Abstract
In his work on moral philosophy Peter Winch was not aiming to establish or defend any generalised description of moral concepts, principles or judgements. In contrast, he uses examples from within the narratives of serious works of literature in order to focus upon the ways in which a particular agent’s own perception of a particular situation informs their response to it. In this way, he is applying Wittgenstein’s admonishment not just to say what a concept means but to show how it is used, specifically in the context of the moral understanding and judgement of a person’s actions within the complexity of human relationships, and also to draw attention to the fact that in some cases an agent can be faced with ineliminable moral conflict. But even though different people may respond to the same situation in different ways, this does not imply that moral agency is merely subjective. If it is a fact that someone abused their authority, then they are answerable both to themselves and to others for their lack of integrity. And although the principles of morality may differ radically at different times and across different cultures, this does not imply any simplistic relativism in the understanding of moral concepts. For, the fact that they are moral concepts entails that they can be respected or challenged. Yet, philosophy can provide no overview to resolve moral conflict.
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Wilde, C. (2020). Moral Agency. In: Campbell, M., Reid, L. (eds) Ethics, Society and Politics: Themes from the Philosophy of Peter Winch. Nordic Wittgenstein Studies, vol 6. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40742-1_2
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