Abstract
This chapter explores the continuing challenge of holding to account an institution, the proposed Public Service Ombudsman (PSO), which is itself a mechanism of accountability, while ensuring its independence is not impaired. The model of Officers of Parliament, as developed in the UK and New Zealand, is used as the template for an examination of the provisions in the draft Public Service Ombudsman Bill. While these provisions draw heavily on the first official to be considered an Officer of Parliament, the Comptroller and Auditor General, there are variations relating to the arrangements for appointment and corporate governance. As well as suggesting specific changes to the draft legislative provisions, the conclusions recommend a wider debate on both (a) Officers of Parliament as a distinct unit of our constitutional watchdogs and (b) best practice in corporate governance in the ombudsman sector.
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Notes
- 1.
Subsequently in 2018 the Patients Association announced that it had welcomed changes which the PHSO had made but that more progress was still required and that it would work with the PHSO to secure it (Patients Association 2018).
- 2.
The Ombudsman, the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment and the Controller and Auditor General, see Ferguson (2010).
- 3.
Scottish Public Services Ombudsman Act 2010, Sched. 1, para. 4; Public Services Ombudsman Act (Northern Ireland) 2016, Sched. 1, para. 9; Public Services Ombudsman (Wales) Act 2019, Sched. 1, para. 3(4)–(5).
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Thompson, B. (2020). The Challenges of Independence, Accountability and Governance in the Ombudsman Sector. In: Kirkham, R., Gill, C. (eds) A Manifesto for Ombudsman Reform. Palgrave Pivot, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40612-7_9
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