Skip to main content

Emerging Capital Economies

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Book cover International Development Law
  • 560 Accesses

Abstract

This chapter examines the importance of emerging capital markets, the reasons for their emergence, and potential future trends in their development. This discussion will examine what types of strategic planning and decision-making need to be undertaken by developing countries in order to structure their respective capital markets. Further, how can legal and regulatory regimes in need of systemic reform be modernized and updated in order to respond to the creation of new emerging capital markets? This chapter provides an analytical framework for structuring emerging capital markets, and highlights the importance of such markets to the overall development equation.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 119.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 159.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 159.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    World Bank (1997). See also R. Stevenson, “World Bank Report Sees Era of Emerging Economies: New Giants Include Brazil, India and Russia,” New York Times (September 10, 1997), at D7; R. Chote and M. Suzman, “Developing Economies Gain Pace: World Bank Predicts Doubling of Output Over Next 25 Years,” Fin. Times (September 10, 1997), at Al.

    Further, Jeffrey Garten, the dean of the Yale School of Management, declares in his book entitled, The Big Ten: The Big Emerging Markets And How They Will Change Our Lives (Basic Books, 1997), that the international rising stars are China, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, India, Indonesia, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey.

  2. 2.

    For a more in-depth discussion of BRICS, see Sarkar (Spring 2016).

  3. 3.

    R. Stevenson, “World Bank Report Sees Era of Emerging Economies,” supra, at D7. See also R. Chote, M. Suzman, “Developing Economies Gain Pace,” at 1; World Bank (1997).

  4. 4.

    ODA consists of grants and/or loans made on a concessional basis to developing countries, whereas official aid (not ODA) is provided to countries that do not qualify for ODA. United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2000, at 280.

  5. 5.

    David Sanger, “Asia’s Economic Tigers Growl at World Monetary Conference: Say Opening of Markets Hands Wall Street Too Much Power,” New York Times (September 22, 1997), at Al.

  6. 6.

    French (August 1998).

  7. 7.

    “Aid reforms could see big increase in private sector subsidies,” The Guardian (October 10, 2016).

  8. 8.

    Buchheit (1995), p. 49.

  9. 9.

    Id. Professor Buchheit notes that Costa Rica is an exception from this rule since it rescheduled its bonds in 1982 (Id. at 48 n. 16, citing “Costa Rica: A Case History,” in Default and Rescheduling, D. Suratgar, ed. [1984], and S.M. Yassukovich, “Eurobonds and Debt Rescheduling,” [January 1982], at 61).

  10. 10.

    Id. at 53–54.

  11. 11.

    Giovannini (1996), p. 100.

  12. 12.

    In a study of portfolio flows, international interest rates have a more substantial impact than country creditworthiness. Fernandez-Arias (1996), p. 418. See also G. A. Calvo, L. Leiderman, and C. M. Reinhart, Capital Inflows and Real Exchange Rate Appreciation in Latin America, MPRA Paper 7125, University Library of Munich, Germany, which shows that factors external to a country’s economic situation often drives flows in and out of a country. (IMF Staff Paper No. 40, 1993); Calvo et al. (1999), p. 239. Further, lowered international transactions costs are also the result of economic liberalization. See McKnight (1996), pp. 869–870.

  13. 13.

    A World Bank study states rather definitively that, “Seventy years of socialism have yielded overwhelming proof of Adam Smith’s views that market forces are more efficient in solving most production and distribution problems than large organizations and administrative controls.” (G. Pohl et al., Creating Capital Markets in Central and Eastern Europe, World Bank Tech. Paper No. 295, 1995, at 3).

  14. 14.

    Dollar and Easterley (1999), pp. 547, 568.

  15. 15.

    Dollar and Svensson (Royal Economic Society, October 2000), p. 894.

  16. 16.

