Abstract
Behaviour in financial markets ultimately turns not on written rules but on how market relationships are lived and felt. Yet one of the most common ways in which humans seek to regulate behaviour is to create written standards and enforce them: laws, regulations, contracts, codes of conduct and so on. Recognition of a social licence for financial markets goes beyond written standards to the desires and beliefs that animate relationships. Nonetheless, it connects with them in various ways. This chapter considers how it does that, drawing a distinction between behavioural norms, written standards that are designed to establish structures within which behaviour takes place, and written standards that directly regulate behaviour, in the case of the last, distinguishing between those that are prescriptive and those that are aspirational.
This chapter builds on David Rouch, ‘The Social Licence for Financial Markets, Written Standards and Aspiration’, in Edward Elgar Handbook on Law and Ethics in Banking and Finance, eds. Costanza Russo, Rosa M. Lastra and William Blair (Edward Elgar 2019).
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Notes
- 1.
‘Culture is a matter for banks not UK regulators’, editorial, Financial Times, London, 12 January 2016.
- 2.
Stephanie Chaly et al., Misconduct Risk, Culture, and Supervision, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, December 2017.
- 3.
This book uses the word ‘regulations’ to distinguish regulatory rules from the process of regulation by regulators which does not rely upon rules alone.
- 4.
The prolonged jurisprudential debate over what distinguishes law from other sorts of expectations, associated with names like Jeremy Bentham, John Austin and H. L. A. Hart, lies beyond the scope of the current exercise.
- 5.
Where these standards are in the form of law, the main focus of this chapter is on what can be described as ‘primary rules’ that require people to do or refrain from doing something (or have a similar effect by defining the context for action) rather than ‘secondary rules’ which concern the making, administration and enforcement of the primary rules (see H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2012), 79 et seq.).
- 6.
Written standards are by no means the only way of seeking to change behaviour, but they are the principal focus of this chapter. In particular, the activities of regulators can be a hybrid affair with written standards often advanced to support the use of other regulatory techniques. However, even these frequently involve articulating standards in writing in one form or another.
- 7.
As with Chap. 4, putting to one side for the present the question of control over rule-making within a group which can result in rules that reflect the wishes of a minority rather than a consensus.
- 8.
It now seems ironic that this was ever referred to as ‘deregulation’, although it did involve a form of structural deregulation of the financial markets.
- 9.
Starting with Julia Black, Rules and Regulators (Clarendon Press Oxford 1997).
- 10.
Solicitors Regulation Authority Principles 2018, contained in the SRA Handbook.
- 11.
Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 7 September 1990, Principles 12 and 14.
- 12.
IBA International Principles on Conduct for the Legal Profession, approved on 25 May 2019 by the Council of the International Bar Association, Principle 5.
- 13.
This chapter has already made use of one of them. As noted above, it does not address ‘secondary rules’ concerning the creation, administration and enforcement of rules with more primary behavioural intent.
- 14.
See, for example, Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Text and Materials (Cambridge University Press 2007), 79 et seq. While they discuss a broader range of regulatory instruments and techniques than just written standards, many involve written standards and the issues are similar.
- 15.
Subject to the qualifications in Chap. 4.
- 16.
Although the distinction between public and private law originates from civil law jurisdictions, it has increasingly been made in common law jurisdictions such as England and is helpful for current purposes.
- 17.
There have been attempts by the United Nations to establish binding international rules for multinational corporations, the main one being the UN Intergovernmental Working Group on a Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations, the work of which ground to a halt in the early 1990s. More recently, the United Nations Human Rights Council established an intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises on human rights tasked with developing an international legally binding instrument to regulate their activities in relation to human rights (14 July 2014, A/HRC/RES/26/9). A preliminary draft treaty has been published. If eventually adopted, as currently drafted it would still rely upon enforcement by individual states rather than in an international court.
- 18.
The United Nations Guiding Principles on Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, 2 March 2011, A/HC/17/31, Annex.
- 19.
Sally Wheeler, Global Production, CSR and Human Rights: The Courts of Public Opinion and the Social Licence to Operate, International Journal of Human Rights, 2015, Vol. 19(6), 757–778.
- 20.
https://fmsb.com/what-we-do/#1 (accessed 25 October 2019).
- 21.
https://www.globalfxc.org/docs/fx_global.pdf (accessed 25 October 2019).
- 22.
Jim Baxter and Chris Megone, Exploring the Role of Professional Bodies and Professional Qualifications in the UK Banking Sector, a report prepared for the Banking Standards Board, October 2016.
- 23.
See, for example, SYSC 10.1, FCA Handbook.
- 24.
See, for example, section 406 of the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, made in the aftermath of the Enron scandal.
- 25.
Art. 47(1)(d) of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on markets in financial instruments.
- 26.
Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on markets in financial instruments, especially Articles 18–20 and 30–31.
- 27.
Tomorrow’s Company describes itself as an independent non-profit think tank that inspires and enables businesses to be a force for good in society.
- 28.
The international anti-bribery and corruption organisation.
- 29.
LR 9.8.6R, FCA Handbook. At the time of going to press, the FRC remains a private body. However, following a review by Sir John Kingman during 2018, a decision has been taken to put it on a statutory footing; see Independent Review of the Financial Reporting Council, December 2018 (HMSO 2018).
