Abstract
Informal constitutional change refers to a change in the normative meaning of the constitution, which occurs without following the procedure for constitutional revision. Theories of informal constitutional change often bolster the argument for a political approach to constitutional law that is sometimes described as “political law”—with a certain degree of ambiguity. In that way, constitutional law cannot be reduced to the study of the written constitution and its interpretation by a judge. Indeed, political law consider the political practice and constitutional interpretation. However, the political approach to constitutional law can pursue very different, more or less prescriptive, objectives since it serves at once to define the constitution, and produce certain representations of constitutional law.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Altwegg-Boussac (2013).
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
See Carré de Malberg (2003).
- 6.
See Capitant (2004).
- 7.
See Avril (1997).
- 8.
See Troper (2001).
- 9.
See Waldron (2016).
- 10.
See Whittington (2001).
- 11.
See Beaud (1994).
- 12.
See Baranger (2008).
- 13.
See Pfersmann (2003).
- 14.
“My descriptive claim is that much-perhaps even most – of “constitutional” work in our legal system is in fact done by legal norms existing outside what we traditionally think of as “the Constitution””. Young (2007).
- 15.
- 16.
See Tushnet (2007).
- 17.
See Prélot (1950).
- 18.
See Jouanjan (2003).
- 19.
Mortati (1998).
- 20.
“Let me attempt further to a seemingly unorthodox position unambiguous: the working Constitution is amended whenever the basic ways of government are changed […] Indeed, amendment occurs typical by action of the relevant specialists along, and without alteration of the Document. Of their own motion they can, and of their own motion or under pressure from interested groups they do, change the manner of government vital aspects, widen it startlingly, ring out old pieces of the Constitution as bells ring out an Old Year”. Llewellyn (1962).
- 21.
- 22.
- 23.
Cf. Ackerman or Whittington, and the notion of “constitutional construction”.
- 24.
- 25.
“Something more must be added. As in the creation of law, the creation of a convention must be due to the reason of the thing because it accords with the prevailing political philosophy. It helps to make the democratic system operate; it enables the machinery of State to run more smoothly; and if it were not there friction would result. Thus, if a convention continues because it is desirable in the circumstances of the constitution, it must be created for the same reason. We have to ask ourselves three questions: first, what are the precedents; secondly, did the actors in the precedents believe that they were bound by a rule; and thirdly, is there a reason for the rule? A single precedent with a good reason may be enough to establish the rule. A whole string of precedents without such a reason will be of no avail, unless it is perfectly certain that the persons concerned regarded them as bound by it. And then, as we have seen, the convention may be broken with impunity”. Jennings (1955, pp. 131–135).
- 26.
Waldron (2006).
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Altwegg-Boussac, M. (2020). Informal Constitutional Change and Political Law. In: Nogueira de Brito, M., Pereira Coutinho, L. (eds) The Political Dimension of Constitutional Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38459-3_6
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