    Alesina and Dollar (March, 2000), pp. 33–63. Among the donor nations, Japan rewards developing countries with aid if they vote with Japan in the UN (more so than France or the United States). The United States gives one-third of its aid to Israel and Egypt; and France and the UK give over half and three-quarters of their aid, respectively, to their former colonies. For these countries, in particular, bilateral aid is only weakly associated with important factors such as policy, democracy, and poverty.

  17. 17.

    United Nations Development Programme, Overcoming Human Poverty (2000), at 54.

  18. 18.

    Lensick and White (1998), p. 1232. See also World Bank (1994).

  19. 19.

    Amadou Sy and F. Rakondrazaka, “Private capital flows, official development assistance, and remittances to Africa: Who gets what?” Brookings (May 19, 2015).

  20. 20.

    See generally, B. Bosworth and S. Collins, Capital Inflows, Investment, and Growth (Brookings, 1998).

  21. 21.

    See USAID Policy Paper, Financial Market Development (1988), at 2.

  22. 22.

    Zank et al. (1991), p. 11.

  23. 23.

    See USAID Policy Paper, Financial Market Development, supra, at 8.

  24. 24.

    Zank et al. (1991), p. 22.

  25. 25.

    See USAID Policy Paper, Financial Market Development, supra, at 14.

  26. 26.

    Other factors in addition to directed credit, interest rate ceilings on deposits and loans, and taxation that may inhibit the growth of stable and transparent capital markets include: exchange controls, market entry barriers in the banking industry, and heavy reserve requirements (Id. at 6, 16, 17).

  27. 27.

    Zank et al. (1991) , pp. 26, 34.

  28. 28.

    See USAID Policy Paper, Financial Market Development, supra, at 3.

  29. 29.

    See de la Torre and Schukler (2007), p. 13; see also Securities Market Development: A Guideline for Policymakers (Economic Development Institute of the World Bank, 1997) at 1–7.

  30. 30.

    See e.g., Baliamoune-Lutz (2006).

  31. 31.

    G. Pohl et al., Creating Capital Markets in Central and Eastern Europe, World Bank Tech. Paper No. 295 (1995), supra, at 3.

  32. 32.

    It should be noted, however, that venture capital funds have generally not been instrumental to stock market development in the United States or in other countries. In fact, well-established stock markets tend to precede venture capital activities. Investment bankers who invest in high technology stocks generally create limited markets for high-risk undertakings, and only after a dynamic capital market is already established.

    Venture capitalists typically support a company with a new technology or process but with little know-how about how to finance, market, or produce it. The collective experiences of bilateral donors such as USAID and multilateral banks such as the International Finance Corporation tend to support the conclusion that investing ODA in venture capital portfolio investment is not an effective means of supporting emerging capital market development. See generally, USAID, The Venture Capital Mirage: Assessing USAID Experience with Equity Investment, USAID Program and Operations Assessment Rep. No. 17 (August 1996), at 5, 13, 21.

  33. 33.

    “Developing the Capital Markets in India,” USAID Publication No. PN-ACA-922 (April 1999), at 4–5.

  34. 34.

    Id. at 6.

  35. 35.

    “NSE India, National Stock Exchange India,” Eco. Watch (June 29, 2010).

  36. 36.

    Id. at 7.

  37. 37.

    K.R. Srivats, “IPO boom to continue in 2018: Survey,” Bus. Line (April 29, 2018).

  38. 38.

    Id.

  39. 39.

    “Developing the Capital Markets in India,” SAID Publication No. PN-ACA-922, supra., at 5, 12, 13.

  40. 40.

    Wolfie Zhao, “Crypto Investment Firm Violates Securities Laws, Warns Philippines,” Coindesk (March 15, 2018).

  41. 41.

    “Developing the Capital Markets in India,” USAID Publication No. PN-ACA-922, supra., at 15.

  42. 42.

    World Bank, Managing Capital Flows in East Asia (1996), at 24–25.

  43. 43.

    Id. at 82.

  44. 44.

    Id. at 28, 29.

  45. 45.