- 30.
Part 28, Companies Act 2006.
- 31.
John C. Coates, The Volcker Rule as Structural Law: Implications for Cost–Benefit Analysis and Administrative Law, Capital Markets Law Journal, 2015, Vol. 10(4), 447–468.
- 32.
Jeff Hass, Economic Sociology: An Introduction (Routledge 2007), 14–15.
- 33.
Bank ring-fencing refers to the requirement for banking groups to separate their retail banking activities from their wholesale banking and investment activities, so that the former will be less affected by a failure in the latter. Among other things, this involves the ring-fenced retail banking activities being run out of a separate legal entity with its own board of directors, subject to discrete liquidity and capital requirements.
- 34.
Once two parties have entered into an investment transaction, clearing houses provide a standardised means for settling it, including making the necessary payments and delivering the relevant financial instruments. In addition, central counterparty clearing, which is now common in the derivatives markets, involves the clearing house being interposed between two parties to a trade, thereby assuming an obligation to each of them to perform the other’s obligations under the contract. The central counterparty is independently capitalised and operated and must be provided with collateral to cover the exposures it assumes under cleared trades. The aim of this is to manage counterparty risk more effectively within the financial system, with the possibility of mutualisation should it crystallise. However, questions remain over the extent to which central counterparty clearing could be a source of new risks.
- 35.
Speed limits, by contrast, concern the behaviour of a person when making use of the licence and are therefore more similar to behavioural standards, considered below.
- 36.
Vernon L. Smith, Human Nature: An Economic Perspective, Dædalus, 2004, Vol. 133(4), 67–76, 71.
- 37.
Regulation (EU) 2016/1011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on indices used as benchmarks in financial instruments and financial contracts or to measure the performance of investment funds.
- 38.
SYSC 10.2, FCA Handbook.
- 39.
Culture in financial institutions: it’s everywhere and nowhere, speech by Andrew Bailey while Chief Executive of the Financial Conduct Authority, 16 May 2017.
- 40.
Section 1E, Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. The Prudential Regulation Authority also has a competition objective (section 2H, Financial Services and Markets Act 2000).
- 41.
An example would be the rules implementing the FCA’s ‘Retail Distribution Review’ which prohibited financial advisors being remunerated directly or indirectly by firms that produce the financial products they sell, thereby exposing both advisory and product charges to greater transparency and competitive pressure. See COBS 6.1A-F, FCA Handbook.
- 42.
A distinction between prescriptive standards and aspirational standards is reasonably well established. See, for example, Mark S. Frankel, Professional Codes: Why, How, and with What Impact, Journal of Business Ethics, 1989, Vol. 8(2), 109–115; Judith Lichtenberg, ‘What Are Codes of Ethics for?’, in Codes of Ethics and the Professions, eds. Margaret Coady and Sidney Block (Melbourne University Press 1996); Brian Farrell, Deirdre Cobbin and Helen Farrell, Codes of Ethics—Their Evolution, Development and Other Controversies, Journal of Management Development, 2002, Vol. 21(2), 152–163, 159; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Legal Ethics: Legal Rules and Professional Aspirations, Cleveland State Law Review, 1981, 571–576; Donald Nicholson, Making Lawyers Moral? Ethical Codes and Moral Character, Legal Studies, 2015, Vol. 25(4), 601–626, 619; Constantine Boussalis, Yuval Feldman and Henry E. Smith, An Experimental Analysis of the Effect of Standards on Compliance Performance, Regulation and Governance, 2018, Vol. 12(2), 277–298.
- 43.
Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017, SI 2017/692, Part 3.
- 44.
PRIN 2.1.1R, Principle 4, FCA Handbook.
- 45.
Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2012), 302; Julia Black, ‘The Rise, Fall and Fate of Principles Based Regulation’, in Law Reform and Financial Markets, eds. Kern Alexander and Niamh Moloney (Edward Elgar 2011).
- 46.
Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, University of Chicago Law Review, 1967, Vol. 35(1), 14–46, 23.
- 47.
PRIN 2.1, FCA Handbook.
- 48.
Most notably, John Rawls: John Rawls and Kelly Erin, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Harvard University Press 2001).
- 49.
COBS 2.1.1, FCA Handbook which requires firms to act ‘honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with the best interests of their clients’.
- 50.
However, written standards requiring a person to behave ‘ethically’ are somewhat empty without an understanding of which ethic is involved, and cynics might suggest that this is precisely the reason the word is used. Indeed, it would be possible for an ethic to be far from other-regarding.
- 51.
Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1995, Vol. 144(5), 2021–2053.
- 52.
Tom R. Tyler, Reducing Corporate Criminality: The Role of Values, American Criminal Law Review, 2014, Vol. 51(1), 267–291.
- 53.
Available at https://internationalbankers.org.uk/thecompany (accessed 31 October 2019).
- 54.
Iris Bohnet, Bruno Frey and Steffen Huck, More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding, American Political Science Review, 2002, Vol. 95(1), 131–144.
- 55.
Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (Clarendon Press Oxford 1998).
- 56.
See, for example, the enforcement pyramid in Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation (Oxford University Press 1992), 35.
