role of Monetary Policy” American Economic Review 58; Nerlove M. 1958 “Adaptive Expectations and Cobweb Phenomena”, Quarterly Journal of Economics; Muth, J. 1961 “Rational expectations and the theory of price movements”, Econometria; Lucas, R. E. Jr. 1972 “Expectations and the Neutrality of Money” Journal of Economic Theory; Sargent, T.J. 1994 “Bounded Rationality in Economics”, Oxford; Benabou, R. & Tirole, J. 2001 “Willpower and Personal Rules,” Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School—Public and International Affairs; Sims, C.A. 2003 “Implications of Rational Inattention”. Journal of Monetary Economics 50(3).
- 27.
In this respect, we follow the approach of Severino, E. 2006 “La filosofia futura”, Milano on the foundations of such apparatus.
- 28.
Moreover, see Billio, M. and Lo, A. W. and Getmansky Sherman, M. and Pelizzon, L. 2011 “Econometric Measures of Connectedness and Systemic Risk in the Finance and Insurance Sectors” MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 4774-10 who propose several econometric measures of connectedness based on principal-components analysis and Granger-causality networks, and apply them to the monthly returns of hedge funds, banks, broker/dealers and insurance companies.
- 29.
Furthermore, see Auer, R. 2019 “Embedded Supervision: How to Build Regulation into Blockchain Finance” BIS Working Paper No. 811 who—after sketching out a design for such schemes—explores the conditions under which distributed ledger data might be used to monitor compliance. To this end, a decentralized market is modelled that replaces today’s intermediary-based verification of legal data with blockchain-enabled data credibility based on economic consensus.
- 30.
It is also worth considering the conclusions of Castronova, E. 2002 “On Virtual Economies” CESifo Working Paper Series No. 752 on the evidence that the nature of games as a produced good suggests that technological advances, and heavy competition, will drive the future development of virtual worlds.
- 31.
It recalls both Argentati, A. 2018 “Le banche nel nuovo scenario competitivo. Fin-Tech, il paradigma Open banking e la minaccia delle big-tech companies” Mercato concorrenza regole, p. 441 ff.; see also Rossano, D. 2015 “La crisi dell’Eurozona e la (dis)unione bancaria”, Federalismi.itp. 31 ff.
- 32.
It refers Zachariadis, M. and Ozcan, P. 2017 “The API Economy and Digital Transformation in Financial Services: The Case of Open Banking” SWIFT Institute Working Paper No. 2016-001 who—by exploring the fundamental properties and various applications of open application programming interfaces (APIs) mentioned in extant literature—highlights the relevant theories that give rise to the new organizational structures and platform business models observed in the digital age.
- 33.
It remarks the need for going deeper in the topics highlighted by several authors: Paracampo M. T. 2019 “FinTech tra algoritmi, trasparenza e algo-governance” Diritto della banca e del mercato finanziario, p. 213 ff.; Minto, A. “Le valutazioni della Vigilanza bancaria (e su queste, quelle dell’eventuale sindacato giurisdizionale) sottostanti la “previsione di gravi perdite patrimoniali” ai fini dell’assoggettamento ad amministrazione straordinaria. Nota a TAR LA sez. III 22 giugno 2011, n. 5567”, Il Diritto fallimentare e delle società commerciali, p. 220 ff.
- 34.
It specifically recalls the conclusions of Schelling, T. C. 1980 “The strategy of conflict”, Harvard-Cambridge-London. On this topic see also Brozzetti, A. “I nuovi “standard” per fronteggiare la crisi dei colossi finanziari di un mercato globale” Diritto della banca e del mercato finanziario, p. 203 ff.
- 35.
In addition, see Maume, P. 2018 “Regulating Robo-Advisory” Texas International Law Journal who argues that robo-advisory is essentially different from traditional financial advice. Nevertheless, it demonstrates that current regulation, in particular the European Union framework for financial intermediaries, is able to address most of the resulting issues. His core conclusion suggests that, in applying the existing rules to robo-advisors, the rules should not be interpreted to create a level playing field for all market participants.
- 36.
Related to the effects of fintech on the collective portfolio management, there is also a need to clarify how rules concerning safekeeping, and the manner and the means required for custodians, would apply for digital assets funds, crypto-assets and cryptocurrencies; see ESMA 2019 “Report. Licensing of FinTech business models” 12 July 2019 | ESMA50-164-2430, p. 18.
In addition, it is worth mentioning the need for creation of new regulated activities such as the brokerage and asset management related to crypto-assets. There are no doubts that the current principles do not ban the management of crypto-assets under a discretionary mandate or provide brokerage services in crypto-assets, while there is the need to classify and regulate the activities that do not fit with the existing rules, such as “social trading” (as mentioned by ESMA in the document above).
- 37.
In particular, see Jin, D. and Kacperczyk, M. T. and Kahraman, B. and Suntheim, G. 2019 “Swing Pricing and Fragility in Open-End Mutual Funds” IMF Working Paper No. 19/227 who—using unique data on investor transactions in UK corporate bond funds—show that swing pricing eliminates the first-mover advantage arising from the traditional pricing rule and significantly reduces redemptions during stress periods.
- 38.
It recalls the conclusions of Lamandini, M. 2008 “Alternative investment vehicles & (self)—regulation (Veicoli di investimento alternativi e (auto)-regolazione)” Rivista di diritto societario, p. 18 ff.
- 39.
Including the conditions for taking up business activities, the application procedures, conditions for granting authorization, initial capital and own funds requirements as well as the rules relating to changes or withdrawal of authorization; these provisions are based on technical advice provided by ESMA to the European Commission (ESMA/2011/379).
- 40.
It should be noted that there is no standard definition of each of these innovations, so FinTech firms can combine different elements of these differing innovations. It also means that the same firm might have been reported under more than one innovation business model; see ESMA 2019 “Report. Licensing of FinTech business models” 12 July 2019 | ESMA50-164-2430, p. 14.
- 41.
Moreover, see Ezrachi, A. and Stucke, M. E. 2017 “Artificial Intelligence & Collusion: When Computers Inhibit Competition” University of Illinois Law Review, who address the abovementioned developments and consider the application of competition law to an advanced ‘computerized trade environment’. After discussing the way in which computerized technology is changing the competitive landscape, the authors explore four scenarios where AI can foster anticompetitive collusion and the legal and ethical challenges each scenario raises.
- 42.
It is worth recalling an analysis made by an Italian perspective, see Ammannati, L. 2019 “Il paradigma del consumatore nell’era digitale: consumatore digitale o digitalizzazione del consumatore?” Rivista Trimestrale di Diritto dell’Economia, 2019, p. 8 ff.
- 43.
It is worth recalling again the conclusion of Annunziata, F. 2018 “La disciplina delle trading venues nell’era delle rivoluzioni tecnologiche: dalle criptovalute alla distributed ledger technology” Orizzonti del diritto commerciale, p. 40 ff. on the current set-up of this industry.
- 44.
See Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 on improving securities settlement in the European Union and on central securities depositories and amending Directives 98/26/EC and 2014/65/EU and Regulation (EU) No 236/2012.
- 45.
In this respect, the analysis may extend to consider Zeno-Zencovich, V. 2017 “Dati, grandi dati, dati granulari e la nuova epistemologia del giurista” La rivista di diritto dei media, p. 7 ff.; Grippo, E. 1999 “Financial Services and Markets Bill” Rivista del diritto commerciale e del diritto generale delle obbligazioni, p. 787 ff.; and Antonucci, A. 1996 “L’accesso diretto delle imprese al mercato del capitale di credito” Banca borsa e titoli di credito, p. 619 ff.
- 46.
It recalls Zetzsche, D. A. and Arner, D. W. and Buckley, R. P. and Weber, R. H. 2019 “The Future of Data-Driven Finance and RegTech: Lessons from EU Big Bang II” European Banking Institute Working Paper Series 2019/35 who highlighted strict data-protection rules reflecting European cultural concerns about dominant actors in the data-processing field.
- 47.
It refers to the definitions of BIS 2010 “Systemic risk: how to deal with it?”, Basel and article 2, Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010.
- 48.
In addition, see Berti De Marinis, G. and Degl’Innocenti, F. and Marcello, and Pistelli, F. 2018 “Diritto, robotica e nuove frontiere tecnologiche”, Diritto del mercato assicurativo e finanziario, p. 194 ff.
- 49.
It refers to Acquisti, A. and Taylor, c. R. and Wagman, L. 2016 “The Economics of Privacy” Journal of Economic Literature who highlight three themes that connect diverse insights from the literature. First, characterizing a single unifying economic theory of privacy is hard, because privacy issues of economic relevance arise in widely diverse contexts. Second, there are theoretical and empirical situations where the protection of privacy can both enhance, and detract from, individual and societal welfare. Third, in digital economies, consumers’ ability to make informed decisions about their privacy is severely hindered, because consumers are often in a position of imperfect or asymmetric information regarding when their data is collected, for what purposes, and with what consequences.
- 50.
It remarks the conclusions of Lin, L. and Chen, C. C. 2019 “The Promise and Perils of InsurTech” NUS Centre for Banking & Finance Law Working Paper 19/03 who highlight the development of InsurTech with corresponding risks and regulatory concerns, by focusing on potential risks associated with the application of InsurTech, and concludes with a discussion of various possible responses or regulatory approaches to InsurTech applications.
See also Borselli, A. 2018 “Insurance by Algorithm” European Insurance Law Review, on the role of artificial intelligence and machine learning, whose contents focus on the possible application of artificial intelligence and smart contracts to this sector, highlighting the need to ensure transparency and accountability of automated decision-making.
- 51.
It refers to Posner, E. A. 2000 “Agency Models in Law and Economics” University of Chicago Law School, John M. Olin Law and Economics Working Paper No. 92 in which a simple example is used to illustrate the basic tradeoff between incentives and insurance when a principal is unable to observe an agent’s level of effort.
- 52.
See Ricks, M. 2010 “Shadow Banking and Financial Regulation” Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 370 who showed that, under plausible assumptions, an insurance regime (supplemented with ex-ante risk constraints to counteract the effects of moral hazard) is efficiency-maximizing.
- 53.
See Werbach, K. and Cornell, N. 2017 “Contracts Ex Machina” Duke Law Journal who show certain potential and limitations of smart contracts, by concluding that smart contracts offer novel possibilities and may significantly demand new legal paradigms.
- 54.
It is worth considering Raskin, M. 2017 “The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts” 1 Georgetown Law Technology Review who introduces a distinction between strong and weak smart contracts, as defined by the costs of their revocation and modification.
- 55.
In particular, see Baran, P. 1965 “Communication, Computer and the People”, Santa Monica (California - US), p. 14 that started a discussion against the position above mentioned.
- 56.
In addition, see the conclusion of Castaldi, G. 2019 “Servizi di pagamento e moneta elettronica: la disciplina antiriciclaggio dei collaboratori esterni” Rivista Trimestrale di Diritto dell’Economia, p. 18 ff. who pointed out that the Italian legislation on external collaborators of payment institutions and electronic money institutions is excessive and confusing. Hence, it suggests that this confusion hinders the adoption of rational and efficient organizational solutions and forces many operators to establish their headquarters in other EU countries. Therefore, the authorities must intervene to clarify and simplify the rules.
- 57.
It refers to FATF 2012 “International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation—the FATF Recommendations”, Paris, 16 February.
- 58.
See FATF 2012 “International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation—the FATF Recommendations”, Paris, 16 February.
- 59.
It is worth considering Rubel, A. P. and Castro, c. and Pham, A. 2019 “Agency Laundering and Information Technologies” Ethical Theory & Moral Practice who argues that when agents insert technological systems into their decision-making processes, they can obscure moral responsibility for the results.
- 60.
See Rose, K. J. 2019 “De-Risking or Re-Contracting the Way around Money Laundering Risks” CBS LAW Research Paper No. 19-37 who shows a rising concern towards the derisking of certain sectors/actors due to the increased anti-money laundering regulation.
- 61.
It is worth considering Morrone, A. 2017 “Sovranità” Rivista AIC, p. 108 ff. on the supreme legislative power (and its extension), and the separation of powers guarantee against arbitrariness in power.
- 62.
It remarks the conclusions of Peluso M. P. 2019 “Le nuove norme antiriciclaggio: i presidi aziendali alla prova del rischio di riciclaggio” Bancaria, p. 5 ff.; Zonile, C. 2019 “La regolamentazione internazionale ed europea di contrasto all’uso di valute virtuali da parte della criminalità transnazionale” Rivista di diritto internazionale, p. 137 ff.
- 63.
See Zachariadis, M. and Ozcan, P. 2017 “The API Economy and Digital Transformation in Financial Services: The Case of Open Banking” SWIFT Institute Working Paper No. 2016-001 who exposes some of the findings around the key challenges and opportunities that open APIs pose for the banking sector in the UK and the EU following the introduction of the Open Banking Working Group (OBWG) and Second Payments Services Directive (PSD2) regulatory frameworks.
- 64.
See Maume, P. 2018 “Regulating Robo-Advisory” Texas International Law Journal and Gürcan, B. 2019 “Various Dimensions and Aspects of the Legal Problems of the Blockchain Technology” Comparative Law Working Papers who examines certain legal problems of the blockchain services relevant to understand the abovementioned issue.
- 65.
See Acquisti, A. and Taylor, c. R. and Wagman, L. 2016 “The Economics of Privacy” Journal of Economic Literature, who conclude by highlighting some of the ongoing issues in the privacy debate of interest to economists.
- 66.
See Auer, R. 2019 “Embedded Supervision: How to Build Regulation into Blockchain Finance” BIS Working Paper No. 811 whose key results set out the conditions under which the market’s economic consensus would be strong enough to guarantee that transactions are economically final, so that supervisors can trust the distributed ledger’s data. The paper concludes with a discussion of the legislative and operational requirements that would promote low-cost supervision and a level playing field for small and large firms.
See also Pellegrini, M. 2009 “Da un riscontro di regolarità alla “supervisione”. La svolta disciplinare degli intermediari finanziari non bancari” Banca borsa e titoli di credito, p. 59 ff. on the effects of a stricter supervision; and Rangone, N. 2006 “Impatto delle analisi delle regolazioni su procedimento, organizzazione e indipendenza delle Autorità” Studi parlamentari e di politica costituzionale, p. 79 ff. on the regulatory impact analysis as a tool for independent regulatory reform; Desario, V. 1984 “Il sistema creditizio italiano, la supervisione bancaria e i rapporti con le altre istituzioni” Banca borsa e titoli di credito, p. 505 ff.
- 67.
See the approach of Kremer, M. and Rao, G. and Schilbach, F. 2019 “Behavioral Development Economics”, Handbook of Behavioral Economics, who examines the existence of high rates of return without corresponding growth.
- 68.
It recalls Stemler, A. 2016 “Chasing Unicorns: The Rise, Power, and Regulatory Challenges of Tech Monopolies” Kelley School of Business Research Paper No. 16-83 on antitrust and Internet laws that fail to address platforms’ threats to privacy and fair competition.
- 69.
It refers to ECB 2018 “Why is cyber resilience important?”, 10 April. It is worth considering that as a regulator for market infrastructure—for example, payment and settlement systems—ECB sets rules and best practices to ensure that individual institutions and providers have a strong level of cyber resilience, and in its role as banking supervisor, asks the largest euro area banks to report significant cyber incidents as soon as they detect them.
Indeed, it is a practice that identifies and monitors trends in cyberattacks, which helps in reacting more swiftly to a potential crisis caused by a cyberattack, but it is expected that specific ICT risk-management tools may be implemented as a form of regtech and suptech.
- 70.
See Farhi, E. and Tirole, J. 2017 “Shadow Banking and the Four Pillars of Traditional Financial Intermediation” NBER Working Paper No. w23930 who provides a rationale for the covariation yielding the quadrilogy, and analyses how prudential regulation must adjust to the possibility of migration towards less regulated spheres.
- 71.
Reference is made to Hirsch, D. and Bartley, T. and Chandrasekaran, A. and Parthasarathy, S. and Turner, P. and Norris, d. and Lamont, K. and Drummond, C. 2019 “Corporate Data Ethics: Data Governance Transformations for the Age of Advanced Analytics and AI” SSRN research paper no. 3478826 who provide useful ideas for the pursuing of data ethics.
- 72.
It remarks the approach of Bessone, M. 1972 “Progresso tecnologico, prodotti dannosi e controlli sull’impresa”, Politica del diritto, p. 203 ff.
- 73.
It is worth considering the analysis of Rodotà, S. 1973 “Elaboratori elettronici e controllo sociale”, Napoli (2018 Ed.), p. 43 ff.
- 74.
See Tirole, J. and Lerner, J. 2000 “The Simple Economics of Open Source” HBS Finance Working Paper No. 00-059 on open source software development that involves developers at many different locations and organizations sharing code to develop and refine programs. These authors analyse the behaviour of individual programmers and commercial companies engaged in open source projects and make a preliminary exploration of the economics of open source software. It refers to their evidences on the difficulties to predict the relevant effects with ‘off-the-shelf’ economic models.
- 75.
See Graham, S. and Frank, G. 1958 “Beloved Infidel: The Education of a Woman”, New York.
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Lemma, V. (2020). Fintech, Regtech and Suptech Towards a New Market Structure. In: FinTech Regulation. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42347-6_8
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