    Id. at 37. Likewise, yen-denominated bonds are referred to as Samurai bonds; U.K. bonds as “Bulldog” bonds; Netherlands as “Rembrandt” bonds; Spain as “Matador” bonds; and Hong Kong and Singapore-issued bonds as “Dragon” bonds.

  46. 46.

    For example, Angola issued a Eurobond on May 2, 2018, for about US$3 million after entering into an IMF structural adjustment program to renegotiate Angola’s bilateral debt as part of the measures aimed at restructuring its economy and controlling mounting debt payments. The bond issuance also took advantage of rising oil prices after a slump in 2014. See Henrique Almeida and Paul Wallace, “The Best-Performing Emerging Market Readies a New Eurobond,” Bloomberg (April 23, 2018); see also Stephen Eisenhammer, “Angola to issue [US] $2 bln Eurobond in 2018 and renegotiate bilateral debt,” Reuters (January 17, 2018). The final issuance was closer to US$3 billion in a dual tranche bond offering. See Robert Hogg, “Angola launches US$3bn bond offering,: Reuters (May 2, 2018).

  47. 47.

    “International Bonds,” Investopedia (June 14, 2018).

  48. 48.

    “The Asian Bond Markets Initiative: Policy Maker Achievements and Challenges,” Asian Dev. Bank (2017), at 1.

  49. 49.

    Id. at 7.

  50. 50.

    Id. at 8.

  51. 51.

    Gary Kleiman, “The Asian Development Bank preaches bond destiny,” Asia Times (June 5, 2018).

  52. 52.

    Homepage of cgif-abmi.com (June 14, 2018).

  53. 53.

    Glen and Pinto (1994), p. 20.

  54. 54.

    World Bank, Managing Capital Flows in East Asia, supra, at 37.

  55. 55.

    Id.

  56. 56.

    Glen and Pinto (1994) supra, at 21.

  57. 57.

    Please note that, “On February 27, 2018, a bipartisan group of nine U.S. Senators introduced Senate Bill 2463 to create a wholly owned government corporation, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (the IDFC). The IDFC is a brand-new U.S. development finance institution (DFI) meant to (i) replace the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and (ii) take control of the Development Credit Authority (DCA), the Enterprise Funds, and the Office of Private Capital and Microenterprise currently run by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). This legislation (known as the “BUILD Act”) was adopted on October 5, 2018, and the IDFC was formally launched on December 20, 2019. See e.g., “Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018: A bill to establish the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation,” Venable, LLP (April 30, 2018).

  58. 58.

    “Investment Funds in Emerging Markets,” IFC , Lessons of Experience Series (July 1996), at 4, 6.

  59. 59.

    Id. at 9, 11. (King William I of the Netherlands is given credit for establishing the first closed-end fund in Belgium in 1822.)

  60. 60.

    Id. at 37.

  61. 61.

    Id. at 9.

  62. 62.

    Id. at 14–15.

  63. 63.

    See generally, Sorabella (2000), p. 517; Zhao (2016), p. 446.

  64. 64.

    World Bank, Managing Capital Flows in East Asia, supra, at 35.

  65. 65.

    Id. at 90; see also G. Pohl et al., Creating Capital Markets in Central and Eastern Europe, supra., at 17.

  66. 66.

    Barry Bosworth and Susan Collins, “Capital Flows to Developing Economies: Implications for Saving and Investment,” Brookings (March 1, 1999).

  67. 67.

    Id. at 90.

  68. 68.

    Id. at 35.

  69. 69.

    Burton et al. (June 2006). See also Anders Aslund, “The Truth About Sovereign Wealth Funds,” For. Pol’y (December 2007). See also Sarkar (2008–2009), p. 1181.

  70. 70.

    Lee Hudson Teslik, “Sovereign Wealth Funds,” Council on For. Rels. (January 18, 2008).

  71. 71.