- 57.
The Barclays Way: How we do business, July 2019, 4, https://home.barclays/content/dam/home-barclays/documents/citizenship/our-reporting-and-policy-positions/policy-positions/CS1924559%20V04%20The%20Barclays%20Way%202019_Online.pdf (accessed 24 October 2019).
- 58.
Morgan Stanley 2019 Code of Conduct (https://www.morganstanley.com/about-us-governance/code-of-conduct); JPMorgan Chase & Co Code of Conduct 2019 (https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/About-JPMC/document/code-of-conduct.pdf), both accessed 24 October 2019. However, see comments at note 50 about use of the word ‘ethics’.
- 59.
For example, both the FCA’s Conduct Code for staff in regulated firms in its Handbook of Rules and Guidance and the Lord George Principles for Good Business Conduct state that those to whom they are addressed should act honestly, fairly and with integrity.
- 60.
The possibility of this crowding out effect is recognised by the FCA. See, for example, Industry Codes of Conduct and Feedback on Principle 5, Policy Statement PS18/18, Financial Conduct Authority, July 2018, paragraph 1.19.
- 61.
Industry associations covering more heavily regulated sectors of the financial services markets do issue various pieces of guidance and codes of good practice. However, these often concern how to comply with technical legal and regulatory rules and can therefore be thought of as related to the enforcement regimes attached to those rules.
- 62.
Industry Codes of Conduct and Feedback on Principle 5, Financial Conduct Authority.
- 63.
Julia Black, Forms and Paradoxes of Principles-Based Regulation, Capital Markets Law Journal, 2008, Vol. 3(4), 425–457, 433.
- 64.
Dan Awrey, William Blair and David Kershaw, Between Law and Markets: Is There a Role for Culture and Ethics in Financial Regulation? Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, 2013, Vol. 38(1), 191–245.
- 65.
Articles 16 and 24 of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on markets in financial instruments and Articles 9 and 10 of Commission Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593.
- 66.
Changing Banking for Good, Report of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, First Report of Session 2013–2014, Volume II: Chapters 1 to 11 and Annexes, together with formal minutes, HL Paper 27-II HC 175-II, June 2013, paragraph 283.
- 67.
See Sect. 5.2.2.
- 68.
Section 66, Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.
- 69.
Remarks by William C. Dudley, President and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 7 February 2018: https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2018/dud180209 (accessed 25 October 2019).
- 70.
Fair and Effective Markets Review, Final Report, HM Treasury, Bank of England and Financial Conduct Authority, June 2015.
- 71.
Nonetheless, regulators have sought to avoid recourse to ‘hard law’ enforcement mechanisms in seeking to secure compliance with the replacement codes: Report on Adherence to the Global FX Code, Foreign Exchange Working Group, May 2017.
- 72.
https://www.charteredbanker.com/uploads/assets/uploaded/5e917c8b-7bc6-45ed-a43287ee7466612b.pdf (accessed 30 November 2019).
- 73.
‘…all professional bodies have a code of ethics, but it was not always clear whether members engaged seriously with the code, or whether there were serious consequences for those who breached the code…,’ Baxter and Megone, Exploring the Role of Professional Bodies, paragraph 76.
- 74.
Ibid., paragraph 32.
- 75.
For an industry view, see Codes of Conduct: A Barrier or a Breakthrough for Corporate Behaviour? PWC 2013.
- 76.
Muel Kaptein and Mark S. Schwartz, The Effectiveness of Business Codes: A Critical Examination of Existing Studies and the Development of an Integrated Research Model, Journal of Business Ethics, 2008, Vol. 77(2), 111–127.
- 77.
However, it is important to distinguish between corporate codes of conduct and the various compliance policies that firms maintain specifically to comply with aspects of the regulatory regime, such as policies on customer verification, trade execution and allocation and managing conflicts of interest.
- 78.
Annual Review 2016/17, Banking Standards Board, 2017.
- 79.
The percentage was higher in systemically important institutions.
- 80.
One 2013 report put the figure rather higher: ‘While respondents admit that an improvement in employees’ ethical conduct would improve their firm’s resilience to unexpected and dramatic risk, 53% think that career progression at their firm would be difficult without being flexible on ethical standards.’ A Crisis of Culture—valuing ethics and knowledge in financial services, Economist Intelligence Unit, 2013, 4. However, it is not clear whether the difference in numbers reflects an improvement or simply a different sample of firms and set of questions. For example, the BSB states that some of the percentages noted above were higher in larger financial institutions.
- 81.
Annual Review 2018/19, Banking Standards Board, 2019, 7.
- 82.
See note 61.
- 83.
As of 30 November 2019. See note 86 concerning the impact of the UK’s anticipated departure from the European Union.
- 84.
See, for example, Climate Change and Green Finance: Summary of Responses and Next Steps, Feedback to DP 18/8, Feedback Statement FS 19/6, Financial Conduct Authority, October 2019.
- 85.
