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Cognitive Liberty and Human Rights

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Neuroscience and Law

Abstract

This chapter discusses the emerging debate regarding the relationship between the concept of Cognitive Liberty and Human Rights. For this reason, after briefly presenting some issues related to the development of recent neurotechnology, the different types of definitions of the concept of cognitive liberty, that have been recently proposed, are illustrated. Starting from these last, this chapter aims to analyze how, the whole relationship between human rights and Cognitive Liberty can change depending on the legislative strategy that one prefers to undertake.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Cf. Boire (2000), and Sententia (2004).

  2. 2.

    Boire (2000), p. 7.

  3. 3.

    Cf. Farah et al. (2010).

  4. 4.

    Cf. Weisberg et al. (2008).

  5. 5.

    Cf. Morse (2011), p. 534; Glannon (2011), pp. 13–14. For another interesting use of Brain imaging in what is called Neuromarketing Cf. Fisher et al. (2010).

  6. 6.

    Cf. Jotterand and Giordano (2008).

  7. 7.

    Cf. Jotterand and Giordano (2008).

  8. 8.

    Cf. Kosfeld et al. (2005).

  9. 9.

    Cf. Baumgartner et al. (2008).

  10. 10.

    Cf. DeWall et al. (2014).

  11. 11.

    Cf. Lynch (2002).

  12. 12.

    Cf. Liao and Sandberg (2008).

  13. 13.

    Cf. Jotterand and Giordano (2008).

  14. 14.

    Cf. Brey (2009).

  15. 15.

    Cf. Wolfslehner (2015).

  16. 16.

    Cf. Brey (2009).

  17. 17.

    Cf. Wolfslehner (2015).

  18. 18.

    Cf. Brey (2009).

  19. 19.

    The term was first introduced around 2000 in order to emphasize the role and the resilience of individual thought in the free usage of technologies at its disposal. In this regard, Cf. Sententia (2013).

  20. 20.

    The term ‘cognitive’, in this context, seems to denote some sort of process that the mind uses to organize the information it receives when it collects and selects information according to perception, attention, comprehension, and memory in order to influence human behavior. In this regard, Cf. Bostrom and Roache (2010).

  21. 21.

    Bublitz (2013), p. 234.

  22. 22.

    Cf. Bublitz (2013), p. 1313; Sententia (2013), p. 358.

  23. 23.

    Which is what is imagined by Boire. Cf. Boire (2004).

  24. 24.

    An application of a negative formulation of CL at the judicial level can be observed in the case Sell vs the United States. In that case, indeed, the court articulated some limits to the use of neuro-techniques. These last can be articulated in four points: (1) there must be a state public interest; (2) medicines administered must at the same time bring the subject to his senses and not cause unwanted effects; (3) the accused may not be subjected to alternative healthcare that may yield the same results; (4) the drug should be administered in the best medical interests based on the subject’s health condition. Cf. Etheridge and Chamberlain (2006).

  25. 25.

    Cf. Meynen (2013).

  26. 26.

    Cf. Greely (2012).

  27. 27.

    In this sense, he asserts, for example, that the traditional forms of direct brain interventions (such as lobotomy) are unduly simplistic solutions for a very complex problem since they are neither safe nor effective. This is the reason why, in his opinion, it is necessary to test new forms of intervention, safe and effective, in order to eradicate socially unaccepted behaviour through behaviour control, provided that the interventions are safe, effective and not improper. Cf. Greely (2008), and Greely (2012), p. 163.

  28. 28.

    Ivi., p. 164.

  29. 29.

    In this sense, he wrote: “A “resistible” treatment, such as a prison rehabilitation effort, still seems to leave some freedom for choice; the more effective (and irresistible) the treatment, the greater the invasion of liberty. I feel that there should be some protected space of cognitive liberty, but, given that all interventions affect the brain, it is hard to see why mandatory brain interventions should be impermissible only if they are direct”. Ibid. However, other authors such as, for instance, Martha Farah, believes that possible interventions on the central nervous system, such as subcutaneous stimulators or neurosurgical operations, should not be used in any circumstances to subjugate the interests of an individual to the interests of society, because they commit a clear violation of the right to human dignity. Each convict must be granted the right to keep his thought and his personality away from any kind of intervention aimed at damaging individual liberty. The possible submission to permanent interventions as an alternative to imprisonment integrates, in any case, an implicit coercion to the individual will. Cf. Farah (2002), p. 1126.

  30. 30.

    In the United States of America, for example, such privilege is foreseen by the V Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America.

  31. 31.

    The problem presents itself mainly when data obtained from brain scans, such as fMRIs, are not only treated as information on the individual, but as true testimonies for non-intervention of the right to self-incrimination. Cf. Ienca and Andorno (2017), p. 16.

  32. 32.

    Blank (2016), p. 52.

  33. 33.

    Cf. Maslen et al. (2014), p. 311.

  34. 34.

    Bostrom (2003), p. 493.

  35. 35.

    Lynch et al. (2011), p. 126.

  36. 36.

    Sommaggio (2016), p. 9.

  37. 37.

    Cf. Giordano (2010), and Larriviere and Williams (2010).

  38. 38.

    Nowadays, however, since there is reasonable doubt about their efficacy and their possible negative effects, it is possible to conclude that such a legal duty cannot be imposed. Cf. Maslen et al. (2014).

  39. 39.

    Cf. Greely et al. (2008).

  40. 40.

    Cf. Larriviere et al. (2009).

  41. 41.

    Cf. Blitz (2016).

  42. 42.

    Beitz (2009), p 109.

  43. 43.

    This is a form of the so-called Nickel’s test. Cf. Nickel (2014).

  44. 44.

    Bublitz and Merkel (2014) p. 52.

  45. 45.

    Ibid.

  46. 46.

    Ibid.

  47. 47.

    Ivi., p. 62.

  48. 48.

    Bublitz (2013), p. 237.

  49. 49.

    Ibid.

  50. 50.

    Bublitz (2015), p. 1312.

  51. 51.

    Ibid.

  52. 52.

    Ivi, p. 99.

  53. 53.

    Cf. Ienca and Andorno (2017), p. 11.

  54. 54.

    Ibid.

  55. 55.

    However, it is necessary to recognize that the rights of the Charter apply only to the institutions, agencies and bodies of the Union respecting the principle of subsidiarity as well as to Member States in the implementation of Union law, as stated in art. 51 European Charter of Human Rights.

  56. 56.

    Cf. Ienca and Andorno (2017), pp. 11–24.

  57. 57.

    Ivi, p. 24.

  58. 58.

    On this point, Cf. Sommaggio et al. (2017).

  59. 59.

    Sepuldeva et al. (2004), p. 3.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Trento, Faculty of Law, Trento, Italy

    Paolo Sommaggio

  2. University of Padova, Department of Public, International, and Community Law, Padova, Italy

    Marco Mazzocca

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  1. Paolo Sommaggio
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  1. Department of Law, Politics and International Studies, University Center for Bioethics, University of Parma, Parma, Italy

    Antonio D’Aloia  & Maria Chiara Errigo  & 

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Sommaggio, P., Mazzocca, M. (2020). Cognitive Liberty and Human Rights. In: D’Aloia, A., Errigo, M.C. (eds) Neuroscience and Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38840-9_6

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