    IMF, “Sovereign Wealth Funds—A Work Agenda,” (February 29, 2008), at 5, This overview provides a thorough discussion of many facets and implications of SWFs. See generally, Sarkar (2010), p. 621; Sarkar (2009), p. 1181; Sarkar (2011), p. 379.

  72. 72.

    “Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings,” Sov. Wealth Fund Inst. (June 14, 2018).

  73. 73.

    “These nine companies were banned from the world’s largest sovereign wealth fund for ethical reasons,” So. China Morning Post (January 16, 2018).

  74. 74.

    Id.

  75. 75.

    Lee Hudson Teslik, “Sovereign Wealth Funds,” Council on For. Rels. (January 18, 2008).

  76. 76.

    For example, in 2005, the United Arab Emirates-owned company, Dubai Ports World, caused a great deal of discussion and Congressional interest by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) , the federal panel responsible for ensuring that national security interests are not harmed by foreign acquisition of U.S. assets. At issue then was the purchase of a British-owned shipping company by Dubai Ports World, thus giving it control over certain U.S. port facilities. Dubai Ports World is not a SWF but a state-owned enterprise, which demonstrates the concern that nation-states have with respect of foreign ownership of their strategic national assets. It later sold its U.S. operations to an American owner. See Jonathan Weisman and Bradley Graham, “Dubai Firm to Sell U.S. Port Operations,” Wash. Post (March 10, 2006). See also, Editorial, “After Dubai Ports World, Investing in the United States should be Easier,” Wash. Post (March 4, 2007).

  77. 77.

    See IMF, “Sovereign Wealth Funds—A Work Agenda,” supra at note 35, at 15–16. The IMF suggests working directly with SWFs, the OECD, the World Bank, and multilateral and other financial institutions to develop a set of best practices. Id. at 23–29.

  78. 78.

    China is a good example of this, although not necessarily limited to its sovereign wealth funds. China has bought more than US$1 trillion in U.S. debt, recently surpassing Japan as the largest overseas holder of U.S. Treasuries. While China’s voracious demand for U.S. bonds has kept interest rates low, China is beginning to lose its appetite for U.S. debt instruments. While there may be no shortage of international buyers for U.S. debt, Chinese demand is gradually slowing because of its own falling rate of foreign direct investment , a reduction in its huge trade surpluses, and a downturn in its own housing and stock markets. See Keith Bradser, “China Losing Its Taste for Debt from U.S.,” New York Times (January 8, 2009).

  79. 79.

    Id.

  80. 80.

    Alexandra Stevenson and Hannah Beech, “Goldman Sachs Made Millions in Malaysia. Now Malaysia Wants Some Money Back,” New York Times (June 14, 2018).

  81. 81.

    Id.

  82. 82.

    Id.

  83. 83.

    N. Spatafora and I. Tytell, “Commodity Price Boom, Better Policies Spur Globalization,” IMF Survey (April 3, 2008).

  84. 84.

    Javier Capapé, “Sovereign Wealth Funds: From Traditional Banking to Artificial Intelligence,” IE Corporate Rels. (October 13, 2017).

  85. 85.

    Id.

  86. 86.

    Id. The United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are eight goals that all 191 UN member states have agreed to try to achieve by the year 2015. These included, reducing child mortality, improving maternal health, and combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases. Subsequently, the UN passed the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) which are 17 goals that all 191 UN Member States have agreed to try to achieve by the year 2030. See generally, Jesse Griffiths, “Financing for Development and the SDGs: An analysis of financial flows, systemic issues and interlinkages,” Urodad (April 2018).

  87. 87.

    Id.

  88. 88.

    Lee Hudson Teslik, “Sovereign Wealth Funds,” Council on For. Rels. (January 18, 2008).

  89. 89.

    Id.

  90. 90.

    Blended finance has been defined as: “1) leverage—development and philanthropic funds are used to catalyze private investment; 2) impact—investments must result in social, economic, and environmental progress; 3) returns—financial returns must be in line with private investor expectations. … According to the Organization for Economic and Co-operation and Development (OECD), 140 blended finance facilities were launched between 2000 and 2014.” USAID, Investing for Impact: Capitalizing on the Emerging Landscape of Global Heath Financing, at 18.

  91. 91.

    See generally, USAID, Investing for Impact: Capitalizing on the Emerging Landscape of Global Heath Financing, at 6, 9. An example of a pooled investment fund may be found in the South Sudan where the U.K.’s DFID-led UK£120-million Health Pooled Fund will improve access to essential health services and strengthen the national health system. The South Sudanese Government is now trying to build a sustainable government-led health system that is responsive to local needs in providing critical healthcare to its citizens. See “South Sudan—Health Pooled Fund,” Crown Agents (June 15, 2018).

  92. 92.

    Excerpts from the following text were originally published in Sarkar and Jindal (2019), pp. at 12–16.

  93. 93.

    Park and Kowal (2013), p. 18.

  94. 94.

    Id., at 18–19. Launched in 2006 by UNEP Finance Initiative and the UN Global Compact, the United Nations-supported Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) initiative is a network of international investors working together to put the six Principles for Responsible Investment into practice. The PRI were devised by the investment community and reflect the view that environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues can affect the performance of investment portfolios and therefore must be given appropriate consideration by investors if they are to fulfill their fiduciary (or equivalent) duty. See homepage of the UN Global Compact (2018).

  95. 95.

    USAID , Investing for Impact: Capitalizing on the Emerging Landscape of Global Heath Financing, supra, at 16.

  96. 96.

    See World Bank, “Global Environment Facility Trust Fund (GEF),” (2018). The GEF was established prior to the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), commonly known as the Rio Earth Summit.

  97. 97.

    See UNFCC, Global Environmental Facility (2018).

  98. 98.

    World Wildlife Fund, “Global Environment Facility,” (June 18, 2019). For a fuller discussion of the project outcomes of the GEF, see generally, Smita Nakhooda, “The effectiveness of climate finance: a review of the Global Environment Facility,” ODI Working Paper (October 2013).

  99. 99.

    See IFAD, “The Global Environment Facility (GEF) Assembly,” (June 18, 2018).

  100. 100.

    See Green Climate Fund homepage (June 18, 2018).

  101. 101.

    Hiroko Tabuchi, “U.N. Climate Projects, Aimed at the Poorest, Raise Red Flags,” New York Times (November 16, 2017).

  102. 102.

    Nadja Popovcih and Henry Fountain, “What Is the Green Climate Fund and How Much Does the U.S. Actually Pay?” New York Times (June 2, 2017).

  103. 103.

    Megan Rowling, “Indigenous rights get boost as Green Climate Fund approves $1 billion for new projects,” Reuters (March 1, 2018).

  104. 104.

    Id.

  105. 105.

    Nina Chestney, “Global green bond issuance hit record $155.5 billion in 2017 data,” Reuters (January 10, 2018).

  106. 106.

    Id.

  107. 107.

    See World Bank Press Release, “World Bank Issues Its First Hong Kong Dollar Green Bond,” (April 16, 2018).

  108. 108.

    See World Bank Press Release, “World Bank Green Bonds Reach $10 Billion in Funding Raised for Climate Finance,” April 7, 2017).

  109. 109.

    See World Bank Press Release, “World Bank’s first Green Bonds Denominated in Indian Rupee,” (January 29, 2015).

  110. 110.

    See World Bank Press Release, “World Bank Issues Its First Hong Kong Dollar Green Bond,” supra.

  111. 111.

    World Bank, Result Briefs, “Green Bonds,” (December 1, 2017).

  112. 112.

    Id.

  113. 113.

    John McNally, “IFC, Amundi to Create World’s Largest Green-Bond Fund Dedicated to Emerging Markets,” IFC (April 21, 2017).

  114. 114.

    Id.

  115. 115.

    See generally, UN Development Program, “Social and Development Impact Bonds (Results-Based Financing),” UNDP (June 15, 2018); Sarkar and Jindal (2019).

  116. 116.

    In fact, the first SIB was launched in the U.K. “to fund the rehabilitation of ex-prisoners from Peterborough jail and reduce recidivism.” Id. The project sponsor, Social Finance, raised US$18 million from 17 investors, and supported ex-offenders and their families with employment, medical and social services, reducing recidivism by 7.5% and paying back investors between 2.5 and 13% interest by the U.K. Ministry of Justice and the Big Lottery Fund. However, these schemes are not always successful. For example, the youth rehabilitation program for New York’s Riker’s Island failed despite a US$9.6 million loan from Goldman Sachs Urban Investment Group and a US$7.2 guarantee from Bloomberg Philanthropists. New York City did not pay back the investors.

  117. 117.

    See David Geral, “Social Impact Bonds—An Option to Address Africa’s Most Pressing Challenges,” Bowman’s (December 6, 2016). See also WHO South-East Asia Journal of Public Health |(July–December 2014) 3 (3–4); Belinsky et al. (June 15, 2018), pp. 219–225. See also Bruce Bloom, “Repurposing Social Impact Bonds for Medicine,” Stan. Soc. Inn. R., (April 8, 2016).

  118. 118.

    Andrew Jack, “The innovators: devices and services to improve maternal and child health,” Fin. Times (November 16, 2016).

  119. 119.

    A DIB bond fund is where a “price is determined for the desired outcome and the implementing organization bids on one or more of the outcomes.” See Roxanne Oroxom, Amanda Glassman, and Lachlan McDonald, “Structuring and Funding Development Impact Bonds for Health: Nine Lessons from Cameroon and Beyond,” Center Global Dev. Policy Paper 117 (January 2018), at 5.

  120. 120.

    See generally, “Investing In Social Outcomes: Development Impact Bonds,” Center Global Dev. (October 7, 2013).

  121. 121.

    The UBS Optimus Foundation has also provided upfront funding for the Educate Girls DIB, also in Rajasthan, India.

  122. 122.

    Catherine Cheney, “USAID announces a new development impact bond,” Devex (November 30, 2017). For a fuller discussion, see “The Utkrisht Impact Bond: Improving Maternal and Newborn Healthcare in Rajasthan, India,” USAID (December 14, 2017).

  123. 123.

    See Roxanne Oroxom, Amanda Glassman, and Lachlan McDonald, “Structuring and Funding Development Impact Bonds for Health: Nine Lessons from Cameroon and Beyond,” supra, at 9–10.

  124. 124.

    Amanda Glassman, Roxanne Oroxom, “Another One Joins the DIB: OPIC Commits [US] $2 Million to a Development Impact Bond on Cataract Surgery,” GCD Blog (October 12, 2017).

  125. 125.

    See Roxanne Oroxom, Amanda Glassman, and Lachlan McDonald, “Structuring and Funding Development Impact Bonds for Health: Nine Lessons from Cameroon and Beyond,” supra, at 22.

  126. 126.

    An appropriate legal infrastructure would also include the following areas of law: (1) company law (defining limited liability, shareholder rights and corporate governance) ; (2) banking law (facilitating the prompt settlement of banking transactions); (3) commercial code (defining the rights and obligations of parties in contractually based transactions); (4) contract law (enforcing the rights and obligations of parties to a contract); (5) secured transactions (defining the rights to collateral); (6) tax law (providing for transparent and equitable taxation); (7) bankruptcy law (addressing the rights of creditors and collateral-holders); (8) competition law (prohibiting anti-competitive and collusive business practices). See Robert Strahota, “Securities Regulation in Emerging Markets: Issues and Suggested Answers,” (Securities Exchange Commission, April 14, 1997), unpublished memorandum prepared for SEC International Institute for the Securities Markets Development (Washington, DC).

  127. 127.