When the UK leaves the European Union, there will be a transition period during which EU law will continue to apply as it did before exit. When that period ends, it is expected that, initially at least, the bulk of European Union financial services regulation will be incorporated into UK law (to the extent not already reflected in UK law), with some amendment to address the fact that the UK is no longer a European Union member state. The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (the ‘Withdrawal Act’) set the framework under which incorporation would happen in the event of a ‘hard Brexit’, with no withdrawal agreement in place. However, the UK’s departure will now be governed by the terms of a withdrawal agreement with the EU; that agreement provides for the transition period during which EU law continues to apply, pending the negotiation of the UK’s long-term relationship with the EU. At the end of the transition period, it seems likely that EU financial services law will be incorporated much as contemplated by the Withdrawal Act. Incorporated law may then develop in ways that diverge from European Union law in future. Broadly, English courts will continue to follow European Union jurisprudence as it applies to pre-exit matters and are permitted to have regard to it in other cases when construing incorporated European Union law. Similarly, UK regulators are likely to continue to have regard to some EU Commission and European Supervisory Authority guidance on European Union law where it is reflected or incorporated in UK law.
- 86.
European Banking Authority, European Securities and Markets Authority and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority.
- 87.
Mainly relevant to firms, but potentially also relevant to individuals in relation to the Conduct Rules.
- 88.
Strictly, the regime applies to firms rather than individuals. However, the effect of the Conduct Rules is that senior managers have heightened responsibility for that part of the firm for which they are allocated responsibility as a result of the Senior Managers Regime, which therefore defines their duties under the Code.
- 89.
Ibid.
- 90.
Financial Services Register: https://register.fca.org.uk/shpo_searchresultspage?preDefined=RM&TOKEN=3wq1nht7eg7tr (accessed 26 October 2019).
- 91.
A list of UK MTFs and OTFs is available at https://register.fca.org.uk (accessed 26 October 2019).
- 92.
For an overview, see https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability/financial-market-infrastructure-supervision (accessed 26 October 2019).
- 93.
DEPP 6.2.3G, EG 12.1.2 and EG 19.14, FCA Handbook.
- 94.
See https://www.fca.org.uk/about/rules-and-guidance/confirmed-industry-guidance (accessed 26 October 2019). The FCA lists four pieces of guidance, but only two have a confirmation expiry date of later than 31 December 2019.
- 95.
DEPP 6.2.1(4)G, FCA Handbook.
- 96.
Report on Adherence to the Global FX Code, Foreign Exchange Working Group, May 2017.
- 97.
DEPP 6.2.4(A), FCA Handbook.
- 98.
The disciplinary powers of the professional associations are currently limited, and there seems to be confusion even within some of the associations themselves as to the extent of their disciplinary powers and the basis upon which they can be exercised (see Exploring the Role of Professional Bodies, note 23, in Sect. 4.3.4.1).
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Appendix
Appendix
1.1 The Written Standards Map
Standards that apply to individuals rather than firms are shown in italics.
1. Category of written standard | 2. Application to UK market participants | 3. Extent to which reliant upon public or private legal enforcement mechanisms | 4. Aspirational rating | 5. Hardness rating |
---|---|---|---|---|
International | ||||
United Nations: various standards relevant to finance sector including Sustainable Development Goals, Paris Climate Agreement, Declaration of Human Rights Numerous initiatives to encourage business to align their activities with these standards such as the Principles of the UN Global Compact, United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative | Not legally binding, except to the extent enshrined in national law, but businesses can voluntarily adhere to or seek to align their business with all or some standards. Otherwise, operate as a framework for national and international legislative initiatives (e.g. the European Union sustainable finance initiative which is intended to orientate EU finance law and policy behind the Paris Agreement and Sustainable Development Goals) and may be referenced in international investment treaties Initiatives such as the Global Compact and UNEPFI generate good practice standards which companies can adhere to, and as a way for society to monitor companies’ sustainability and human rights impact | Public: not enforceable except where enshrined in national law (see further below) or investment treaties Private: no private law enforcement (unless incorporated in some way by the parties into their relationship). However, the Guiding Principles are sufficiently specific to facilitate monitoring (e.g. by NGOs) so encouraging compliance | A1 | H3 |
International standards for regulators set by bodies such as the Financial Stability Board, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the OECD, the International Organisation of Securities Commissions, International Association of Insurance Supervisors and the Financial Action Task Force to coordinate legal and regulatory standards globally | Not directly applicable to market participants, but assumed to be relevant to: • The way other directly applicable regulatory standards may be interpreted or applied • The future shape of the regulatory regime Hence, larger firms pay attention to emerging policy and statements at this level | Public: not enforced against market participants since they generally define standards for regulators, but may influence practice through a belief that they could influence the enforcement of rules identified below that are directly applicable Private: no private law enforcement (unless incorporated in some way by the parties into their relationship) | A2 | H3 |
International private law coordination: in particular the Hague Convention, UNIDROIT and UNCITRAL—principally focused on harmonisation of standards relating to property, contract and insolvency rights and the elimination of legal uncertainty | Only applicable to the extent incorporated in national law or contractually adopted by the parties | Public: no direct enforcement against market participants Private: no private law enforcement (unless incorporated in some way by the parties into their relationship) | A3 | H2 |
Other international standard setting bodies: these are a mixture of (a) public-private bodies (such as the Task Force on Climate Related Financial Disclosure, established by the FSB but with industry members), (b) private bodies (such as Transparency International, the Global Reporting Initiative and the International Organization for Standardization) and (c) industry associations (such as ICMA and ISDA). As to the last, see further below | Only applicable to the extent incorporated in national law or voluntarily adopted by the parties. Strong UK regulatory encouragement to adhere to TCFD and moves to incorporate into some areas of regulationFootnote 84 | Public: no direct enforcement against market participants. However, compliance with the TCFD in particular is likely to be relevant to regulatory assessments of compliance with UK regulation, where relevant Private: limited, but could be referenced as a guide to good practice in private law actions, and enforceable between parties if incorporated in some way by the parties into their relationship | A2–3 | H3 |
European UnionFootnote 85 | ||||
EU Regulations (Level I/Level II) | Apply directly to businesses. Must be enforced by relevant UK authorities and applied by English courts, subject ultimately to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) | Public: generally enforced at UK level using public enforcement tools. EU trend to stipulate minimum requirements Private: limited, but could be taken into account in private law actions. May rely upon market forces to secure desired result. Breach could affect attitudes of counterparties and clients and therefore firm’s commercial position | A2–3 | H1.2 |
EU Directives (Level I/Level II) | Implemented by UK authorities in rules that apply to businesses. Enforced by relevant UK authorities and applied by English courts, subject ultimately to the CJEU | Public: generally enforced at UK level using public enforcement tools. EU trend to stipulate minimum requirements Private: limited, but could be taken into account in private law actions. May rely upon market forces to secure desired result. Breach could affect attitudes of counterparties and clients and therefore firm’s commercial position | A2–3 | H1.2 |
Regulatory Technical Standards and Implementing Technical Standards | Detailed implementing rules made under Regulations or Directives. Enforced by relevant UK authorities and applied by English courts, subject ultimately to the CJEU | Public: as for framework legislation Private: limited, but could be taken into account in private law actions | A3 | H1.2 |
EU Commission guidance | Relevant principally because it expresses the EU Commission’s view on the meaning and application of EU legislation | Public: no direct sanction, but may influence the enforcement of EU Regulations or rules implementing EU Directives Private: limited, but could be taken into account in private law actions | A2–3 | H2 |
EBA/ESMA/EIOPAFootnote 86 (ESAs) guidance and recommendations | To promote supervisory convergence, the ESAs have the power to issue guidelines that are addressed to individual member state regulatory authorities or, less frequently, to market participants. ESAs may also address an individual decision to a market participant where a member state authority has failed to act. Need not be specifically related to the application of Regulations and Directives, but often will be | Public: in most cases ESAs do not currently have direct enforcement rights, but should influence member state enforcement of EU rules or those implementing relevant EU legislation Private: limited, but could be taken into account in private law actions | A2–3 | H2 |
EU Commission Q&A/EBA/ESMA/EIOPA Q&A | Provides the views of the EU Commission/ESAs on the meaning and application of EU legislation, but is not legally binding | Public: not directly enforceable against market participants, but could be used by member state courts and regulators in assisting in the interpretation and enforcement of EU legislation Private: limited, but could be taken into account in private law actions | A2–3 | H2 |
Commission and ESA consultations, feedback documents and other commentary | No direct legal effect, but is sometimes referenced by industry participants in seeking to understand the purpose and effect of the resulting provisions in Regulations and Directives | Public: not directly enforceable against market participants, but could be taken into account in assisting in member state and judicial interpretation and enforcement of EU legislation Private: limited, but could be taken into account in private law actions | A3 | H3 |
UK | ||||
Private law, especially contract law and fiduciary duties | Directly applicable, as a minimum, to those located and conducting activities in the UK. Contractual rights are a particularly important feature of the financial markets, especially under industry standard documentation such as the master documentation maintained by the International Capital Market Association or ICMA (bond market documentation and repurchase agreements), ISDA (derivatives), the International Securities Lending Association or ISLA (securities lending) and the Loan Market Association or LMA (lending) | Public: enforced by the courts using the full range of private law remedies and sanctions Private: may be used as a basis for enforcing written norms promulgated by private bodies | A1–2 | H2 |
UK Statute/Statutory Instruments | Directly applicable to all persons within their jurisdictional reach—that is, very broadly, those carrying on activity with a UK connection. (Also implement EU regulatory standards—see above) | Public: will depend upon the relevant statute, but generally apply criminal sanctions for breach of the primary legislation. See regulatory regimes below for sanctions upon breach of rules made by regulators under the legislation Private: not generally applicable save to the extent the legislation makes use of private enforcement mechanisms or market forces | A2–3 | H1.1–1.2 |
Prudential Regulatory Authority (‘PRA’)—prudential regulation of UK incorporated banks and insurers | ||||
PRA Fundamental Rules—technically PRA ‘General Rules’ (see below), but in the form of high-level principles rather than precise targeted requirements | Directly applicable to all PRA authorised firms. (Also implement EU regulatory standards—see above) | Public: full range of PRA sanctions applies if breached. Could also have other consequences such as increased capital requirements Private: limited, but could be taken into account in private law actions Breach could affect attitudes of counterparties and clients and therefore firm’s commercial position | A1 | H1.2 |
PRA General Rules (under s137G of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (‘FSMA’)), specialised rules and various other rules made under other powers | Directly applicable to all PRA authorised firms. (Also implement EU regulatory standards—see above) | Public: full range of PRA sanctions applies if breached. Could also have other consequences such as increased capital requirements Private: limited, but could be taken into account in private law actions May rely upon market forces to secure a given result. Breach could affect attitudes of counterparties and clients and therefore firm’s commercial position | A2–3 | H1.2 |
PRA Evidential Rules (s138C FSMA) | Apply to all PRA authorised firms except inward business under an EU cross-border passport. However, indicative only. Compliance with these will tend to establish compliance with another specified rule and breach will tend to establish non-compliance | Public: no sanction for breach, but may be relevant to whether a binding rule breached—see above Private: limited, but could be taken into account in private law actions | A2–3 | H2 |
PRA Guidance including guidance statements in the PRA Handbook PRA Supervisory Statements Other materials such as PRA lettersFootnote 87 | Guidance on the operation of specified parts of FSMA and on the PRA rules and the PRA’s functions, therefore, relevant to authorised firms in complying with the above | Public: may be taken into account by the PRA in considering whether a standard has been breached Private: limited, but could be taken into account in private law actions | A2–3 | H2 |
PRA Directions/Requirements given under various Acts (including s138A FSMA) and statutory instruments | Binding on the persons or categories of persons to whom they are addressed. Relevant to the way particular rules apply to those persons | Public: as for the rules to which the direction relates Private: as for the rules to which the direction relates | A3 | H1.2 |
PRA Senior Managers RegimeFootnote 88 | Requirement for PRA individual approval for those managing aspects of the firm’s affairs relevant to regulated activities which could involve a risk of serious consequences for the firm or business or other interests in the UK | Public: a range of PRA sanctions can be applied under the PRA Conduct Rules to an individual who fails to discharge responsibilities Private: limited, but could be taken into account in private law actions, including between an individual and their employer. Could also be taken into account in the context of membership of professional bodies and by future potential employers | A2 | H1.2 |
PRA Conduct Rules | Apply to all PRA senior managers and PRA certified persons and others involved in the business of the firm | Public: a range of PRA sanctions can be applied to an individual who is in breach Private: limited, but could be taken into account in private law actions. Could also be taken into account in the context of membership of professional bodies and by future potential employers | A1 | H1.2 |
FCA—conduct of business regulation for all firms in the UK market, prudential regulation of non-PRA UK firms, listing authority | ||||
FCA Principles for Businesses—technically FCA ‘General Rules’ (see below), but in the form of high-level principles rather than precise targeted requirements | Increasing use made of these. Directly applicable to all authorised firms except inward business under an EU cross-border passport. (Also implement EU regulatory standards—see above) | Public: full range of FCA sanctions applies if breached. Could also have other consequences such as increased capital requirements Private: limited, but could be taken into account in private law actions Breach could affect attitudes of counterparties and clients and therefore firm’s commercial position | A1 | H1.2 |
FCA General Rules (under s137A-F, H, O-R and T FSMA), specialised rules (under s140-7 FSMA), listing rules under s73A and various other rules | Directly applicable to all authorised firms except inward business under an EU cross-border passport. (Also implement EU regulatory standards—see above) | Public: full range of public enforcement mechanisms used. FCA sanctions apply if breached. In some circumstances, can also lead to an action for damages from those who suffer loss as a result of the breach. Could also have other consequences such as increased capital requirements Interplay with Financial Ombudsman complaints process for firms dealing with private individuals Private: limited, but could be taken into account in private law actions May rely upon market forces to secure a given result. Breach could affect attitudes of counterparties and clients and therefore firm’s commercial position | A2–3 | H1.2 |
FCA Evidential Rules (s138C FSMA)—applicable to firms | Apply to all authorised firms except inward business under an EU cross-border passport. However, indicative only. Compliance with these will tend to establish compliance with another specified rule and breach will tend to establish non-compliance | Public: no sanction for breach, but may be relevant to whether a binding rule breached—see above Private: limited, but could be taken into account in private law actions | A2–3 | H2 |
FCA General Guidance (s139A FSMA) Generally set out in the FCA Handbook or in a separate ‘Regulatory Guide’ or, in an emergency, in a Guidance Note | Guidance on the operation of specified parts of FSMA and on the FCA rules and the FCA’s functions, therefore, relevant to authorised firms in complying with the above. Must generally be consulted upon in the same way as rules Not binding on the courts | Public: not binding and does not have evidential effect. Enforcement action would turn on breach of a binding rule to which the guidance relates However, FCA has indicated that where a person acts in accordance with general guidance, FCA will proceed as if the person has complied with the requirement to which the rule relates Private: limited, but could be taken into account in private law actions | A2–3 | H2 |
Other FCA material: informal guidance/expressions of view—in consultation papers, feedback statements, discussion papers, speeches | Potentially relevant to all authorised firms except inward business under and EU cross-border passport to the UK | Public: not binding and does not have evidential effect, but taken by the industry as providing a further gloss on the way the FCA is likely to enforce particular Principles or Rules Private: limited, but could be taken into account in private law actions | A2–3 | H2 |
FCA Senior Managers RegimeFootnote 89 | Requirement for FCA individual approval for those managing aspects of the firm’s affairs relevant to regulated activities which could involve a risk of serious consequences for the firm or business or other interests in the UK | Public: a range of FCA sanctions can be applied under the FCA Code of Conduct to an individual who fails to discharge responsibilities Private: limited, but could be taken into account in private law actions, including between an individual and their employer. Could also be taken into account in the context of membership of professional bodies and by future potential employers | A2–3 | H1.2 |
FCA Code of Conduct | Applies to all employees in a firm other than those performing a role not specific to the financial services business of the firm, such as drivers | Public: full range of FCA sanctions applies if breached. Could also have other consequences such as increased capital requirements Private: limited, but could be taken into account in private law actions including between an individual and their employer. Could also be taken into account in the context of membership of professional bodies and by future potential employers | A1 | H1.2 |
Regulated markets | ||||
Membership rules, etc. of UK regulated markets (IPSX, London Metal Exchange, ICE Futures Europe, London Stock Exchange, Euronext London, NEX Exchange, Cboe Europe Equities)Footnote 90 | Apply to market participants that need membership of the relevant markets to carry on business, and may have an impact on the terms on which those participants can transact in the market. Concern the operation of and conduct within the relevant markets | Public: regulated markets are required to maintain these as condition of being permitted to operate. Breaches by market participants could affect the exercise of regulatory discretion or even involve a breach of regulatory rules Private: generally enforceable against members as a private law matter under the terms of membership; may also involve rights between members. Breach could affect market perception | A2–3 | H2 |
Multilateral trading facilities/organised trading facilities | Â | Â | Â | Â |
Effectively a form of investment market operated by financial firms or market operators.Footnote 91 Access will generally depend upon entering into a user agreement and agreeing to comply with various operating standards setting out the terms on which the operator is willing to allow access, and also reflecting regulatory requirements | Apply to market participants that need access to the relevant platforms to carry on business, and may have an impact on the terms on which those participants can transact in the market | Public: operators are required to maintain these as a condition of being permitted to operate. Breaches of user terms and standards by market participants could affect the exercise of regulatory discretion or even involve a breach of regulatory rules. Private: user terms generally enforceable against users by operator as a private law matter under the terms of membership; may also involve rights between users | A3 | H2 |
Infrastructure providers | ||||
Membership and operating rules of market infrastructure providers (e.g. payment systems such as CHAPS, central securities depositaries such as Euroclear UK & Ireland and central counterparties such as LCH Limited)Footnote 92 | Apply to market participants that need membership of the relevant organisations to carry on business (i.e. effect payments, clear transactions and hold UK securities), and may have an impact on the terms on which those participants can transact with third parties | Public: the relevant infrastructures are required to maintain these as a condition of being permitted to operate. Breaches by market participants could affect the exercise of regulatory discretion or even involve a breach of regulatory rules Private: generally enforceable against members as a private law matter under the terms of membership; may also involve rights between members | A3 | H2 |
Other UK Codes with a legal footing | ||||
The Corporate Governance Code (FRC) | Sets out standards of good practice in relation to board leadership and effectiveness, remuneration, accountability and relations with shareholders All companies with a Premium Listing of equity shares in the UK are required under the Listing Rules to report in their annual report and accounts on how they have applied the Code. Tends to be regarded as relevant by other authorised firms because it is believed that the PRA and FCA refer to it in setting governance standards | Public: ‘comply or explain’ for UK-listed firms. Otherwise, no direct sanction Private: relevant to assessment of company by potential investors/clients. Could be taken into account in private law actions | A1–2 | H2–3 |
The Stewardship Code (FRC) | A statement of good practice to which the FRC believes institutional investors should aspire. It also describes steps asset owners can take to protect and enhance the value that accrues to the ultimate beneficiary | Public: all UK-authorised Asset Managers are required under the FCA's Rules to produce a statement of commitment to the Stewardship Code or explain why it is not appropriate to their business model Private: ‘comply or explain’. Could be taken into account in private law actions and by potential clients | A1–2 | H2–3 |
The Takeover Code (Takeover Panel) | Intended to reflect collective opinion of those professionally involved in takeovers as to appropriate business standards, fairness to offeree company shareholders and an orderly framework for takeovers. While the Takeover Panel was originally a private body, it has since been designated as the authority to carry out certain regulatory functions set out in Chapter 1 of Part 28 of the Companies Act 2006. As a result, the rules set out in the Code now have a statutory basis | Public: may issue a private or public censure, suspend or withdraw any exemption, approval or other special status which the Panel has granted May report conduct to a regulatory authority particularly the FCA to decide whether to take action (including fines), for example, where a firm fails to observe proper standards of market conduct May publish a Panel Statement indicating that the offender is someone who is not likely to comply with the Code. FCA rules and certain professional bodies oblige their members, in certain circumstances, not to act for the person in question in a Code transaction (cold shouldering) May issue directions (enforceable through the courts) and order the payment of compensation Certain breaches of bid documentation rules constitute a criminal offence Private: Panel grew from the private not public sector but now placed on a statutory footing Regime is intended to reduce scope for recourse to the courts in matters covered by the Code | A2 | H1.2–3 |
The Joint Money Laundering Steering Group Guidance Notes | The JMLSG is comprised of the leading UK financial services trade associations. Its aim is to promulgate good practice in countering money laundering and to give practical assistance in interpreting the UK Money Laundering Regulations, principally by publishing guidance | Public: no sanction for not complying with the guidance, but potentially relevant to whether the primary money laundering prohibitions, the Money Laundering Regulations or other regulatory rules have been breached. Courts required to take account of behaviour in accordance with the guidance in certain circumstances. FCA has regard to whether conduct complied with the guidance in determining whether requirements breachedFootnote 93 Private: limited | A2–3 | H2 |
Private UK codes ‘confirmed’ by the FCAFootnote 94 | ||||
Libor Code of Conduct, Investment Association guidance on electronic instructions | The first was adopted by ICE Benchmark Administration Limited for benchmark submitters to ICE LIBOR. Intended to provide a framework within which contributing banks can operate and to assist users of LIBOR rates when deciding whether LIBOR is an appropriate rate to use in contracts | Public: the FCA will regard firms following the guidance as complying with the relevant FCA Handbook rule. But failure to comply with the guidance does not indicate failure to comply with the rule.Footnote 95 (Knowingly or deliberately making false or misleading statements in relation to benchmark-setting is a criminal offence under the Financial Services Act 2012 and the FCA’s rules on benchmark submission are in Chapter 8 of its Market Conduct Sourcebook) Private: limited, but could be taken into account in private law actions and impact market perception | A2–3 | H2 |
Other private UK/international industry codes for financial services firms | ||||
Codes produced with the active involvement of regulators, especially the Bank of England and other central banks: (a) the UK Money Markets Code (a voluntary code of good practice for the money and securities financing markets facilitated by the Money Markets Committee which is chaired by the Bank of England), (b) the FX Global Code (a voluntary code of good practice in the global FX markets developed by the FX Global Committee comprised of central banks and FX market participants) and (c) the London Bullion Markets Global Precious Metals Code (standards and best practice expected of participants in the global wholesale precious metals markets) | Voluntary, but regulators take a keen interest in adherence. Central banks (through the FX Working Group) have published a ‘blueprint’ on adherence to the FX Global Code.Footnote 96 The Bank of England is involved in key oversight committees The FCA has formally ‘recognised’ the FX Global Code and the UK Money Markets Code. As a result, behaviour consistent with these codes will tend to indicate a person subject to the Senior Managers and Certification Regime is meeting their obligation to observe ‘proper standards of market conduct’ in relation to unregulated activitiesFootnote 97 | Public: not directly enforceable, but levels of compliance could influence the exercise of regulators’ supervisory powers and could be relevant to whether other rules have been complied with, whether by firms or individuals Private: limited, but could be taken into account in private law actions and impact market perception | A1–2 | H2–3 |
Industry association conduct standards produced by, for example, the Alternative Investment Management Association, the Asset Backed Finance Association, the Association of British Insurers, the British Private Equity and Venture Capital Association, the International Capital Markets Association, the Investment Association, the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, the Lending Standards Board, the Standards Board for Alternative Investments, the Wolfsburg Group | Generally voluntary in that firms usually have a decision as to whether or not to join the relevant body or on the extent to which they will adhere to the relevant written norms. Codes issued by industry bodies in areas of the financial markets that are heavily regulated generally concern matters of technical compliance with regulatory rules, whereas codes concerning conduct in more lightly regulated parts of the market are more likely to be in the form of over-arching conduct codes | Public: no direct sanction, but in some cases, these standards could be referenced by regulators in deciding whether standards under their rules have been met Private: in some cases, private bodies may rely to some degree upon Court-enforced contracts (such as membership agreements) to secure compliance. Otherwise, generally rely upon a mixture of private enforcement mechanisms. Could affect market perception if not followed | Lightly regulated market sectors: A1–2 More heavily regulated market sectors: A1–3 | H3 |
Other private UK codes for individuals working in the financial services sector | ||||
Codes produced by the Chartered Banker Institute, the Chartered Financial Analysts Institute, the Chartered Institute for Securities & Investment, the Chartered Insurance Institute, The London Institute of Banking & Finance, The Worshipful Company of International Bankers | UK professional and other membership bodies. Codes voluntary, but could affect continued membership | Public: no direct sanction. Private: generally rely upon a mixture of private enforcement mechanisms. Breach could be relevant to whether employment contracts breached and employment decisions by employers and potential employers | H3 | |
Firms’ own codes of conduct | ||||
Firm-specific | Frequently apply group-wide within international financial services groups, including UK staff who are expected to comply as part of the terms of their employment | Public: no direct sanction, but the extent to which a firm has complied with its own standards could be relevant to the exercise of regulatory discretion Private: privately enforced within the firm, including under the terms of employment contracts, but also using career progression and remuneration decisions. Could be relevant to private law action, for example, in assessing the nature of a firm’s duties to third parties | A1–2 | H2–3 |
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Rouch, D. (2020). Realising Justice: the Role of Written Standards. In: The Social Licence for Financial Markets. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40220-4_5
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