Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to reassess Winch’s argument on the universalizability of moral judgment. Although it may seem as if his argument has been superseded, in fact, on closer examination it presents a viewpoint which is missing from modern mainstream metaethics. I will first review Winch’s criticism of the universalizability thesis, then examine some responses to that criticism. Finally, I will reconsider Winch’s proposals from a different angle. Then it becomes clear that while the mission of mainstream metaethics is to establish the rationality of moral verdicts on choices, morality exists as well in other moments; such as those in which we discover and decide upon the moral self. If we miss these, we miss the full reality of the phenomenon. Contemporary metaethics still has much to learn from Winch’s fruitful discussion of these matters.
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Notes
- 1.
Here taking ‘φ-ing is wrong’ as equivalent to ‘it is not the case that φ-ing is right’.
- 2.
Winch in fact bases his discussion on Benjamin Britten’s operatic rendering of the story (Britten 1951).
- 3.
E.g. all human beings have rights to life and liberty and everyone is entitled to those rights, without discrimination.
- 4.
Italic is mine.
- 5.
Sidgwick introduced his universalizability thesis as a feature of objective ethical judgment, as contrasted with objective physical judgments which cannot be universalizable because of the limits of our knowledge of physical causation (Sidgwick 1907/1981, 208–209).
- 6.
- 7.
In Freedom and Reason, Hare also says that “to universalize is to give the reason”. So his basic position seems not to change.
- 8.
This idea is inspired by Michael Levin’s short paper “The Universalizability of Moral Judgments Revisited” (Levin 1979). In that paper Levin stressed the aspect of language in moral judgment.
- 9.
Junya Tomita (2019) is insightful on this point. Tomita stresses the importance of the learning and education as the function of the decision.
- 10.
Recall Cora Diamond’s argument in “Eating Meat and Eating People” (Diamond 1978). People just do not eat people.
- 11.
I would like to thank Satomi Abe, Yoshiya Akudo, Seiyu Hayashi and Takumichi Kojo for their helpful comments on the previous draft. I thank JSPS for supporting research on this paper. I am most grateful to Michael Campbell.
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Sato, T. (2020). Between Discovery and Decision: Winch’s Critique of the Universalizability of Moral Judgment Revisited. In: Campbell, M., Reid, L. (eds) Ethics, Society and Politics: Themes from the Philosophy of Peter Winch. Nordic Wittgenstein Studies, vol 6. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40742-1_12
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