    The goal of a regulatory regime should be to create transparent and orderly markets where the settlement of securities transactions takes place promptly and accurately. Additionally, securities market regulation needs to provide for the full and fair disclosure of market information to investors in order to avoid fraudulent and deceptive conduct. See Robert Strahota, “Securities Regulation in Emerging Markets,” supra, at 2–3.

  128. 128.

    Clearing is the process by which the number, identity, and price of the shares; the date of the transaction; and the identity of the buyer and seller are verified. “Settling” refers to transferring payment to the seller and legal ownership to the buyer. See G. Pohl et al., Creating Capital Markets in Central and Eastern Europe, at 14.

  129. 129.

    For example, what should be reported, how much information should be disclosed, and when? Whom should this information be made available to for review, comment, and regulation?

  130. 130.

    World Bank, Managing Capital Flows in East Asia, supra., at 99.

  131. 131.

    G. Pohl et al., Creating Capital Markets in Central and Eastern Europe, supra, at 6.

  132. 132.

    G. Pohl et al., Creating Capital Markets in Central and Eastern Europe, supra, at 7.

  133. 133.

    Id.

  134. 134.

    Id. at 22, 23.

  135. 135.

    Id. at 22–23.

  136. 136.

    S. Strom, “Bailing Out of the Bailout Game: Tokyo Does the Unthinkable and Lets a Big Bank Fail,” New York Times (November 18, 1997), at Dl.

  137. 137.

    S. Strom, “Large Japanese Securities Firm Collapses,” New York Times (November 24, 1997).

  138. 138.

    G. Pohl et al., Creating Capital Markets in Central and Eastern Europe, supra, at 6, 21.

  139. 139.

    The impact of culture on law, even within a financial context, can be felt quite clearly. In a study completed by the IFC, the “legal determinants of external finance” were explored in terms of the impact that certain legal regimes had on investor behavior. By using a sample of forty-nine countries, the quality and character of legal rules and regulations as applied to both equity and debt markets were explored. The results were quite remarkable. The authors concluded that the rules differ systematically by legal origin, to wit, English, French, German, or Scandinavian (La Porta et al. 1997, p. 1131).

    For example, the empirical data collected by the authors revealed certain general trends, namely, that legal rules from different cultures differ significantly in content. Further, common law jurisdictions tended to protect shareholders and creditors the most, whereas, French civil code countries gave the least amount of protection to these actors. Germany and Scandinavian countries fell somewhere in the middle. The study also concluded that common law countries also provided private companies with better access to equity than did French civil law countries, and that adequate law enforcement of financial market-related issues has a “large effect” on the depth and breadth of debt and equity markets (Id. at 1132, 1137, 1146).

    The authors conclude that good legal enforcement provides an incentive to invest one’s capital, thus potentially increasing the scope of capital markets. English common law countries offered the most legal protection and have the biggest capital markets. The French civil law countries, conversely, had the weakest investor protections and the least developed capital markets. The authors rather vaguely conclude that the absence of investor trust generally in French civil law jurisdictions accounted for the overall poor institutional development, including that of capital markets, but admit that this issue could not be adequately resolved based on their research. (Id., at 1149–1150). Of course, the research parameters will change considerably when China enters world securities markets in earnest. The influx of equity and debt offerings will, no doubt, be overwhelming, and perhaps the same correlations regarding investor-friendly laws will no longer be as apparent as they seem to be now.

References

  • Alesina A, Dollar D (2000) Who gives foreign aid to whom and why? J Econ Growth 5:33–63

    Google Scholar 

  • Baliamoune-Lutz M (2006) Financial reform and the mobilization of domestic savings: the experience of Morocco, WIDER Working Paper Series100. World Institute for Development Economic Research, Helsinki

    Google Scholar 

  • Belinsky M, Eddy M, Lohmann J, George M (2018) The application of social impact bonds to universal health-care initiatives in South-East Asia. WHO South-East Asia J Public Health 3:219–225

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Buchheit LC (1995) Cross-border lending: what’s different this time. Northwest J Int Law Bus 16:44

    Google Scholar 

  • Burton D et al (2006) Asia’s winds of change. Finance Dev 43:8–15

    Google Scholar 

  • Calvo GA, Leiderman L, Reinhart CM (1999) Private capital and development: challenges facing international financial institutions in a globalized economy. Transnational Law Contemp Prob 9:239

    Google Scholar 

  • de la Torre A, Schukler S (2007) Emerging capital markets and globalization: the Latin America experience. World Bank, Washington, D.C., p 13

    Google Scholar 

  • Dollar D, Easterley W (1999) The search for the key: aid, investment and politics in Africa. J Afr Econ 8:546

    Google Scholar 

  • Dollar D, Svensson J (2000) What explains the success of failure of structural adjustment programmes. Econ J 110:894

    Google Scholar 

  • Fernandez-Arias E (1996) The new wave of private capital inflows: push or pull? J Dev Econ 48:389

    Google Scholar 

  • French H (1998) In focus, capital flows and the environment. Foreign Policy 3(22):1–4

    Google Scholar 

  • Giovannini A (1996) Borrowing in international capital markets: lessons from experience. In: Calvo GA et al (eds) Private capital flows to emerging markets after the Mexican crisis. Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC, p 100

    Google Scholar 

  • Glen J, Pinto B (1994) Debt or equity? World Bank, Washington, D.C., p 20

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • La Porta R et al (1997) Legal determinants of external finance. J Finance 52:1131

    Google Scholar 

  • Lensick R, White H (1998) Does the revival of international private capital flows mean the end of aid?: an analysis of developing countries’ access to private capital. World Dev 26:1221

    Google Scholar 

  • McKnight SN (1996) Stepping stones to reform: the use of capital controls in economic liberalization. Va Law Rev 82:859

    Google Scholar 

  • Park J, Kowal S (2013) Socially responsible investing 3.0: understanding finance and environmental, social, and governance issues in emerging markets. Georgetown Public Policy Rev 18:17

    Google Scholar 

  • Sarkar R (2008–2009) Critical essay: sovereign wealth finds: furthering development or impeding it? Georgetown J Int Law 40:1181

    Google Scholar 

  • Sarkar R (2009) Sovereign wealth funds: furthering development or impeding it? Georgetown J Int Law 40:1181

    Google Scholar 

  • Sarkar R (2010) Sovereign wealth funds as a development tool for ASEAN nations: from social wealth to social responsibility. Georgetown J Int Law 41:621

    Google Scholar 

  • Sarkar R (2011) A “re-visioned” foreign direct investment approach from an emerging country perspective: moving from a vicious circle to a virtuous cycle. ILSA J Int Comp Law 17:379

    Google Scholar 

  • Sarkar R (2016) Trends in global finance: the new development (BRICS) bank. Loyola Univ Chicago Int Law Rev 13:89

    Google Scholar 

  • Sarkar R, Jindal R (2019) Legal and financial models for public-private partnerships: making global outreach more feasible. Bull Am Coll Surg

    Google Scholar 

  • Sorabella W (2000) Less developed countries as a start-up corporation: adopting the venture capital model for development in light of global capital market realities. Law Policy Int Bus 31:517

    Google Scholar 

  • World Bank (1994) The East Asian miracle: economic growth and public policy, 2nd edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • World Bank (1997) Global economic prospects and developing countries. World Bank, Washington, D.C.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zank N et al (1991) Reforming financial systems: policy changes and privatization. Greenwood Press, Westport, p 11

    Google Scholar 

  • Zhao J (2016) Promoting a more efficient corporate governance model in emerging markets through corporate law. Wash Univ Global Stud Law Rev 15:446

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2020 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Sarkar, R. (2020). Emerging Capital Economies. In: International Development Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40071-2_7

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40071-2_7

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-40070-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-40071-2

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics