Skip to main content

European Approaches to Fintech: The Role of Regulation and the Evolution of Supervision

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
FinTech Regulation
  • 2040 Accesses

Abstract

This chapter clarifies the European approach to financial innovation. In order to outline the common features of the regulatory approach across Europe, it highlights the interventions of EU institutions. Focus on the current rules outlines that, apart from the efforts in the European Commission’s Action Plan on FinTech, a uniform legal framework applicable to fintech has not yet been established in either the European Union or the G20’s countries. Indeed, EU regulator does not approach fintech as a new industry, so the role of the European Central Bank will ensure that fintechers are properly authorized and have in place ‘risk control frameworks’. In addition, this chapter considers evidence from Switzerland, showing that an advanced democracy should enact the principles of freedom, independence and self-determination.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 99.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 129.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 129.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    In addition, it is worth referring to Merton, R. C. 2018. “Observations on the Digital Revolution: Financial Innovation and FinTech” Speech at 17th International Conference on Credit, Venice, which addressed four challenges for the successful and wide-scope adoption of FinTech: (1) Trust—fundamental to financial services; technology by itself is not sufficient to create it; (2) Credit risk—what’s worse than being uninsured? Believing you are insured when you are not; (3) Innovation risk—implementation of innovation mismatched to the infrastructure to support it; (4) Regulation—supports trust; government is ultimately responsible for system failures.

    See also Vulkan, N. and Astebro, T. and Sierra M. F., 2016. “Equity crowdfunding: A new phenomena(opens in new window)” Journal of Business Venturing Insights; Wang, W. and Mahmood, A. and Sismeiro, C. and Vulkand, N. 2019. “The evolution of equity crowdfunding: Insights from co-investments of angels and the crowd” Research Policy, which found evidence of information flows in crowdfunding platforms between angels, and from angels to the crowd. These authors showed that angels play an important role in funding of large ventures, whereas the crowd not only fill the funding gaps for such large ventures but also play a pivotal role in the funding of small ones. The complementarity between angels and crowd investors seems to increase the overall efficiency in an otherwise highly asymmetric and uncertain market, confirming that digitization can indeed bring important benefits to venture investment.

  2. 2.

    This analysis is moving from the consideration on the ‘ongoing changes’ to the current business models of fintech firms; see Lemma, V. 2018. “Fintech regulation: the need for a research” Open review of management, banking and finance; see also Engst, A. and Lemma, V. 2018. “Insurtech and interoperability of Fintech firms” Open review of management, banking and finance, para. 2, where it is highlighted that ‘regulatory issues are related to the algorithms supporting the partially automated activities in insurance undertaking (and other advanced technique of risk mitigation)’.

  3. 3.

    Market players data shows that increasing consumer and SME awareness of, and engagement with, FinTech is driving concrete growth in adoption rates; see Hwa, G. and Lloyd, J. and Hatch, M. 2019. “Eight ways FinTech adoption remains on the rise” and “EY third biennial FinTech adoption trends survey”.

  4. 4.

    Thus, the need for a clarification of the scope of this research with regard to the role of the public in this sector; see Cassese, S. 2000. “Quattro paradossi sui rapporti tra poteri pubblici ed autonomie private” Rivista trimestrale diritto pubblico, p. 390 ss.

    See also Capriglione, F. 2018. “Considerazioni a margine del volume: il tramonto della banca universale?” Rivista Trimestrale di Diritto dell’Economia, p. 22 ff.

  5. 5.

    Nowadays, several researches cast doubt that ICT service providers are able to produce the same output of banking and finance, as well as that the shadow banking system satisfies the needs of several firms and savers (in the market for capital and investments); see Gorton, G. B. and Metrick, A. 2010. “Regulating the Shadow Banking System” SSRN Research Paper no. 1676947; Ricks, M. 2010. “Shadow Banking and Financial Regulation” Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 370; Jagtiani, J. and Lemieux, C. 2018. “The Roles of Alternative Data and Machine Learning in Fintech Lending: Evidence from the Lendingclub Consumer Platform” FRB of Philadelphia Working Paper No. 18-15.

    Therefore, it aims at clarifying that such alternatives (to banking and finance) are able to execute also activities that have been reserved to banks and financial firms, provide that there are no specific limitations to place their supply and demand within the market for capitals. Indeed, it is necessary to understand whether there are rights to protect, and then the role of the international bodies, national governments and central banks in the oversight of the financial innovation (i.e. new tools and instruments provided by the evolution of personal devices, network infrastructures and software).

  6. 6.

    On this point, see Begley, T. A. and Srinivasan, K. 2019 “Small Bank Lending in the Era of Fintech and Shadow Banking: A Sideshow?” Northeastern U. D’Amore-McKim School of Business Research Paper No. 3317672, which found that cross-sectional variation in consumer preferences for traditional banks and institutional features of the mortgage market play important roles in explaining these findings, and whose results highlight the continued importance of small banks despite the rise of shadow banks and financial technology disruption.

  7. 7.

    In addition, this analysis refers to the conclusions of Simoncini, A. 2016. “The Constitutional Dimension of the Internet: Some Research Paths” EUI Working Paper Law 2016/16; Messina, D. 2018. “Il Regolamento (EU) 2016/679 in materia di protezione dei dati personali alla luce della vicenda Cambridge Analytica”, Federalismi.it.

  8. 8.

    For the purposes of this analysis, it is worth starting from the approach suggested by Coase, R. H. 1988. “The firm the market and the law” Chicago.

  9. 9.

    See Zuiderveen Borgesius, F. 2014. “Behavioural Sciences and the Regulation of Privacy on the Internet” Institute for Information Law Research Paper No. 2014-02, which examines the policy implications of behavioural sciences insights for the regulation of privacy on the Internet, by focusing in particular on behavioural targeting.

    See also Baker, H. K. and Ricciardi, V. 2015. “Understanding Behavioral Aspects of Financial Planning and Investing” Journal of Financial Planning, which pointed out that understanding fundamental human tendencies can help financial planners and advisers recognize behaviours that may interfere with clients achieving their long-term goals; see also Ricciardi, V. and Simon, H. K. 2000. “What is Behavioral Finance?” Business, Education & Technology Journal, which investigates the cognitive factors and emotional issues that impact the decision-making process of individuals, groups, and organizations.

  10. 10.

    See Zuiderveen Borgesius, F. 2013. “Behavioral Targeting, A European Legal Perspective” IEEE Security & Privacy, p. 82 ff.; Davies, G. B. 2017 “New Vistas in Risk Profiling” CFA Institute Research Foundation, which suggests the usefulness of analytics aimed at controlling the crucial elements of (a) risk tolerance, (b) behavioural risk attitudes and (c) risk capacity.

  11. 11.

    In this regulatory context, it is not possible to deny that—if compared—the technical enhancement of velocity, frequency and size of financial dealing seems greater; and the legal order seems to have little possibility of orienting social behaviours. In the wired society, relations are direct (or rather dis-intermediate); the institutions of democracies seem to be un-resilient, nor are they able to conform the reality to the principles set forth—to safeguard freedom, justice and welfare; see Canalini, V. 2019 “Il FinTech e le nuove frontiere dell’innovazione finanziaria”, “Manuale di diritto bancario e finanziario”, Padova.

  12. 12.

    Let us recall Cassese, S. 2009. “Il diritto globale” Torino; Carcaterra, G. 1979. “La forza costitutiva delle norme. L’uomo e la società”, Roma; Carcaterra, G. 2014. “Le norme costitutive”, Torino on the ‘performative utterances’, which aim to look for and interpret traces in legal experience, from constituent judgements to rights and powers, then going back to the rules of structure and the fundamental rule, and finally looking at the totality of the system.

  13. 13.

    See Olkova, A. 2018. “Portfolio Performance Measurement: Traditional vs Utility-Based Approaches” 1st International Management, Quality and Marketing Conference Research Paper on the role of traditional and utility-based approaches in constructing risk-adjusted performance measures. This paper suggests the possibility to facilitate investor profiling and portfolio assessment by a piecewise-linear utility framework. To model an investor profile, and proposed an approximation to the possibly non-linear utility curve, under the assumption of discretely changing marginal utility.

  14. 14.

    In this respect, the analysis may rely on the considerations of Zillien, N. and Hargittai, E. 2009. “Digital Distinction: Status-Specific Internet uses”. Social Science Quarterly, p. 274 ff.

  15. 15.

    In particular, this has been summarized by Draghi, M. 2019. “Farewell Remarks”. See also de Guindos, L. 2019. “Welcome Remarks at the third ECB Forum on Banking Supervision”, Frankfurt am Main, 6 November. In general on this point, see Capriglione, F. 2019. “Un secolo di regolazione” “Manuale di diritto bancario e finanziario”, Padova.

  16. 16.

    It refers to McKinsey Global Institute 1992, “Service Sector Productivity”, Washington, DC.

  17. 17.

    See Zhang, t. “Balancing Fintech Opportunities and Risks. Remarks by IMF Deputy Managing Director” Vilnius, who stated that “Fintech can support productivity and growth by strengthening financial development, inclusion, and efficiency, but may pose risks to consumers and investors and, more broadly, to financial stability and integrity.”

  18. 18.

    See OECD 2019 “Regulatory effectiveness in the era of digitalisation”, Paris, which assumed that governments and regulators play a major role in encouraging digital innovation and in incentivizing the development of these technologies for the benefit of society.

  19. 19.

    It refers to the document of OCSE, “Regulatory Reform and Innovation”, which recalls BAILY, M. N. 1993. “Competition, Regulation and Efficiency in Service Industries” Brookings Papers in Microeconomics.

  20. 20.

    See Bruckner, M. A. 2018. “Regulating Fintech Lending” Banking & Financial Services Policy Report; Runshan, F. and Yan, H. and Param Vir, S. 2019. “Crowds, Lending, Machines, and Bias” SSRN Research Paper no. 3206027.

    See also Borselli, A. 2018. “Insurance by Algorithm” European Insurance Law Review on an example of algorithmic systems that have the potential to transform large sectors of the economy.

  21. 21.

    It is worth recalling the efforts of the regulatory analysis on the legal reasoning, see Posner, R. 2008. “How judges think”, Harvard and Vandevelde, K. J. 2011. “Thinking like a lawyer”, Boulder, 2011.

  22. 22.

    See Engst and Lemma, Insurtech and interoperability of Fintech firms, in Open review of management, banking and finance, 2018, para. 2 on the absence of significant changes of the national legislative framework, which ‘should suggest a complete freedom in starting up a fintech firm that would support the business of insurance companies or distributors’.

  23. 23.

    See Banca d’Italia, 2017. “FinTech In Italia. Indagine conoscitiva sull’adozione delle innova-zioni tecnologiche applicate ai servizi finanziari, Roma; Panetta, F. 2017. “L’innovazione digitale nell’industria finanziaria italiana”, Milano, 26 september; Bofondi, M. 2017. “Il lending-based crowdfunding: opportunità e rischi”, Questioni di Economia e Finanza, Roma, p. 7.

  24. 24.

    This would refer also to the outcome of Warschauer, M. 2009. “Demystifying the Digital Divide” Elsevier, p. 191 ff.

  25. 25.

    In particular, it refers to Warschauer, M. 2003. “Technology and Social Inclusion: Rethinking the Digital Divide”, Cambridge. See also Capriglione, F. 2004. “Etica della finanza mercato globalizzazione”, Bari, Chapter V; Lastra, R. 2013. “The Globalization Paradox: Review of Dani Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy”, International Journal of Constitutional Law, p. 809 ff.

  26. 26.

    Let us recall Engst, A. and Lemma, V. “Insurtech and interoperability of Fintech firms” Open review of management, banking and finance, 2018, para. 2 with respect to both the consideration that “the current legislative path for the adoption of a EU directive would not be timely for driving the innovation in this industry, anyway new rules should be able to set common standards (in order to ensure a fair competition in this market)” and the doubt “that new technologies and different business models are spreading in the insurance business, so the monitoring of outsourcing (and then the perspective of certain developments in licensing the ancillary service provided to traditional insurance companies) should allow the starting of new form of supervision without jeopardizing the market for servicing”.

  27. 27.

    See Jackson, G. and Deeg, R. 2006. “How Many Varieties of Capitalism? Comparing the Comparative Institutional Analyses of Capitalist Diversity” MPIfG Discussion Paper No. 06/2 on the distinct institutional configurations that generate a particular systemic “logic” of economic action.

  28. 28.

    See Grant, S. H. and Van Zandt, T. 2007. “Expected Utility Theory” INSEAD Business School Research Paper No. 2007/71/EPS, which present the mathematical structure of additive and linear utility representations and their axiomatizations, in the context of abstract choice theory and using intertemporal choice as a source of examples.

    See also Campbell, J. Y. and Cochrane, J. H., 1998. “By Force of Habit: A Consumption-Based Explanation of Plantation of Aggregate Stock Market Behavior” Center for Research in Security Prices Working Paper No. 412 for a model that adds a slow-moving external habit to the standard power utility function. See also Chang, H. F. 1999. “A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle” University of Pennsylvania Law School, Institute for Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 272, which give weight to considerations other than the overall utility level of each individual.

  29. 29.

    In this respect, regulator should consider that the firms and other types of organizations are feverishly exploring ways of taking advantage of the big data phenomenon; see Galbraith, J. R. 2014. “Organizational Design Challenges Resulting from Big Data” Journal of Organization Design, p. 2 ff.

    See also Ezrachi, A. 2018. “EU Competition Law Goals and the Digital Economy” Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 17/2018; Wachter, S. and Mittelstadt, B. 2018. “A Right to Reasonable Inferences: Re-Thinking Data Protection Law in the Age of Big Data and AI” Columbia Business Law Review.

  30. 30.

    Let us recall Rodotà, S. 1973. “Elaboratori elettronici e controllo sociale”, Bologna; in addition, see D’Acquisto, G. and Naldi, M. 2017. “Big data e privacy by design”, Torino; Pollicino, O. and Frosini, T. and Apa, E. 2017. “Diritti e libertà in Internet”, Milano.

  31. 31.

    See Goanta, C. 2018. “How Technology Disrupts Private Law: An Exploratory Study of California and Switzerland as Innovative Jurisdictions” Stanford-Vienna TTLF Working Paper No. 38/2018.

  32. 32.

    See Remolina, N. 2019. “Open Banking: Regulatory Challenges for a New Form of Financial Intermediation in a Data-Driven World” SMU Centre for AI & Data Governance Research Paper No. 2019/05 on the consideration that open banking—as a service—is emerging as a new form of intermediation that portraits positive and negative externalities for the financial system. See also Belleflamme, P. and Lambert, T. and Schwienbacher, A. “Crowdfunding Dynamics” CESifo Working Paper No. 7797, which pointed out various forms of social learning and network effects that are at work on crowdfunding platforms, giving rise to informational and payoff externalities.

  33. 33.

    In general, it is worth recalling Cirillo, P. and Taleb, N. 2015. “Expected Shortfall Estimation for Apparently Infinite-Mean Models of Operational Risk” Quantitative Finance, whose research showed that statistical analyses on actual data depict operational risk as an extremely heavy-tailed phenomenon, able to generate losses so extreme as to suggest the use of infinite-mean models. However, these authors concluded that no loss can actually destroy more than the entire value of a bank or of a company, and this upper bound should be considered when dealing with tail-risk assessment.

    Hence, the need for a deeper analysis of a sort of multipurpose data-driven optimization heuristic capable to deal efficiently with a variety of risk functions and practical constraints on the positions in the portfolio, as suggested by Gilli, M. and Këllezi, E. and Hysi, H. 2006. “A Data-Driven Optimization Heuristic for Downside Risk Minimization” Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper No. 06-2.

  34. 34.

    This refers to OCSE, “Regulatory Reform and Innovation”. In this respect, see also Lehmann, M. 2019. “Global Rules for a Global Market Place? – The Regulation and Supervision of FinTech Providers” Boston University International Law Journal; and—with respect to EU—Zetzsche, D. A. and Preiner, C. 2017. “Cross-Border Crowdfunding – Towards a Single Crowdfunding Market for “European Banking Institute Working Paper Series 2017, which—in contrast to the European Commission’s Capital Market Action Plan—takes the view that national limitations on crowd investing and crowd lending de facto are the result of limits de jure.

  35. 35.

    This part of the analysis specifically recalls FSB, 2017. “Financial stability implications from fintech”, 27 June.

  36. 36.

    See Berlingò, V. 2017. “Il fenomeno della datafication e la sua giuridicizzazione”, Rivista Trimestrale di Diritto Pubblico, p. 3 ff.; Wachter, S. 2018. “Normative challenges of identification in the Internet of Things: Privacy, profiling, discrimination, and the GDPR”, Computer law & security Review.

  37. 37.

    See Status, R. 1971. “Contract and the Welfare State” Stanford Law Review, 1971, p. 941 ff. Recently, Stylianou, T. 2018. “An Investigation into the Utility and Potential Regulation of Initial Coin Offerings and Smart Contracts in Selected Industries and Jurisdictions” King’s College London Law School Research Paper No. 19-8 sought to give an answer whether regulatory bodies are required to make more steps into creating a regulatory framework for the utilities of blockchain technology.

    See also Zetzsche, D. A. and Buckley, R. P. and Arner, D. W. and Barberis, J. N., 2017. “Regulating a Revolution: From Regulatory Sandboxes to Smart Regulation” Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law.

  38. 38.

    Moreover, see Hansmann, H. and Kraakman, R. H. 2004. “What is Corporate Law?” Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 300, on the details of the economic importance of the corporate form’s features: legal personality, limited liability, transferable shares, delegated management and investor ownership.

    This recalls Armour, J. and Hansmann, H. and Kraakman, R. H. “The Essential Elements of Corporate Law” Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 20/2009, which represented that whilst the ‘core’ features of corporate law are present in all—or almost all—legal systems, different systems have made different choices regarding the form and content of many other aspects of their corporate laws.

  39. 39.

    See Carcaterra, G. 2014. “Le norme costitutive”, Torino on the ‘performative utterances’, which moves on a theoretical-logical research level, and it is with this in mind that he investigates the possibility of using constitutive propositions in regulation as reconstructive models of standardisation activity.

  40. 40.

    Henceforth, freedom depends not only on the mere absence of public limitations, but also on an infrastructure; see Balkin, J. M. 2008. “The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age” Pepperdine Law Review.

  41. 41.

    It remarks the conclusion of FSB 2019. “Fintech and market structure in financial services: Market developments and potential financial stability implications”, which is a part of the FSB’s ongoing work to monitor FinTech market developments and their potential implications for financial stability.

  42. 42.

    It may be noted that Thakor, A. V. 2019, “Fintech and Banking: What Do We Know?” Journal of Financial Intermediation, provided a definition of fintech and examined some statistics and stylized facts, and then the author reviewed the relevant theoretical and empirical literature.

  43. 43.

    Furthermore, these considerations reflect the conclusion of Dell’Ariccia, G. and Marquez, R. 2006. “Competition among regulators and credit market integration” Journal of Financial Economics. Let us recall also Berle A. A. and Means G. C. 1932. “The Modern Corporation and Private Property”; Engineer, M. 1990. “Brennan and Buchanan’s Leviathan models” The Social Science Journal; and—with respect to fintech—Lehmann, M. 2019. “Global Rules for a Global Market Place? The Regulation and Supervision of FinTech Providers” Boston University International Law Journal

  44. 44.

    In this respect, reference is made to Bennett, S. and Maton, K. and Kervin, L. 2008. “The ‘Digital Natives’ Debate: A Critical Review of the Evidence” British Journal of Educational Technology, p. 775 ff.

  45. 45.

    In particular, see De Polis, A. and Pietrunti, M. 2019. “Exchange Rate Dynamics and Unconventional Monetary Policies: It’s All in the Shadows” Bank of Italy Temi di Discussione (Working Paper) No. 1231.; Cohen-Setton, J. and Vallée, S. 2018. “Federalizing a Central Bank: A Comparative Study of the Early Years of the FED and the ECB” “Lessons for EU Integration from US History. Report to the European Commission”

    See also Orphanides, A. 2014. “European Headwind: ECB Policy and Fed Normalization” MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 5119-14; Cukierman, A. 2014. “Euro-Area and US Banks Behavior, and ECB-Fed Monetary Policies During the Global Financial Crisis: A Comparison” CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10289. With regard to the beginning of this century, see also Wray, L. R. and Sardoni, C. 2005 “Monetary Policy Strategies of the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve Bank of U.S.” Levy Economics Institute Working Paper No. 431; Savona, P. 2002. “Politica economica e new economy”, Milano; Savona, P. 2008. “I momenti d’oro dell’economia visti da Paolo Savona”, Roma.

  46. 46.

    See FSB 2019. “Resolution Report: Mind the Gap. Eighth Report on the Implementation of Resolution Reforms”, which pointed out that an important lesson of the global financial crisis was that it is insufficient for authorities to rely entirely on policies aimed at reducing the probability of individual financial firms failing.

  47. 47.

    According to the FSB, “The fact that many third party providers may fall outside the regulatory perimeter places increased emphasis on the importance of managing related operational risks, which could ultimately undermine financial stability”; see FSB. 2017. “Financial Stability Implications from FinTech. Supervisory and Regulatory Issues that Merit Authorities’ Attention”, 27 June.

  48. 48.

    Consequently, it has been easy for the FSB to add a new consideration concerning the risk that the entry of BigTech firms could expedite or amplify the alternative market-based financing (through these firms’ existing wide customer base, trusted customer relationships, strong capital positions, easy access to external funding and potentially different business focus).

  49. 49.

    Hereafter, there is the opportunity to take into account the further efforts that are ongoing in the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), considering that the relevant market structure is characterized by such factors as the number and size of market participants, barriers to entry and exit, and accessibility of information and technology to all participants.

  50. 50.

    The above consideration refers to Clinton, B. 2000 “From Digital Divide to Digital Opportunity”, Washington D.C., February 2.

  51. 51.

    It worth notice that all the above refers to THE WHITE HOUSE, Office of the vice president, Remarks by Vice President Al Gore “Digital Divide Event”, April 28, 1998.

  52. 52.

    In particular, this part of the research refers to Negreiro, M. 2015. “Briefing at EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service. Bridging the digital divide in the EU”, Bruxelles; see also the foundations of the research conducted by Abu-Shanab, E. and Al-Jamal, N. 2015 “Exploring the Gender Digital Divide in Jordan”, Gender, Technology and Development, p. 91 ff.

  53. 53.

    It is worth noting that “Presidency Conclusions” at Lisbon European Council 23 and 24 March 2000; see also Piazolo, D. 2001. “The Digital Divide” CESifo Forum, p. 29 ff.

  54. 54.

    By referring to this asymmetry with respect to the objective of bridging the digital divide in the EU, the European Parliament refers to the fact that about half of the less-educated and the elderly in the population do not use it regularly, and about 58 million EU citizens (aged 16–74 years old) have never used it at all; see UNEVOC – UNESCO 2014 “Digital divide” Resources and Services.

  55. 55.

    Let us recall Rodotà, S. 2012. “Il diritto di avere diritti”, Roma-Bari; Rodotà, S. 2006. “La vita e le regole. Tra diritto e non diritto”, Milano; Rodotà, S. 2004. “Tecnopolitica. La democrazia e le nuove tecnologie della comunicazione”, Rodotà, S. 1995. “Tecnologie e diritti”, Bologna, Rodotà, S., 2004. “Diritto, scienza, tecnologia: modelli e scelte di regolamentazione”, “Scienza e diritto nel prisma del diritto comparato”, p. 397 ss.

  56. 56.

    See Hertig, G. and McCahery, J. A. 2003. “Company and Takeover Law Reforms in Europe: Misguided Harmonization Efforts or Regulatory Competition?” ECGI – Law Working Paper No. 12/2003, which suggested that harmonization is likely to be ineffective or to promote bureaucratic uniformity rather than enable market-driven diversity.

  57. 57.

    See Maume, P. 2018. “Reducing Legal Uncertainty and Regulatory Arbitrage for Robo-Advice” European Company and Financial Law Review, which argued that robo-advisers provide investment advice within the meaning of the Second Markets in Financial Instruments Directive.

  58. 58.

    It is worth considering Rodotà, S. 1973. “Elaboratori elettronici e controllo sociale”, Bologna, p. 183 ss. and the literature about ‘small claims’; see Stone, K. 2004. “Alternative Dispute Resolution” Encyclopedia of Legal History, Oxford; Wissler, E. 1997. “The Effects of Mandatory Mediation: Empirical Research on the Experience of Small Claims and Common Pleas Courts” Willamette Law Review.

  59. 59.

    See European Commission’s Action Plan on how to harness the opportunities presented by technology-enabled innovation in financial services (FinTech), 8 march 2018.

  60. 60.

    It refers to Art. 130, Treaty of European Union, signed at Maastricht on 7 February 1992.

  61. 61.

    It is worth adding a reference to European Commission 2018, European Commission’s Action Plan on how to harness the opportunities presented by technology-enabled innovation in financial services (FinTech), 8 march.

  62. 62.

    It refers to EBA 2018. “The EBA’s fintech roadmap. Conclusions from the consultation on the EBA’s approach to financial technology (fintech)”. 15 March.

  63. 63.

    It remarks that FSB. 2019. “FinTech and market structure in financial services: Market developments and potential financial stability implications”. 14 February, recalls the EBA has published its results on the application of new high-tech business models by credit institutions, and the new risks and opportunities for financial operators from which it then developed a ‘Fintech Knowledge Hub’; see EBA 2019, Report on crypto-assets, available at www.eba.europa.eu.

  64. 64.

    In addition to the considerations above, it is worth to include a reference to Arner, D. W. and Barberis, Janos Nathan and Buckley, Ross P., The Evolution of Fintech: A New Post-Crisis Paradigm? (October 1, 2015). University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2015/047. See also Barrantes, R. 2007. “Analysis of ICT Demand: What is Digital Poverty and how to Measure it?” “Digital poverty: Latin American and Caribbean perspectives” Ottawa.

  65. 65.

    The analysis recalls Ecofin (2019) “Draft Joint Statement by the Council and the Commission on Stablecoins” Brussels, 6 November 2”.

  66. 66.

    See, on this point, the general critique of Bonfadelli, H. 2002. “The Internet and Knowledge Gaps – A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation” European Journal of Communication, p. 65 ff. See also Solove, D. J. 2002. “Conceptualizing Privacy” California Law Review; Longo, E. and Lorenzini, L. 2017. “Ict e parlamenti: oltre la mera diffusione dei contenuti”, “Studi Pisani sul Parlamento VII. La crisi del Parlamento nelle regole sulla sua percezione” Pisa.

  67. 67.

    It is sufficient to recall Pellegrini, M. 2003. “Banca Centrale Nazionale e Unione Monetaria Europea. Il caso italiano”, Padova, with respect to central banking and monetary policy.

  68. 68.

    In view of the above, the Council and the Commission state that no global stablecoin arrangement should begin operation in the European Union until the legal, regulatory and oversight challenges and risks have been adequately identified and addressed; see Ecofin (2019) “Draft Joint Statement by the Council and the Commission on Stablecoins” Brussels, 6 November. Hence, whether this statement is covered by the EU Treaties or not is the rising doubt.

  69. 69.

    It refers to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 2012. “Core principles for effective banking supervision”, Basel.

  70. 70.

    In addition, see Philippon, T. 2017. “The FinTech Opportunity”, BIS Working Papers No 655. However, the current market trends suggest that nowadays the regulatory interventions have made the financial sector safer, and it is possible that the scope of supervision will include fintech, even if this approach would increase political economy and coordination costs (as certain analysis shows).

  71. 71.

    Moreover, see Laeven, L. and Levine, R. and Michalopoulos, S. 2015. “Financial innovation and endogenous growth”, Journal of Financial Intermediation, p. 1 ff., with respect to the consideration that, sometimes, the contracts underlying fintech can reflect the uncertainties and concerns arising from the instability of the capital market; however, it is not possible to admit agreements not adequate to support the challenges set by the changes taking place (and by the new centrality of banking compared to the recovery of the real economy); see Lemma, outsourcing.

  72. 72.

    This suggested making a distinction between the platforms aimed at supporting bank’s supply and those able to sustain alternative forms of market-based financing (as—e.g.—invoice trading). Indeed, the latter would require specific rules, their being a sort of marketplace that usually involves borrowers being matched directly with investors (although some platforms use the balance sheet of their managing company to lend). Even if the BIS declares a limited availability of official data on fintech credit, it is possible to rely on its summaries (most of them based on non-official sector surveys and financial disclosures of platforms); see Working Group established by the Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) 2017. “FinTech credit. Market structure, business models and financial stability implications”.

  73. 73.

    It refers to Working Group established by the Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) 2017. “FinTech credit. Market structure, business models and financial stability implications”.

  74. 74.

    In this respect, the BIS shared available data showing that fintech credit activity has expanded rapidly in many countries over recent years, albeit from a very low base (and that estimates from the CCAF indicate that $284 billion in such credit was extended globally in 2016, up from $11 billion in 2013); see Claessens, S. and Frost, J. and Turner, G. and Zhu, F. 2018 “Fintech credit markets around the world: size, drivers and policy issues” BIS Quarterly Review.

  75. 75.

    Let us recall again Claessens, S. and Frost, J. and Turner, G. and Zhu, F. 2018. “Fintech credit markets around the world: size, drivers and policy issues” BIS Quarterly Review.

  76. 76.

    It recalls the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 2018. “Sound Practices Implications of fintech developments for banks and bank supervisors”, February.

  77. 77.

    Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and Financial Stability Institute (FSI) 2019. “Fintech developments in the insurance industry”, which describes fintech innovations that are relevant to the insurance industry and presents an overview of their potential impacts on the insurance sector and supervisory approaches.

  78. 78.

    In particular, see BIS-FSI 2019. “Fintech developments in the insurance industry” with respect to the possibility that the insurance value chain becomes fragmented as new technology-enabled players enter the market, and so the traditional customer relationship weakens.

  79. 79.

    In particular, it recalls Cœuré, B. 2019 “Fintech for the people. Keynote speech by the chair of the CPMI and Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the 14th BCBS-FSI high-level meeting for Africa on strengthening financial sector supervision and current regulatory priorities”, Cape Town, 31 January. In addition, see also Cœuré, B. 2018, “A Euro Cyber Resilience Board for pan-European Financial Infrastructures”, introductory remarks at the first meeting of the Euro Cyber Resilience Board for pan-European Financial Infrastructures, Frankfurt, 9 March.

  80. 80.

    This is considering the general outcome of Barzilai-Nahon, K. 2006. “Gaps and Bits: Conceptualizing Measurements for Digital Divide/s”, The Information Society, p. 269 ff.

  81. 81.

    It is worth highlighting the consideration that Central banks and other authorities should recognize this. Moreover, they should be explicit in their commitment to expand payments access. This needs to make it known to the industry and the public alike that we, as authorities, are putting the emphasis on inclusion for everyone; See Cœuré, B. 2019. “Fintech for the people. Keynote speech by the chair of the CPMI and Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the 14th BCBS-FSI high-level meeting for Africa on strengthening financial sector supervision and current regulatory priorities”, Cape Town, 31 January.

  82. 82.

    It refers to the conclusion of FSB 2017. “Financial stability implications from FinTech”, 27 June. See also CPMI 2017, “Distributed ledger technology in payment, clearing and settlement”, February; European Commission 2018. “FinTech action plan: For a more competitive and innovative European financial sector”, 8 March.

    See also ECB and Bank of Japan 2017, “Payment systems: liquidity saving mechanisms in a distributed ledger environment”, a joint research project of the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan—STELLA, September.

  83. 83.

    It is worth recalling ECB Advisory Group on Market Infrastructures for Securities and Collateral 2017. “The potential impact of DLTs on securities post-trading harmonization and on the wider EU financial market integration”, which highlighted that some distributed ledgers do not use double-entry bookkeeping but single-entry bookkeeping with cryptographic linkages. This calls into question the role of an issuance or distribution account. Hence, in the case of DLT adoption, it is possible that DLTs would be used as “niche” solution for the issuance of specific products that currently takes place in an inefficient way; transfer instructions and enrichment to trade data would flow in near-real time.

  84. 84.

    See also ECB and Bank of Japan 2017, “Payment systems: liquidity saving mechanisms in a distributed ledger environment”, a joint research project of the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan—STELLA, September.

  85. 85.

    Indeed, there is no doubt that there was persistent, directional change in the regulation adopted to prevent further degeneration of the financial markets and to avoid the experienced pro-cyclical effects.

  86. 86.

    All of the above complies with the assumption that opening up market access to fintech companies will help increase competition, lower costs and be incentive for further innovation.; see Cœuré, B. 2018a. “Financial regulation and innovation: a two-way street. Introductory remarks by the member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at a roundtable organised by FinLeap”, Berlin, 14 March 2018.

  87. 87.

    See Nabilou, H., 2019. “Central Bank Digital Currencies: Preliminary Legal Observations”. Journal of Banking Regulation.

    See also Walch, A. 2015. “The Bitcoin Blockchain as Financial Market Infrastructure: A Consideration of Operational Risk” NYU Journal of Legislation and Public Policy, which highlights the importance of functioning financial market infrastructure to global financial stability, and describes relevant principles that global financial regulators have adopted to help maintain this stability, focusing particularly on governance, risk management and operational risk.

  88. 88.

    See Buchak, G. and Matvos, G. and Piskorski, T. and Seru, A. 2017. “Fintech, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the Rise of Shadow Banks”, Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 17-39, which showed how two forces, regulatory differences and technological advantages, contributed to the growth of fintech.

  89. 89.

    ‘The High-Level Group of Financial Supervision in the EU’, chaired by Jacques de Larosière, “Report”, 25 February 2009, p. 57.

    See Venturi, E. 2009. “Globalizzazione, interconnessione dei mercati e crisi finanziaria. Identificazione di possibili interventi correttivi” Banca borsa titoli di credito I, p. 84.; Pellegrini, M. 2012 “L’architettura di vertice dell’ordinamento finanziario europeo: funzioni e limiti della supervisione” Rivista trimestrale di diritto dell’economia, I, p. 54.; Guarracino, F. 2012 “Supervisione bancaria europea (Sistema delle fonti e modelli teorici)” Padova.

  90. 90.

    The Lamfalussy process did not deal with strengthening prudential oversight—but the report warned: “While the committee strongly believes that large deep, liquid and innovative financial markets will result in substantial efficiency gains and will therefore bring individual benefits to European citizens; it also believes that greater efficiency does not necessarily go hand in hand with enhanced financial stability”; see Troiano, V. 2012 “Interactions Between EU and National Authorities in the New Structure of EU Financial System Supervision” Law and Economics Yearly Review, p. 104 ff.

  91. 91.

    See ‘The High-Level Group of Financial Supervision in the EU’, chaired by Jacques de Larosière, “Report”, 25 February 2009, p. 7.

  92. 92.

    Obviously, in this period, the meaning of ‘technical’ itself improved, and therefore this group highlighted that “given the speed at which financial markets evolve, it is important to maintain a consistent set of technical rules applying to all financial firms”; see ‘The High-Level Group of Financial Supervision in the EU’, chaired by Jacques de Larosière, “Report”, 25 February 2009, p. 58.

  93. 93.

    See REGULATION (EU) No 1095/2010, Recital 15.

  94. 94.

    See REGULATION (EU) No 1095/2010, Art. 9, para. 4.

  95. 95.

    In addition, it is worth referring to Recine, F. and Teixeira, P. G. 2009 “The New Financial Stability Architecture in the EU” Paolo Baffi Centre Research Paper No. 2009-62 on the need to reinforce significantly—ten years after the introduction of the euro—the financial stability architecture at the EU level.

  96. 96.

    It refers to ESMA Report. Licensing of FinTech business models, of 12 July 2019 | ESMA50-164-2430.

  97. 97.

    See on this Lener, R. and Parrillo, G. 2018 “Quali regole per fintech?” “”Fintech: diritto tecnologia e finanza” Roma, p. 7 ff.

  98. 98.

    See ESMA, EBA, EIOPA, Joint Committee Discussion Paper on automation in financial advice, JC 2015 080, 4 December 2015.

  99. 99.

    This refers to ESAs Report on FinTech: Regulatory Sandboxes and Innovation Hubs, January 2019.

  100. 100.

    It is worth recalling again to ‘The High-Level Group of Financial Supervision in the EU’, chaired by Jacques de Larosière, “Report”, 25 February 2009, p. 13.

  101. 101.

    See EBA. 2018. “The EBA’s fintech roadmap. Conclusions from the consultation on the EBA’s approach to financial technology (fintech)”. 15 March.

  102. 102.

    It is worth recalling that innovation was consider also at the time of the Basel III review; see Delimatsis, P. 2012. “Financial Innovation and Prudential Regulation – The New Basel III Rules” TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2012-016.

  103. 103.

    In general, this topic refers also to the digital divide, see Brandtzæg, P. B. and Heim, J. and Karahasanovic, A. 2011. “Understanding the new digital divide—A typology of Internet users in Europe” International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, p. 123 ff.

  104. 104.

    See Keidar, R. and Blemus, S. “Cryptocurrencies and Market Abuse Risks: It’s Time for Self-Regulation” Lexology, which highlighted that market abuse risks have not been eliminated by distributed ledger technology (DLT), and, given the nature of unregulated ICOs or cryptocurrencies investments, such risks are, in many ways, far greater.

  105. 105.

    See Ellis, E. 1999. “The principle of proportionality in the laws of Europe” Oxford, and in particular Tribimas, T. 1999. “Proportionality in community law: searching for the appropriate standard of scrutiny”, which moves to a specific reference to the appropriateness and the relevant objectives.

  106. 106.

    It refers to EBA 2018. “Report on the prudential risks and opportunities arising for institutions from fintech”, 3 July p. 4.

  107. 107.

    It recalls, in particular, Okafor, A. and Fadul, J. 2019. “Bank Risks, Regulatory Interventions and Deconstructing the Focus on Credit Risk” Research Journal of Finance and Accounting. See also de Fontnouvelle, P. and Jordan, J. S. and Rosengren, E. S. 2005 “Implication of alternative operational risk modeling techniques” National Bureau of Economic Research; Ebnöther, S. and Vanini, P. and McNeil, A. and Antolinez-Fehr, P. 2003. “Modelling Operational Risk” Journal of Risk p. 1 ff.

  108. 108.

    It is worth considering the possibility to exploit a board-level technology committee; see Harrast, S. and Swaney, A. 2019. “What Is the Role of the Board-Level Technology Committee?” SSRN Research Paper no. 3456770.

  109. 109.

    See EBA Report on innovative uses of consumer data by financial institutions, 28 June 2017.

  110. 110.

    See EBA, Fintech: Regulatory Sandboxes and Innovation Hubs, JC 2018 74, p. 10.

  111. 111.

    On the arduous process of completing the single regulatory rulebook for the European Union; see Ferran, E. and Babis, V. 2013. “The European Single Supervisory Mechanism” University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 10/2013.

    See Wymeersch, E. 2012. “The European Banking Union. A first Analysis”, Financial Law Institute Working Paper Series WP 2012-07; Capriglione, F. “L’unione bancaria europea”, Torino, 2013; Ibrido, R. 2017. “L’unione bancaria europea. Profili costituzionali” Roma, 2017.

    See also Babis, B. 2014. “Single Rulebook for Prudential Regulation of Banks: Mission Accomplished?” European Business Law Review.

  112. 112.

    It is worth recalling the EBA 2019. “EBA report on the impact of fintech on payment institutions’ and e-money institutions’ business models”, July.

  113. 113.

    See EBA 2018. “EBA Report on the prudential risks and opportunities arising for institutions from fintech”, 3 July, p. 54.

  114. 114.

    This assumption refers to the latest public intervention on the banking industry, aimed at overriding specific problems, with respect to the resolution of certain banks, the management of their crises, the reform of the cooperative banking (i.e. popular and mutual banks). Indeed, Italian market has recorded a remarkable activism by the policy-makers, legislators and supervisors; see Troiano, V. 2019, “Le Banche” “Manuale di diritto Bancario e Finanziario”, Padova, p. 350 ff.

    See also Capriglione, F. 1995, “Cooperazione di credito e testo unico bancario” Quaderni di ricerca giuridica della Consulenza Legale della Banca d’Italia, Roma; Oppo, G. 1997, “Mutualità e integrazione cooperativa”, Rivista di diritto civile, 1997, I, p. 357 ss.; Capriglione, F. Banche popolari. Metamorfosi di un modello, Bari, 2001; Saccomanni, F. 2010, “La sfida per le banche popolari nel nuovo scenario regolamentare” Verona, 26 febbraio; VV.AA. 2015, “La riforma delle banche popolari”, Padova; VV.AA. 2018, “Per un’ipotesi ricostruttiva della riforma delle BCC”, Rivista Trimestrale di Diritto dell’economia; Bonfatti, S. 2017, “La responsabilità degli “enti ponte” (e delle banche incorporanti) per le pretese risarcitorie nei confronti delle “quattro banche” (vantate dagli azionisti “risolti”, e non solo)”, dirittobancario.it, 2017.

  115. 115.

    Let us recall on this topic the considerations of De Vecchis, P. 1982. “Spunti per una rinnovata riflessione sulla nozione di banca”, Banca borsa titoli di credito, p. 754 ss.

  116. 116.

    Indeed, this refers not only to the praxis of empowering the public authorities with the duty to supervise the resolution of the crisis of a supervised entity, but also to the continued interventions of the supervisors’ employees in carrying out lectures at the university, and interaction with writers in academic collective productions. The result is a constant supervisory update, due to the continuous sharing of common knowledge; see D’Ambrosio, R. 2015, “The ECB and NCA liability within the Single Supervisory Mechanism” Quaderni di Ricerca Giuridica della Consulenza Legale della Banca d’Italia, Roma; Lamandini, M. and Muñoz, D. R. and Álvarez, J. S. 2015, “Depicting the limits to the SSM’s supervisory powers: The Role of Constitutional Mandates and of Fundamental Rights’ Protection” Quaderni di Ricerca Giuridica della Consulenza Legale della Banca d’Italia, Roma.

    See also Cassese, S. 2014, “La nuova architettura finanziaria europea” and Costi, R. 2014, “Il Testo Unico Bancario, oggi” and Capolino, O. 2014, “Il Testo unico bancario e il diritto dell’Unione Europea” and Perassi, M. 2014 “Brevi conclusioni” “Dal Testo unico bancario all’Unione bancaria: tecniche normative e allocazione di poteri” Quaderni di Ricerca Giuridica della Consulenza Legale della Banca d’Italia, Roma.

  117. 117.

    See Visco, I. 2019. “Sustainable development and climate risks: the role of central banks. Speech by the Governor of the Bank of Italy at the 18th International Conference for Credit Risk Evaluation “Assessing and Managing Climate Change Risk: Opportunities for Financial Institutions” Venice, 26 September.

    Whereby Ignazio Visco started by noting that “the issue of the compatibility between natural resources and the development goals of nations has been studied since at least the end of the eighteenth century, with the works of Thomas Malthus on food supply and population growth. It has then re-emerged a number of times in the public debate”.

  118. 118.

    See Barbagallo, C. 2019. “Fintech: Ruolo dell’Autorità di Vigilanza in un mercato che cambia” Napoli, 8 February, which recalls on this point “Global Monitoring Report on Non-Bank Financial Intermediation 2018”, published by the Financial Stability Board and highlights that the range of applications of regtech is very wide: policy, management of regulatory updates, reporting, processing and exploitation of corporate information. The most qualifying aspect concerns the tendency to use innovation not only in a passive logic of respect for the rules but in an active perspective of exploitation of the regulatory framework to develop competitive capacity, especially through the increase of efficiency of the organizational infrastructure.

  119. 119.

    It is worth adding a reference to VV.AA., 2018 “Intelligenza artificiale, protezione dati personali e regolazione”, Milano.

  120. 120.

    It recalls Visco, I. 2019. “Lezione Giorgio Fuà 2019. Centenario della nascita”, which pointed out that policy-makers must dwell also with the delay accumulated over the last thirty years in the spread of innovation in the economic and financial system and in the skills of adults and students. See also Visco, I. 2019. Speech at Associazione Bancaria Italiana – Assemblea degli Associati. Milan, July 12.

  121. 121.

    It refers to Wong, Y. C. and Law, C. K. and Fung, J. Y. C. and Lee, V. W. P. 2010. “Digital divide and social inclusion: policy challenge for social development in Hong Kong and South Korea’” Journal of Asian Public Policy, p. 37 ff.

  122. 122.

    In addition, it may be considered the conclusion of Jagtiani, J, and Lemieux, C. 2018. “Do Fintech Lenders Penetrate Areas that are Underserved by Traditional Banks?” FRB of Philadelphia Working Paper No. 18-13 on the role of innovation in shaping financial and banking landscapes.

  123. 123.

    See Visco, I. 2019. Considerazioni finali del Governatore. Relazione annuale. Roma, May 31, with regard to the use of artificial intelligence, which should not be limited to the search for improvements in the forecasting of economic and financial variables. To this end, the Italian central bank actively participates in the work of international committees and bodies to define a framework of harmonized rules aimed at supporting the virtuous development of financial innovation.

  124. 124.

    The first is the “fintech channel”; the second is represented by a ‘unit’ set up with the aim of dealing with the authorizations process of new entities intending to enter the financial perimeter, in which a special “fintech sector” has recently been established.

  125. 125.

    It is worth recalling the approach used in the 1990s to understand the need for a comprehensive assessment of the rules governing the authorizations to operate in the capital market; in this respect, see Amorosino, S. 1994. “L’autorizzazione all’attività creditizia nel nuovo T.U. delle leggi bancarie” Diritto della banca e del mercato finanziario, 1994, p. 149 ff.

  126. 126.

    This suggests that the high-tech nature of the business model cannot influence the duty to have an authorization (or not). Indeed, any market operator has to meet the safety standards necessary for the proper functioning of financial transactions and work to ensure savers’ confidence and prevent any abuse (regardless of the level of technology applied by those who carry out such activities). And the same is true for the protection of monetary stability, whereby the introduction of non-sovereign cryptocurrencies may entail risks of a different nature from those directly linked to technological innovation.; see Cœuré, B. and Loh, J. 2018, “Bitcoin not the answer to a cashless society”, opinion piece in the Financial Times, 12 March.

  127. 127.

    See ECB 2018 “Guide to assessments of fintech credit institution licence applications”, which pointed out that the ECB and NCAs will assess whether the applicant can demonstrate that it is able to hold in reserve sufficient capital to cover start-up losses in the first three years of activity and, where applicable, the costs associated with the possible execution of an exit plan. This is why this document requires that the business plan should precisely describe the forecast start-up losses in the first three years of activity and should include financial forecasts for the period up to the break-even point.

  128. 128.

    IVASS is currently challenging the need for supervising the software that trade and share risks among undertakers, insurance and reinsurance companies. However, at this stage, supervisors have not begun to run towards the control of the innovations that are influencing the insurance sector, nor extending the scope of their intervention to the tools able to contain the threats and dangers that would arise in risks (and then supports the market for insurance policies); see Rossi, S. 2018. Speech at the Conference ‘FinTech e lnsurTech: tecnologie digitali, banche, assicurazioni, nell’ambito dell’iniziativa “Incontri con la Banca d’Italia”. September 10.

  129. 129.

    The benefit of these developments can easily be seen in Italy, where the trends of the market depends predominantly on the banking system.; see Visco, I. 2019. Speech at Associazione Bancaria Italiana – Assemblea degli Associati. Milan, July 12.

  130. 130.

    Hence, it is possible to highlight the current effort of Consob, which—rather than monitoring fintech applications only—is going to “outline the broad direction of this process of digitalisation of the financial system and the structural changes prompted by competition in intermediaries’ business models; highlight the main open issues, with a view to preserving the smooth running of the financial market, preventing risks to investors, but also to safeguarding the innovation capability of operators (and potential new comers); predesign the viable public policy (wide-ranging) actions, where deemed useful”; see Savona, P. 2019. “Incontro annuale con il mercato finanziario Discorso del Presidente” Milano, 14 June.

  131. 131.

    See Schena, C. and Tanda, A. and Arlotta, C. and Potenza, G. 2018. “The development of FinTech. Opportunities and risks for the financial industry in the digital age”, Quaderno FinTech n. 1 – marzo 2018.

  132. 132.

    All the above considers the preliminary evidences shown by Palmerini, E. and Aiello, G. and Cappelli, V. and Morgante, G. and Amore, N. and Di Vetta, G. and Fiorinelli, G. and Galli, M. 2018. “Il FinTech e l’economia dei dati. Considerazioni su alcuni profili civilistici e penalistici. Le soluzioni del diritto vigente ai rischi per la clientela e gli operatori”, Quaderno FinTech n. 2 – December.

  133. 133.

    In this respect, it goes beyond the approach used by Burchi, A. and Mezzacapo, S. and Musile Tanzi, P. and Troiano, V. 2019. “Financial Data Aggregation e Account Information Services. Questioni regolamentari e profili di business”, Quaderno FinTech n. 4, March.

  134. 134.

    It is worth adding also a reference to the research of Sciarrone Alibrandi, A. and Borello, G. and Ferretti, R. and Lenoci, F. and Macchiavello, E. and Mattassoglio, F. and Panisi, F. 2019. “Marketplace lending, Verso nuove forme di intermediazione finanziaria?”, Quaderno FinTech n. 5, July.

  135. 135.

    This is not the case, but there is the risk that while the wise intermediaries point at programmers and coders, and the supervisors still examine the intermediaries; see in this rexpect Burchi, A. and Mezzacapo, S. and Musile Tanzi, P. and Troiano, V. 2019. “Financial Data Aggregation e Account Information Services. Questioni regolamentari e profili di business”, Quaderno FinTech n. 4, March

  136. 136.

    It is worth considering that “supporting technological innovation, and its efficient diffusion throughout the economy is key to obtaining sustained increases in productivity in the longer term, and to safeguarding the living standards of future generations, as well as the sustainability of our countries’ social security systems and public finances”; see Visco, I. 2019. “Remarks at the Event to Commemorate Thirty Years of Banca d’Italia in Japan. Speech by the Governor of the Bank of Italy. Thirty Years of Banca d’Italia in Japan: Anniversary Celebration” Tokyo, 11 June.

  137. 137.

    It is worth recalling Amorosino, S. and Lemma, V. 2016. “Administrative and Transaction Costs Arising from Brexit. A Regulatory Challenge” Law and economics yearly review; see also Capriglione F. and Ibrido, R. 2017. “La Brexit tra finanza e politica”, Milano.

  138. 138.

    It refers to FCA Regulatory sandbox lessons learned report, October 2017.

  139. 139.

    See FCA, Global Financial Innovation Network (GFIN), 09/08/2019. Nowadays, GFIN provides cross-border testing applications for creating an environment that allowed firms to simultaneously trial and scale new technologies in multiple jurisdictions, gaining real-time insight into how a product or service might operate in the market.

  140. 140.

    See GFIN, The global financial innovation network on its first year, June 2019.

  141. 141.

    See Innovating for the future: the next phase of Project Innovate, Speech by Christopher Woolard, Executive Director of Strategy and Competition at the FCA, delivered at the Innovate Finance Global Summit., 10/04/2017.

  142. 142.

    Furthermore, it also investigates the possibility of using blockchain technology for automating regulation and compliance. It would be expectable that reporting requirements, compliance procedures, databases and standards will flow together into a universal machine-readable format, and then will run into a smart device; see FCA 2019, “Blockchain Technology for Algorithmic Regulation and Compliance (BARAC)”, University College London, 11 September 2019.

  143. 143.

    See FCA, Digital regulatory reporting, 13 March 2019.

  144. 144.

    This starts from the content of the “Legal framework for distributed ledger technology and blockchain in Switzerland An overview with a focus on the financial sector”, Federal Council report, Bern, 14 December 2018.

  145. 145.

    It refers to a previous analysis that, before the current fintech wave, reviewed the historical reasons behind the success of Swiss private banks and discussed whether they possess the attributes necessary to be successful in the future. The authors suggested that, although at that time Swiss banquiers were positioned to retain their global supremacy, they needed to make important strategic decisions concerning the way they manage their businesses and the relevant technological support; see Shojai, S. and Feiger, G. 2002. “Les Banquiers Suisses: Can They Remain Leaders in Private Banking?”. Journal of Financial Transformation, p. 65 ff.

  146. 146.

    It refers to “Legal framework for distributed ledger technology and blockchain in Switzerland. An overview with a focus on the financial sector”, Federal Council report, Bern, 14 December 2018, whose content aims to provide an overview of the relevant legal framework and to clarify the need for action. In addition, the report should send a signal and show (1) that Switzerland is open to technological developments such as DLT and blockchain, (2) that the Swiss legal framework is already suitable for dealing with business models based on DLT and blockchain, (3) that Switzerland wants to further improve the innovation-friendly framework conditions and (4) that the Swiss authorities are determined to rigorously combat abuses.

  147. 147.

    See Bartlett, R. P. and Morse, A. and Stanton, R. H. and Wallace, N. E. 2019. “Consumer-Lending Discrimination in the Fintech Era” NBER Working Paper No. w25943 with respect to provide a workable interpretation of the courts’ legitimate-business-necessity defense of statistical discrimination.

  148. 148.

    In addition, see Chen, Y and Bellavitis, C. 2019. “Blockchain Disruption and Decentralized Finance: The Rise of Decentralized Business Models” Journal of Business Venturing Insights, which assessed the benefits of decentralized finance, identify existing business models and evaluate potential challenges and limits.

  149. 149.

    It is worth recalling the analysis of Whitacre, B. and Mills, B. 2007. “Infrastructure and the rural-urban divide in high-speed residential internet access” International Regional Science Review, p. 249 ff.

  150. 150.

    It recalls the “Legal framework for distributed ledger technology and blockchain in Switzerland. An overview with a focus on the financial sector”, Federal Council report, Bern, 14 December 2018, p. 42.

  151. 151.

    It refers to the foundation of the analysis provided by Willis, S., & Tranter, B. 2006 “Beyond the ‘digital divide’. Internet diffusion and inequality in Australia”, Journal of Sociology, p. 43 ff.

  152. 152.

    This risk adds to Buckley, R. P. and Arner, D. W. and Zetzsche, D. A. and Selga, E. 2019. “The Dark Side of Digital Financial Transformation: The New Risks of FinTech and the Rise of TechRisk” University of Luxembourg Law Working Paper 2019-009, which highlighted that the digitization and datafication combined with new technologies are taking place in developed global markets and at times even faster in emerging and developing markets.

  153. 153.

    See Weber, R. H. and Thouvenin, F. 2018. “Dateneigentum und Datenzugangsrechte – Bausteine der Informationsgesellschaft?” ZSR p. 60 ff. See also the press release by the Federal Council of 9 May 2018 on measures for a future-oriented data policy in Switzerland (“benchmarks”).

  154. 154.

    It is worth to recall Art. 16 D-FADP (Draft of the Federal Act on Total Revision of the Federal Act on Data Protection and amendment of other enactments on data protection, BBl 2017 7193, 7213); Art. 20 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (GDPR); and Parliamentary initiative Dobler 17.410 of 7 March 2017.

  155. 155.

    In particular, see Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority FINMA, ICO. Guidelines for enquiries regarding the regulatory framework for initial coin offerings (ICOs), updated 16 February 2018.

  156. 156.

    Moreover, see Hacker, P. and Thomale, C., “Crypto-Securities Regulation: ICOs, Token Sales and Cryptocurrencies under EU Financial Law” European Company and Financial Law Review p. 645 ff., which close their research by offering two policy proposals to mitigate legal uncertainty concerning token sales.

  157. 157.

    On this topic, see the outcome of Grey, R. and Dharmapalan, J. 2017. “The Macroeconomic Policy Implications of Digital Fiat Currency” “The Case for Digital Legal Tender”, which articulated a vision for how widespread adoption of Digital Fiat Currency may affect the macroeconomic levers a nation has at its disposal to steady economic growth.

  158. 158.

    This refers to the process related to the enhancement of the regulatory framework to facilitate client onboarding via digital channels made by FINMA, see “Asset management: technology-neutral FINMA regulations”, 1 July 2016; “FINMA reduces obstacles to FinTech”, 17 March 106; “Due diligence requirements for client onboarding via digital channels (Valid until 31.07.2018)”, 3 March 2016.

  159. 159.

    See Federal Department of Finance FDF, 2017. “Report on amendments to the Banking Ordinance (Fintech), Explanations”, p. 11 ff. See in general Reiser, N (2018). “Ist der Bankbegriff im Lichte aktueller technologischer Entwicklungen noch zeitgemäss?” AJP, p. 811 ff. See also Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority FINMA, Fact sheet: “Virtual Currencies”, updated 30 August 2018.

  160. 160.

    See again ”Legal framework for distributed ledger technology and blockchain in Switzerland. An overview with a focus on the financial sector”, Federal Council report, Bern, 14 December 2018, p. 85.

  161. 161.

    See “Federal Council report of 25 June 2014 on virtual currencies in response to the Schwaab (13.3687) and Weibel (13.4070) postulates”, p. 12 ff.

    See also “Swiss National Bank: Survey on payment methods 2017, Survey on payment methods and use of cash in Switzerland”, May 2018.

  162. 162.

    See Art. 6 para. 3 BankO as amended on 1 January 2019.

  163. 163.

    See Art. 6 para. 2 let. c BankO.

  164. 164.

    It is worth considering also the digital divide, as mentioned above; in this respect, see Verdegem, P. and Verhoest, P. 2009 “Profiling the Non-user: Rethinking Policy Initiatives Stimulating ICT Acceptance” Telecommunications Policy, p. 642 ff.

  165. 165.

    Furthermore, see again Zetzsche, D. A. and Preiner, C. 2017 “Cross-Border Crowdfunding – Towards a Single Crowdfunding Market for “European Banking Institute Working Paper Series 2017.

  166. 166.

    It recalls the conclusions of Stulz, R, M. 2019 “FinTech, BigTech, and the Future of Banks”. Fisher College of Business Working Paper No. 2019-03-020.

  167. 167.

    It is worth considering again “Legal framework for distributed ledger technology and blockchain in Switzerland. An overview with a focus on the financial sector”, Federal Council report, Bern, 14 December 2018, p. 92.

  168. 168.

    All the above recalls the research of Barth, J. R. and Caprio, G. and Levine, R. E. 1999. “Banking Systems Around the Globe: Do Regulation and Ownership Affect Performance and Stability?” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2325.

  169. 169.

    In this respect, this is considering that Ganchev, A. 2018. “The Swiss National Bank – a Central Bank or a Hedge Fund?” Zlaten vestnik. Tavex questions certain foundations of banking and central banking.

  170. 170.

    See “Legal framework for distributed ledger technology and blockchain in Switzerland. An overview with a focus on the financial sector”, Federal Council report, Bern, 14 December 2018, p. 92.

  171. 171.

    It refers to art. 2 let. c FMIA no. 2; Art. 94 para. 3 FMIA; Art. 2 para. 3 FMIO; and Art. 80 FMIO; see in this respect Favre, O. and Kramer, S. 2017 “Art. 2 FinfraG”. “Kommentarzum Finanzmarktinfrastrukturgesetz FinfraG”. Zurich.

  172. 172.

    See FINMA 2018a: section 3.2.

  173. 173.

    This is considering that “Legal framework for distributed ledger technology and blockchain in Switzerland. An overview with a focus on the financial sector”, Federal Council report, Bern, 14 December 2018, p. 96, provides that this kind of approach would primarily entail risks: risks in the areas of investor protection and the reputation of the Swiss financial market; risks relating to the equivalence of Swiss financial market law provisions to foreign requirements; the risk of being treated unequally without good reason compared with financial market players that do not use blockchain technology; and opportunities for regulatory arbitrage via the use of blockchain technologies.

    It is worth recalling on this point Allenspach, N. and Monnin, P., 2006. “International integration, common exposures and systemic risk in the banking sector: An empirical investigation”. Working paper, Swiss National Bank; Avgouleas, E. and Kiayias, A., 2018. “The Promise of Blockchain Technology for Global Securities and Derivatives Markets: The New Financial Ecosystem and the ‘Holy Grail’ of Systemic Risk Containment”. Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper No. 2018/43; ESMA. 2017. “ESMA alerts investors to the high risks of Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs)”.

  174. 174.

    See Chen, Y and Bellavitis, C. 2019. “Blockchain Disruption and Decentralized Finance: The Rise of Decentralized Business Models” Journal of Business Venturing Insights, which highlighted how—as a new area of financial technology—decentralized finance may reshape the structure of modern finance and create a new landscape for entrepreneurship and innovation, showcasing the promises and challenges of decentralized business models.

  175. 175.

    See Art. 81 FMIA. See also Bärtschi, H. and MEISSER, C. 2015. “Virtuelle Währungen aus finanzmarkt- und zivilrechtlicher Sicht”. “Rechtliche Herausforderungen durch webbasierte und mobile Zahlungssysteme. Zurich: Schulthess” p. 115 ff.

  176. 176.

    In addition, see Baker, F. J. 2018. “The Concept of Cybercrime: Applying the General Part to Limit Offending via Cyber Means” People’s Procuratorial Semimonthly; de Boyrie, M. E. and Pak, S. J. and Zdanowicz, J. S. 2001 “The Impact of Switzerland’s Money Laundering Law on Capital Flows Through Abnormal Pricing in International Trade” EFMA 2001 Lugano Meetings; CIBER Working Paper.

  177. 177.

    See Laskowski, M. and Kim, H. M. and Zargham, M. and Barlin, M. and Kabanov, D. 2019. “Token Economics in Real-Life: Cryptocurrency and Incentives Design for Insolar’s Blockchain Network” SSRN Research Paper no. 3465085 about systems and simulation combined with cryptocurrency expertise that are able to design a mechanism to incentivize enterprises and individual users—and in particular through the use of subsidy pools, application developers—to help adoption of their new public blockchain network.

  178. 178.

    It recalls Yu, G. and Zhang, J. 2017. “A Revisit to Capital Control Policies When Bitcoin Is in Town” 31st Australasian Finance and Banking Conference 2018 on the magnitude and statistical properties of triangle arbitrage gains.

  179. 179.

    It refers to the Italian approach to the juridical system, provided that traditional banks and fintech serve the same needs of the society. Hence the importance of the legal studies on the unity of the legal order, and the coherence of its principles and norms.

    In fact, legal orders are dynamic systems, the meaning of which shows that individual legal propositions, although they can also be considered in themselves, in their abstractness, tend to be interpreted as part of a system. The result is the possibility of a systemic interpretation, understood as a form of interpretation of a system that is justified on the assumption that some rules constitute an ordered totality. Therefore, the legislator must tend to derive all the rules from certain general principles, considered in the same way as the postulates of a scientific system.

    In particular, the system will have to be completed with an inductive procedure, that is, starting from the content of the individual technical solutions in order to constitute increasingly general concepts, as Bobbio suggested; see Bobbio, N. 1992 “Teoria generale del diritto”, Torino, p. 201 ff.

  180. 180.

    See FINMA 2019. “Partial revision of the Circular 2008/3 ‘Public deposits with non-banks’” with respect to the fact that investing and paying interest on deposits received is no longer prohibited within the sandbox, but merely operating the so-called interest rate differential business, which remains the privilege of the banks.

References

  • Abu-Shanab, E. and Al-Jamal, N. 2015. ‘Exploring the Gender Digital Divide in Jordan’, Gender, Technology and Development.

    Google Scholar 

  • Allenspach, N. and Monnin, P., 2006. “International integration, common exposures and systemic risk in the banking sector: An empirical investigation”. Working paper, Swiss National Bank;

    Google Scholar 

  • Alpa, G. 2019. “Fintech: un laboratorio per i giuristi” Contratto e impresa, 2019.

    Google Scholar 

  • Amorosino, S. and Lemma, V., 2016. “Administrative and Transaction Costs Arising from Brexit. A Regulatory Challenge” Law and economics yearly review.

    Google Scholar 

  • Amorosino, S., 1994. “L’autorizzazione all’attività creditizia nel nuovo T.U. delle leggi bancarie” Diritto della banca e del mercato finanziario.

    Google Scholar 

  • Antonio, A. and Tuffley, D. 2014. “The gender digital divide in developing countries” Future Internet.

    Google Scholar 

  • Armour, J. and Hansmann, H. and Kraakman, R. H. 2009. “The Essential Elements of Corporate Law” Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 20/2009.

    Google Scholar 

  • Arnaboldi, F. 2019. “Progress on the First Two Pillars of the Banking Union” “Risk and Regulation in Euro Area Banks”, London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Arner, D. W. and Barberis, J. N. and Buckley, R. P., 2016. “FinTech, RegTech and the Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation”. University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2016/035.

    Google Scholar 

  • Arner, D. W. and Barberis, J. N. and Buckley, Ross P. 2015 “The Evolution of Fintech: A New Post-Crisis Paradigm?” University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2015/047.

    Google Scholar 

  • Arrow, K. J. and Hahn, F. 1971 “General Competitive Analysis”, San Francisco.

    Google Scholar 

  • Attewell, P. 2001. “The First and the Second Digital Divides” Sociology of Education.

    Google Scholar 

  • Avgouleas, E. and Kiayias, A., 2018. “The Promise of Blockchain Technology for Global Securities and Derivatives Markets: The New Financial Ecosystem and the ‘Holy Grail’ of Systemic Risk Containment”. Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper No. 2018/43.

    Google Scholar 

  • Babis, B., 2014. “Single Rulebook for Prudential Regulation of Banks: Mission Accomplished?” European Business Law Review.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baily, M. N., 1993. “Competition, Regulation and Efficiency in Service Industries” Brookings Papers in Microeconomics.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baker, F. J., 2018. “The Concept of Cybercrime: Applying the General Part to Limit Offending via Cyber Means” People’s Procuratorial Semimonthly.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baker, H. K. and Ricciardi, V., 2015. “Understanding Behavioral Aspects of Financial Planning and Investing” Journal of Financial Planning.

    Google Scholar 

  • Balkin, J. M. 2008. “The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age” Pepperdine Law Review

    Google Scholar 

  • Banca d’Italia, 2017. “FinTech In Italia. Indagine conoscitiva sull’adozione delle innova-zioni tecnologiche applicate ai servizi finanziari, Roma.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and Financial Stability Institute (FSI), 2019. “Fintech developments in the insurance industry”.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barbagallo, C., 2019. “Fintech: Ruolo dell’Autorità di Vigilanza in un mercato che cambia” Napoli, 8 February.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barrantes, R. 2007. “Analysis of ICT Demand: What is Digital Poverty and how to Measure it?” “Digital poverty: Latin American and Caribbean perspectives” Ottawa.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barth, J. R. and Caprio, G. and Levine, R. E., 1999. “Banking Systems Around the Globe: Do Regulation and Ownership Affect Performance and Stability?” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2325.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bartlett, R. P. and Morse, A. and Stanton, R. H. and Wallace, N. E., 2019. “Consumer-Lending Discrimination in the Fintech Era” NBER Working Paper No. w25943.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bärtschi, H. and Meisser, C., 2015. “Virtuelle Währungen aus finanzmarkt- und zivilrechtlicher Sicht”. “Rechtliche Herausforderungen durch webbasierte und mobile Zahlungssysteme. Zurich: Schulthess”.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barzilai-Nahon, K. 2006 “Gaps and Bits: Conceptualizing Measurements for Digital Divide/s”, The Information Society.

    Google Scholar 

  • Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), 2012. “Core principles for effective banking supervision”, Basel.

    Google Scholar 

  • Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), 2018. “Sound Practices Implications of fintech developments for banks and bank supervisors”, February.

    Google Scholar 

  • Begley, T. A. and Srinivasan, K., 2019. “Small Bank Lending in the Era of Fintech and Shadow Banking: A Sideshow?” Northeastern U. D’Amore-McKim School of Business Research Paper No. 3317672.

    Google Scholar 

  • Belleflamme, P. and Lambert, T. and Schwienbacher, A. “Crowdfunding Dynamics” CESifo Working Paper No. 7797.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bennett, S. and Maton, K. and Kervin, L. 2008. “The ‘Digital Natives’ Debate: A Critical Review of the Evidence” British Journal of Educational Technology.

    Google Scholar 

  • Berle A. A. and Means G. C. 1932. “The Modern Corporation and Private Property”;

    Google Scholar 

  • Berlingò, V. 2017. “Il fenomeno della datafication e la sua giuridicizzazione”, Rivista Trimestrale di Diritto Pubblico.

    Google Scholar 

  • BIS-FSI, 2019. “Fintech developments in the insurance industry”.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bobbio, N., 1992. “Teoria generale del diritto”, Torino.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bofondi, M., 2017. ““Il lending-based crowdfunding: opportunità e rischi”, Questioni di Economia e Finanza, Roma.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bonfadelli, H. 2002. “The Internet and Knowledge Gaps – A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation” European Journal of Communication.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bonfatti, S., 2017. “La responsabilità degli “enti ponte” (e delle banche incorporanti) per le pretese risarcitorie nei confronti delle “quattro banche” (vantate dagli azionisti “risolti”, e non solo)”, dirittobancario.it, 2017.

    Google Scholar 

  • Borselli, A. 2018 “Insurance by Algorithm” European Insurance Law Review.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brandtzæg, P. B. and Heim, J. and Karahasanovic, A. 2011. “Understanding the new digital divide—A typology of Internet users in Europe” International Journal of Human-Computer Studies.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bruckner, M. A. 2018 “Regulating Fintech Lending” Banking & Financial Services Policy Report. Runshan, F. and Yan, H. and Param Vir, S. 2019 “Crowds, Lending, Machines, and Bias” SSRN Research Paper no. 3206027.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchak, G. and Matvos, G. and Piskorski, T. and Seru, A. 2017 “Fintech, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the Rise of Shadow Banks”, Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 17–39.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buckley, R. P. and Arner, D. W. and Zetzsche, D. A. and Selga, E., 2019. “The Dark Side of Digital Financial Transformation: The New Risks of FinTech and the Rise of TechRisk” University of Luxembourg Law Working Paper 2019-009.

    Google Scholar 

  • Burchi, A. and Mezzacapo, S. and Musile Tanzi, P. and Troiano, V. 2019. “Financial Data Aggregation e Account Information Services. Questioni regolamentari e profili di business”, Quaderno FinTech n. 4, March.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bure, C. 2005. ‘Digital Inclusion without Social Inclusion: The Consumption of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) within Homeless Subculture in Scotland’, The Journal of Community Informatics.

    Google Scholar 

  • Campbell, J. Y. and Cochrane, J. H., 1998. “By Force of Habit: A Consumption-Based Explanation of Plantation of Aggregate Stock Market Behavior” Center for Research in Security Prices Working Paper No. 412.

    Google Scholar 

  • Canalini, V., 2019. “Il FinTech e le nuove frontiere dell’innovazione finanziaria”, Manuale di diritto bancario e finanziario, Padova.

    Google Scholar 

  • Capolino, O., 2014. “Il Testo unico bancario e il diritto dell’Unione Europea”

    Google Scholar 

  • Capriglione F. and Ibrido, R., 2017. “La Brexit tra finanza e politica”, Milano.

    Google Scholar 

  • Capriglione, F. 1995 “Cooperazione di credito e testo unico bancario” Quaderni di ricerca giuridica della Consulenza Legale della Banca d’Italia, Roma.

    Google Scholar 

  • Capriglione, F. 2001. “Banche popolari. Metamorfosi di un modello”, Bari.

    Google Scholar 

  • Capriglione, F. 2004. “Etica della finanza mercato globalizzazione”, Bari.

    Google Scholar 

  • Capriglione, F. 2013. “L’unione bancaria europea”, Torino.

    Google Scholar 

  • Capriglione, F. 2018. “Considerazioni a margine del volume: il tramonto della banca universale?” Rivista Trimestrale di Diritto dell’Economia.

    Google Scholar 

  • Capriglione, F. 2019. “Un secolo di regolazione” “Manuale di diritto bancario e finanziario”, Padova.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carcaterra, G. 2014. “Le norme costitutive”, Torino.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cassese, S., 2000 “Quattro paradossi sui rapporti tra poteri pubblici ed autonomie privateRivista trimestrale diritto pubblico.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cassese, S., 2009. “Il diritto globale” Torino; Carcaterra, G. 1979 “La forza costitutiva delle norme. L’uomo e la società”.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cassese, S., 2014. “La nuova architettura finanziaria europea”.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chang, H. F. 1999. “A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle” University of Pennsylvania Law School, Institute for Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 272.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chen, Y. and Bellavitis, C. 2019 “Blockchain Disruption and Decentralized Finance: The Rise of Decentralized Business Models” Journal of Business Venturing Insights.

    Google Scholar 

  • Christopher, Woolard, 2017. “Innovating for the future: the next phase of Project Innovate” Speech by the Executive Director of Strategy and Competition at the FCA, delivered at the Innovate Finance Global Summit., April.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ciocca, P., 2019 “Il tempo è adesso – FinTech: mercato, regolazione, futuro”.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cirillo, P. and Taleb, N. 2015. “Expected Shortfall Estimation for Apparently Infinite-Mean Models of Operational Risk” Quantitative Finance.

    Google Scholar 

  • Claessens, S. and Frost, J. and Turner, G. and Zhu, F. 2018. “Fintech credit markets around the world: size, drivers and policy issues” BIS Quarterly Review.

    Google Scholar 

  • Clinton, B. 2000. “From Digital Divide to Digital Opportunity”, Washington D.C., February 2.

    Google Scholar 

  • Coase, R. H., 1988. “The firm the market and the law” Chicago.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cœuré, B. 2018a “Financial regulation and innovation: a two-way street. Introductory remarks by the member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at a roundtable organised by FinLeap”, Berlin, 14 MarcH.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cœuré, B. 2018b, “A Euro Cyber Resilience Board for pan-European Financial Infrastructures”, introductory remarks at the first meeting of the Euro Cyber Resilience Board for pan-European Financial Infrastructures, Frankfurt, 9 March.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cœuré, B. 2019 “Fintech for the people. Keynote speech by the chair of the CPMI and Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the 14th BCBS-FSI high-level meeting for Africa on strengthening financial sector supervision and current regulatory priorities”, Cape Town, 31 January

    Google Scholar 

  • Cœuré, B. and Loh, J., 2018. “Bitcoin not the answer to a cashless society”, opinion piece in the Financial Times, 12 March.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cohen-Setton, J. and Vallée, S. 2018. “Federalizing a Central Bank: A Comparative Study of the Early Years of the FED and the ECB”.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cooter, R and Ulen, T., 2008. “Law and Economics”, Boston.

    Google Scholar 

  • Costi, R., 2014. “Il Testo Unico Bancario, oggi. Quaderni di Ricerca Giuridica della Banca d’Italia”. Roma

    Google Scholar 

  • CPMI 2017, “Distributed ledger technology in payment, clearing and settlement”, February.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cukierman, A. 2014. “Euro-Area and US Banks Behavior, and ECB-Fed Monetary Policies During the Global Financial Crisis: A Comparison” CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10289.

    Google Scholar 

  • D’Acquisto, G. and Naldi, M. 2017. “Big data e privacy by design”, Torino.

    Google Scholar 

  • D’Ambrosio, R., 2015. “The ECB and NCA liability within the Single Supervisory Mechanism” Quaderni di Ricerca Giuridica della Consulenza Legale della Banca d’Italia, Roma.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davies, G. B., 2017. “New Vistas in Risk Profiling” CFA Institute Research Foundation.

    Google Scholar 

  • de Boyrie, M. E. and Pak, S. J. and Zdanowicz, J. S., 2001. “The Impact of Switzerland’s Money Laundering Law on Capital Flows Through Abnormal Pricing in International Trade” EFMA 2001 Lugano Meetings; CIBER Working Paper.

    Google Scholar 

  • de Fontnouvelle, P. and Jordan, J. S. and Rosengren, E. S. 2005. “Implication of alternative operational risk modeling techniques” National Bureau of Economic Research; Ebnöther, S. and Vanini, P. and McNeil, A. and Antolinez-Fehr, P. 2003 “Modelling Operational Risk” Journal of Risk.

    Google Scholar 

  • de Guindos, L., 2019. “Welcome Remarks at the third ECB Forum on Banking Supervision”, Frankfurt am Main, 6 November.

    Google Scholar 

  • De Polis, A. and Pietrunti, M. 2019. “Exchange Rate Dynamics and Unconventional Monetary Policies: It’s All in the Shadows” Bank of Italy Temi di Discussione (Working Paper) No. 1231.

    Google Scholar 

  • De Vecchis, P., 1982. “Spunti per una rinnovata riflessione sulla nozione di banca”, Banca borsa titoli di credito.

    Google Scholar 

  • Delimatsis, P. 2012. “Financial Innovation and Prudential Regulation – The New Basel III Rules” TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2012-016.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dell’Ariccia, G. and Marquez, R. 2006. “Competition among regulators and credit market integration” Journal of Financial Economics.

    Google Scholar 

  • Draghi, M. 2019. “Farewell Remarks”.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eagly, A. H. and Shelly, S. 1993 “The psychology of attitudes”.

    Google Scholar 

  • EBA 2017. “Report on innovative uses of consumer data by financial institutions”, 28 June.

    Google Scholar 

  • EBA 2018a. “EBA Report on the prudential risks and opportunities arising for institutions from fintech”, 3 July.

    Google Scholar 

  • EBA 2018b. “Fintech: Regulatory Sandboxes And Innovation Hubs”, JC 2018 74.

    Google Scholar 

  • EBA 2018c. “Report on the prudential risks and opportunities arising for institutions from fintech”, 3 July.

    Google Scholar 

  • EBA 2018d. “The EBA’s fintech roadmap. Conclusions from the consultation on the EBA’s approach to financial technology (fintech)”. 15 March.

    Google Scholar 

  • EBA 2019a “Report on crypto-assets”, available at www.eba.europa.eu.

  • EBA 2019b. “EBA report on the impact of fintech on payment institutions’ and e-money institutions’ business models”, July

    Google Scholar 

  • ECB Advisory Group on Market Infrastructures for Securities and Collateral 2017 “The potential impact of DLTs on securities post-trading harmonization and on the wider EU financial market integration”.

    Google Scholar 

  • ECB and Bank of Japan 2017, “Payment systems: liquidity saving mechanisms in a distributed ledger environment”, a joint research project of the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan – STELLA, September.

    Google Scholar 

  • ECB, 2018. “Guide to assessments of fintech credit institution licence applications”.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ecofin, 2019. “Draft Joint Statement by the Council and the Commission on Stablecoins” Brussels, 6 November 2.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ellis, E. 1999. “The principle of proportionality in the laws of Europe” Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Engineer, M. 1990. “Brennan and Buchanan’s Leviathan models” The Social Science Journa.

    Google Scholar 

  • Engst, A. and Lemma V., 2018. “Insurtech and interoperability of Fintech firms”, in Open review of management, banking and finance.

    Google Scholar 

  • ESAs 2019. “Report on FinTech: Regulatory Sandboxes and Innovation Hubs”, January.

    Google Scholar 

  • ESMA 2017. “ESMA alerts investors to the high risks of Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs)”.

    Google Scholar 

  • ESMA 2019 “Report. Licensing of FinTech business models”, 12 July.

    Google Scholar 

  • ESMA, EBA, EIOPA Joint Committee 2015 “Discussion Paper on automation in financial advice”, JC 2015 080, 4 December.

    Google Scholar 

  • European Commission 2018a “European Commission’s Action Plan on how to harness the opportunities presented by technology-enabled innovation in financial services (FinTech), 8 March.

    Google Scholar 

  • European Commission 2018b, “FinTech action plan: For a more competitive and innovative European financial sector”, 8 March.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ezrachi, A. 2018. “EU Competition Law Goals and the Digital Economy” Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 17/2018;

    Google Scholar 

  • Favre, O. and Kramer, S., 2017. “Art. 2 FinfraG”. “Kommentarzum Finanzmarktinfrastrukturgesetz FinfraG”, Zurich.

    Google Scholar 

  • FCA 2019a. “Blockchain Technology for Algorithmic Regulation and Compliance (BARAC)”, University College London, 11 September.

    Google Scholar 

  • FCA 2019b. “Digital regulatory reporting”, 13 March.

    Google Scholar 

  • FCA 2019c. “Global Financial Innovation Network (GFIN)” 9 August.

    Google Scholar 

  • FCA Regulatory sandbox lessons learned report, October 2017.

    Google Scholar 

  • Federal Department of Finance FDF, 2017. “Report on amendments to the Banking Ordinance (Fintech), Explanations”.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ferran, E. and Babis, V. 2013. “The European Single Supervisory Mechanism” University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 10/2013.

    Google Scholar 

  • FINMA, 2016a. “Asset management: technology-neutral FINMA regulations”, 1 July.

    Google Scholar 

  • FINMA, 2016b. “Due diligence requirements for client onboarding via digital channels (Valid until 31.07.2018)”, 3 March.

    Google Scholar 

  • FINMA, 2016c. “FINMA reduces obstacles to FinTech”, 17 March.

    Google Scholar 

  • FINMA, 2019. “Partial revision of the Circular 2008/3 “Public deposits with non-banks”.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fluhmann, D. and Hsu, P., 2019. “Switzerland: Fintech 2019”.

    Google Scholar 

  • FSB 2019a “Regulatory issues of stablecoins”.

    Google Scholar 

  • FSB 2019b. “Fintech and market structure in financial services: Market developments and potential financial stability implications”.

    Google Scholar 

  • FSB 2019c. “Resolution Report: Mind the Gap. Eighth Report on the Implementation of Resolution Reforms”.

    Google Scholar 

  • FSB. 2017. “Financial Stability Implications from FinTech. Supervisory and Regulatory Issues that Merit Authorities’ Attention”, 27 June.

    Google Scholar 

  • FSB 2020. “Global Monitoring Report on Non-Bank Financial Intermediation 2019”, 19 January.

    Google Scholar 

  • Galbraith, J. R. 2014. “Organizational Design Challenges Resulting from Big Data” Journal of Organization Design.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ganchev, A., 2018. “The Swiss National Bank – a Central Bank or a Hedge Fund?” Zlaten vestnik. Tavex questions certain foundations of banking and central banking.

    Google Scholar 

  • GFIN, The global financial innovation network on its first year, June 2019.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gilli, M. and Këllezi, E. and Hysi, H. 2006. “A Data-Driven Optimization Heuristic for Downside Risk Minimization” Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper No. 06-2.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goanta, C. 2018. “How Technology Disrupts Private Law: An Exploratory Study of California and Switzerland as Innovative Jurisdictions” TTLF Working Paper No. 38/2018

    Google Scholar 

  • Gore, A. A. Jr. 1998 “Digital Divide Event”, April 28, 1998

    Google Scholar 

  • Gorton, G. B. and Metrick, A., 2010. “Regulating the Shadow Banking System” SSRN Research Paper no. 1676947.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grant, S. H. and Van Zandt, T. 2007. “Expected Utility Theory” INSEAD Business School Research Paper No. 2007/71/EPS.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grey, R. and Dharmapalan, J., 2017. “The Macroeconomic Policy Implications of Digital Fiat Currency” “The Case for Digital Legal Tender”.

    Google Scholar 

  • Guarracino, F. 2012. “Supervisione bancaria europea (Sistema delle fonti e modelli teorici)” Padova.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hacker, P. and Thomale, C., 2017. “Crypto-Securities Regulation: ICOs, Token Sales and Cryptocurrencies under EU Financial Law” European Company and Financial Law Review.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hacker, P. and Thomale, C., 2018. “Crypto-Securities Regulation: ICOs, Token Sales and Cryptocurrencies under EU Financial Law” European Company and Financial Law Review.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hansmann, H. and Kraakman, R. H. 2004. “What is Corporate Law?” Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 300.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harrast, S. and Swaney, A. 2019 “What Is the Role of the Board-Level Technology Committee?” SSRN Research Paper no. 3456770.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hertig, G. and McCahery, J. A. 2003. “Company and Takeover Law Reforms in Europe: Misguided Harmonization Efforts or Regulatory Competition?” ECGI – Law Working Paper No. 12/2003.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hwa, G. and Lloyd, J. and Hatch, M. 2019. “Eight ways FinTech adoption remains on the rise” and “EY third biennial FinTech adoption trends survey”

    Google Scholar 

  • Ibrido, R., 2017. “L’unione bancaria europea. Profili costituzionali” Roma.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jackson, G. and Deeg, R. 2006. “How Many Varieties of Capitalism? Comparing the Comparative Institutional Analyses of Capitalist Diversity” MPIfG Discussion Paper No. 06/2.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jagtiani, J, and Lemieux, C., 2018a. “Do Fintech Lenders Penetrate Areas that are Underserved by Traditional Banks?” FRB of Philadelphia Working Paper No. 18-13.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jagtiani, J. and Lemieux, C., 2018b. “The Roles of Alternative Data and Machine Learning in Fintech Lending: Evidence from the Lendingclub Consumer Platform” FRB of Philadelphia Working Paper No. 18-15.

    Google Scholar 

  • Keidar, R. and Blemus, S., 2018. “Cryptocurrencies and Market Abuse Risks: It’s Time for Self-Regulation” Lexology.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laeven, L. and Levine, R. and Michalopoulos, S. 2015, “Financial innovation and endogenous growth”, Journal of Financial Intermediation.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lamandini, M. and Muñoz, D. R. and Álvarez, J. S., 2015. “Depicting the limits to the SSM’s supervisory powers: The Role of Constitutional Mandates and of Fundamental Rights’ Protection” Quaderni di Ricerca Giuridica della Consulenza Legale della Banca d’Italia, Roma.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laskowski, M. and Kim, H. M. and Zargham, M. and Barlin, M. and Kabanov, D., 2019. “Token Economics in Real-Life: Cryptocurrency and Incentives Design for Insolar’s Blockchain Network” SSRN Research Paper no. 3465085.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lastra, R., 2013. “The Globalization Paradox: Review of Dani Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy”, International Journal of Constitutional Law.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lehmann, M. 2019. “Global Rules for a Global Market Place? – The Regulation and Supervision of FinTech Providers” Boston University International Law Journal.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lemma, V., 2018. “Fintech regulation: the need for a research” Open review of management, banking and finance.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lener, R. and Parrillo, G. 2018. “Quali regole per fintech?”, Fintech: diritto tecnologia e finanza, Roma.

    Google Scholar 

  • Longo, E. and Lorenzini, L. 2017. “Ict e parlamenti: oltre la mera diffusione dei contenuti”, “Studi Pisani sul Parlamento VII. La crisi del Parlamento nelle regole sulla sua percezione”, Pisa.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maijoor, S. 2018 “New technologies within and beyond capital markets” ESMA71-99-1036.

    Google Scholar 

  • Malamud, S. and Zucchi, F. 2016 “Liquidity, innovation, and endogenous growth” No 1919.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maume, P. 2018. “Reducing Legal Uncertainty and Regulatory Arbitrage for Robo-Advice” European Company and Financial Law Review.

    Google Scholar 

  • McKinsey Global Institute, 1992. “Service Sector Productivity”, Washington, DC.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mersch, Y. 2016 “Distributed Ledger Technology: role and relevance of the ECB. Speech by the member of the Executive Board of the ECB, 22nd Handelsblatt Annual Conference Banken-Technologie”, 6 December.

    Google Scholar 

  • Merton, R. C., 2018. “Observations on the Digital Revolution: Financial Innovation and FinTech” Speech at 17th International Conference on Credit, Venice.

    Google Scholar 

  • Messina, D., 2018. “Il Regolamento (EU) 2016/679 in materia di protezione dei dati personali alla luce della vicenda Cambridge Analytica”, Federalismi.it.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nabilou, H., 2019. “Central Bank Digital Currencies: Preliminary Legal Observations”. Journal of Banking Regulation.

    Google Scholar 

  • Negreiro, M. 2015. “Briefing at EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service. Bridging the digital divide in the EU”, Bruxelles;

    Google Scholar 

  • OCSE, 1996 “Regulatory Reform and Innovation”.

    Google Scholar 

  • OECD, 2019. “Regulatory effectiveness in the era of digitalisation”, Paris.

    Google Scholar 

  • Okafor, A. and Fadul, J. 2019. “Bank Risks, Regulatory Interventions and Deconstructing the Focus on Credit Risk” Research Journal of Finance and Accounting

    Google Scholar 

  • Olivieri, G. and Falce, V., 2016. “Smart cities e diritto dell’innovazione” Milano.

    Google Scholar 

  • Olkova, A., 2018. “Portfolio Performance Measurement: Traditional vs Utility-Based Approaches” 1st International Management, Quality and Marketing Conference Research Paper.

    Google Scholar 

  • Oppo, G., 1997. “Mutualità e integrazione cooperativa”, Rivista di diritto civile, 1997.

    Google Scholar 

  • Orphanides, A. 2014. “European Headwind: ECB Policy and Fed Normalization” MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 5119-14.

    Google Scholar 

  • Palmerini, E. and Aiello, G. and Cappelli, V. and Morgante, G. and Amore, N. and Di Vetta, G. and Fiorinelli, G. and Galli, M., 2018. “Il FinTech e l’economia dei dati. Considerazioni su alcuni profili civilistici e penalistici. Le soluzioni del diritto vigente ai rischi per la clientela e gli operatori”, Quaderno FinTech n. 2, December.

    Google Scholar 

  • Panetta, F., 2017. “L’innovazione digitale nell’industria finanziaria italiana”, Milano, 26 september.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pellegrini, M. 2003. “Banca Centrale Nazionale e Unione Monetaria Europea. Il caso italiano”, Padova.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pellegrini, M. 2012. “L’architettura di vertice dell’ordinamento finanziario europeo: funzioni e limiti della supervisione” Rivista trimestrale di diritto dell’economia.

    Google Scholar 

  • Perassi, M., 2014. “Brevi conclusioni” “Dal Testo unico bancario all’Unione bancaria: tecniche normative e allocazione di poteri” Quaderni di Ricerca Giuridica della Consulenza Legale della Banca d’Italia, Roma.

    Google Scholar 

  • Philippon, T. 2017 “The FinTech Opportunity”, BIS Working Papers No 655.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pollicino, O. and Frosini, T. and Apa, E. 2017. “Diritti e libertà in Internet”, Milano.

    Google Scholar 

  • Posner, R. 2007. “Economic Analysis of Law”, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Posner, R. 2008 “How judges think”, Harvard.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quarles, R. K. 2019. “FSB Letter from the FSB Chair to G20 Leaders ahead of their Summit in Osaka”, 25 June Vehovar, V., Sicherl P., Hüsing T. and Dolnicar, V. 2006 “Methodological Challenges of Digital Divide Measurements”, The Information Society.

    Google Scholar 

  • Recine, F. and Teixeira, P. G. 2009 “The New Financial Stability Architecture in the EU” Paolo Baffi Centre Research Paper No. 2009-62.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reiser, N, 2018. “Ist der Bankbegriff im Lichte aktueller technologischer Entwicklungen noch zeitgemäss?” AJP, Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority FINMA, 2018. Fact sheet: “Virtual Currencies”, updated 30 August.

    Google Scholar 

  • Remolina, N. 2019. “Open Banking: Regulatory Challenges for a New Form of Financial Intermediation in a Data-Driven World” SMU Centre for AI & Data Governance Research Paper No. 2019/05

    Google Scholar 

  • Ricciardi, V. and Simon, H. K., 2000. “What is Behavioral Finance?” Business, Education & Technology Journal.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ricks, M., 2010. “Shadow Banking and Financial Regulation” Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 370.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rodotà, S. 1973a. “Elaboratori elettronici e controllo sociale”, Bologna.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rodotà, S. 1973b. “Elaboratori elettronici e controllo sociale”, Bologna, p. 183 ss. and the litterature about ‘small claims’;

    Google Scholar 

  • Rodotà, S. 1995. “Tecnologie e diritti”, Bologna,

    Google Scholar 

  • Rodotà, S. 2004a. “Tecnopolitica. La democrazia e le nuove tecnologie della comunicazione”,

    Google Scholar 

  • Rodotà, S. 2006. “La vita e le regole. Tra diritto e non diritto”, Milano;

    Google Scholar 

  • Rodotà, S. 2012. “Il diritto di avere diritti”, Roma-Bari;

    Google Scholar 

  • Rodotà, S., 2004b. “Diritto, scienza, tecnologia: modelli e scelte di regolamentazione”, “Scienza e diritto nel prisma del diritto comparato”.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosa, H., 2003. “Social acceleration: ethical and political consequences of a desynchronized high-speed society”, Constellations.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rossi, S., 2018. Speech at the Conference ‘FinTech e lnsurTech: tecnologie digitali, banche, assicurazioni, nell’ambito dell’iniziativa “Incontri con la Banca d’Italia”. September 10.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rubinstein, I. S., 2013. “Big Data: The End of Privacy or a New Beginning?” International Data Privacy Law.

    Google Scholar 

  • Saccomanni, F., 2010. “La sfida per le banche popolari nel nuovo scenario regolamentare” Verona, 26 febbraio.

    Google Scholar 

  • Savona, P. 2002. “Politica economica e new economy”, Milano;

    Google Scholar 

  • Savona, P. 2008. “I momenti d’oro dell’economia visti da Paolo Savona”, Roma.

    Google Scholar 

  • Savona, P. 2019 “Incontro annuale con il mercato finanziario Discorso del Presidente” Milano, 14 June.

    Google Scholar 

  • Scardovi, C. 2016. “Restructuring and Innovation in Banking”, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Schena, C. and Tanda, A. and Arlotta, C. and Potenza, G., 2018. “The development of FinTech. Opportunities and risks for the financial industry in the digital age”, Quaderno FinTech n. 1, march.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schumpeter, J., 1990. “Storia dell’analisi economica”, Torino.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sciarrone Alibrandi, A. and Borello, G. and Ferretti, R. and Lenoci, F. and Macchiavello, E. and Mattassoglio, F. and Panisi, F. 2019. “Marketplace lending, Verso nuove forme di intermediazione finanziaria?”, Quaderno FinTech n. 5, July.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shojai, S. and Feiger, G., 2002. “Les Banquiers Suisses: Can They Remain Leaders in Private Banking?”. Journal of Financial Transformation.

    Google Scholar 

  • Simoncini, A., 2016. “The Constitutional Dimension ofthe Internet: Some Research Paths” EUI Working Paper Law 2016/16.

    Google Scholar 

  • SNB. 2018. “Swiss National Bank: Survey on payment methods 2017, Survey on payment methods and use of cash in Switzerland”, May.

    Google Scholar 

  • Solove, D. J. 2002. “Conceptualizing Privacy” California Law Review.

    Google Scholar 

  • Status, R. 1971. “Contract and the Welfare State” Stanford Law Review.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stone, K. 2004. “Alternative Dispute Resolution” Encyclopedia of Legal History, Oxford;

    Google Scholar 

  • Stulz, R. M., 2019. “FinTech, BigTech, and the Future of Banks”. Fisher College of Business Working Paper No. 2019-03-020.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stylianou, T. 2018. “An Investigation into the Utility and Potential Regulation of Initial Coin Offerings and Smart Contracts in Selected Industries and Jurisdictions” King’s College London Law School Research Paper No. 19-8.

    Google Scholar 

  • Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority FINMA, ICO. 2018. “Guidelines for enquiries regarding the regulatory framework for initial coin offerings (ICOs)”, updated 16 February.

    Google Scholar 

  • Thakor, A. V. 2019. “Fintech and Banking: What Do We Know?” Journal of Financial Intermediation

    Google Scholar 

  • Thouvenin, F. and Früh, A. and Lombard, A., 2017, “Eigentum an Sachdaten: Eine Standortbestimmung” SZW 2017/1.

    Google Scholar 

  • Thouvenin, F. and Weber, R. H., 2017 “Zum Bedarf nach einem Dateneigentum”, Jusletter IT of 11 December 2017

    Google Scholar 

  • Tribimas, T. 1999. “Proportionality in community law: searching for the appropriate standard of scrutiny”.

    Google Scholar 

  • Troiano, V. 2012. “Interactions Between EU and National Authorities in the New Structure of EU Financial System Supervision” Law and Economics Yearly Review.

    Google Scholar 

  • Troiano, V., 2019. “Le Banche” “Manuale di diritto Bancario e Finanziario”, Padova.

    Google Scholar 

  • UNEVOC - UNESCO 2014. “Digital divide” Resources and Services.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vandevelde, K. J. 2011 “Thinking like a lawyer”, Boulder.

    Google Scholar 

  • Venturi, E. 2009. “Globalizzazione, interconnessione dei mercati e crisi finanziaria. Identificazione di possibili interventi correttivi” Banca borsa titoli di credito.

    Google Scholar 

  • Verdegem, P. and Verhoest, P. 2009 “Profiling the Non-user: Rethinking Policy Initiatives Stimulating ICT Acceptance” Telecommunications Policy.

    Google Scholar 

  • Visco, I. 2019a. Speech at Associazione Bancaria Italiana – Assemblea degli Associati. Milan, July 12.

    Google Scholar 

  • Visco, I., 2019b. “Lezione Giorgio Fuà 2019. Centenario della nascita”.

    Google Scholar 

  • Visco, I., 2019c. “Remarks at the Event to Commemorate Thirty Years of Banca d’Italia in Japan. Speech by the Governor of the Bank of Italy. Thirty Years of Banca d’Italia in Japan: Anniversary Celebration” Tokyo, 11 June.

    Google Scholar 

  • Visco, I., 2019d. “Sustainable development and climate risks:the role of central banks. Speech by the Governor of the Bank of Italy at the 18th International Conference for Credit Risk Evaluation “Assessing and Managing Climate Change Risk: Opportunities for Financial Institutions” Venice, 26 September.

    Google Scholar 

  • Visco, I., 2019e. Considerazioni finali del Governatore. Relazione annuale. Roma, May 31.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vulkan, N. and Astebro, T. and Sierra M. F., 2016. “Equity crowdfunding: A new phenomena (opens in new window)”, Journal of Business Venturing Insights.

    Google Scholar 

  • VV.AA. 2015. “La riforma delle banche popolari”, Padova.

    Google Scholar 

  • VV.AA. 2018a. “Intelligenza artificiale, protezione dati personali e regolazione”, Milano.

    Google Scholar 

  • VV.AA. 2018b. “Per un’ipotesi ricostruttiva della riforma delle BCC”, Rivista Trimestrale di Diritto dell’economia.

    Google Scholar 

  • VV.AA., ‘The High-Level Group of Financial Supervision in the EU’, chaired by Jacques de Larosière, “Report”, 25 February 2009.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wachter, S. 2018. “Normative challenges of identification in the Internet of Things: Privacy, profiling, discrimination, and the GDPR”, Computer law & security Review

    Google Scholar 

  • Wachter, S. and Mittelstadt, B. 2018. “A Right to Reasonable Inferences: Re-Thinking Data Protection Law in the Age of Big Data and AI” Columbia Business Law Review.

    Google Scholar 

  • Walch, A. 2015 “The Bitcoin Blockchain as Financial Market Infrastructure: A Consideration of Operational Risk” NYU Journal of Legislation and Public Policy.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wang, W. and Mahmood, A. and Sismeiro, C. and Vulkand, N., 2019 “The evolution of equity crowdfunding: Insights from co-investments of angels and the crowd” Research Policy.

    Google Scholar 

  • Warschauer, M., 2003. “Technology and Social Inclusion: Rethinking the Digital Divide”, Cambridge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Warschauer, M., 2009. “Demystifying the Digital Divide” Elsevier.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wasserman, I and Richmond-Abbott, M., 2005. “Gender and the Internet: Causes of Variation in Access, Level, and Scope of Use” Social Science Quarterly.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weber, R. H. and Thouvenin, F., 2018. “Dateneigentum und Datenzugangsrechte – Bausteine der Informationsgesellschaft?” ZSR.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wei, L. and Hindman, D. 2011. “Does the Digital Divide Matter more? Comparing the Effects of New Media and Old Media Use on the Education-Based Knowledge Gap” Mass Communication and Society.

    Google Scholar 

  • Whitacre, B. and Mills, B., 2007. “Infrastructure and the rural-urban divide in high-speed residential internet access” International Regional Science Review.

    Google Scholar 

  • Willis, S. and Tranter, B., 2006. “Beyond the ‘digital divide’. Internet diffusion and inequality in Australia”, Journal of Sociology.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wissler, E. 1997. “The Effects of Mandatory Mediation: Empirical Research on the Experience of Small Claims and Common Pleas Courts” Willamette Law Review.

    Google Scholar 

  • Witte, J. and Mannon, S. 2007. “The Internet and Social Inequalities” New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Wong, Y. C. and Law, C. K. and Fung, J. Y. C. and Lee, V. W. P., 2010. “Digital divide and social inclusion: policy challenge for social development in Hong Kong and South Korea’” Journal of Asian Public Policy.

    Google Scholar 

  • Working Group established by the Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB), 2017. “FinTech credit. Market structure, business models and financial stability implications”.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wray, L. R. and Sardoni, C. 2005. “Monetary Policy Strategies of the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve Bank of U.S.” Levy Economics Institute Working Paper No. 431.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wyatt, S. and Henwood, F. and Hart, A. and Smith, J. 2005. “The digital divide, health information and everyday life’, New Media and Society.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wyatt, S. and Thomas, G. and Terranova, T. 2002. “They Came, they Surfed, they Went Back to the Beach: Conceptualising Use and Non-Use of the Internet” “Virtual Society? Technology, Cyperbole and Reality”, Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wymeersch, E., 2012. “The European Banking Union. A first Analysis”, Financial Law Institute Working Paper Series WP 2012-07.

    Google Scholar 

  • Yu, G. and Zhang, J., 2017. “A Revisit to Capital Control Policies When Bitcoin Is in Town” 31st Australasian Finance and Banking Conference 2018.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zeng, F. 2011. ‘College students’ perception of the second-level digital divide: An empirical analysis’, Asian social science.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zeno-Zencovich, V. 2018 “Dati, grandi dati, dati granulari e la nuova epistemologia del giurista”, Media Laws, Rivista di diritto dei media, 2/2018.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zetzsche, D. A. and Buckley, R. P. and Arner, D. W. and Barberis, J. N., 2017. “Regulating a Revolution: From Regulatory Sandboxes to Smart Regulation” Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zetzsche, D. A. and Preiner, C. 2017 “Cross-Border Crowdfunding – Towards a Single Crowdfunding Market for “European Banking Institute Working Paper Series 2017

    Google Scholar 

  • Zhang, T. 2019 “Balancing Fintech Opportunities and Risks. Remarks by IMF Deputy Managing Director” Vilnius.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zillien, N. and Hargittai, E., 2009. “Digital Distinction: Status-Specific Internet uses”. Social Science Quarterly.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zuiderveen Borgesius, F., 2013. “Behavioral Targeting, A European Legal Perspective” IEEE Security & Privacy.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zuiderveen Borgesius, F., 2014. “Behavioural Sciences and the Regulation of Privacy on the Internet” Institute for Information Law Research Paper No. 2014-02.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2020 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Lemma, V. (2020). European Approaches to Fintech: The Role of Regulation and the Evolution of Supervision. In: FinTech Regulation. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42347-6_4

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42347-6_4

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-42346-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-42347-6

  • eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics