How Do Cognitive Styles Influence Political Attitudes? A Joint Consideration of Dual-Process Model and Construal Level Theory

Part of the Identity in a Changing World book series (ICW)


Recent correlational and experimental studies demonstrate that differences in people’s thinking styles have an impact on their political attitudes. Whereas the dual process model of mind relates social conservative attitudes to intuitive (vs. analytical) thinking style, construal level theory links abstract (i.e., concrete) thinking style to political consistency and polarization. Although empirical backing for each position is rather strong, there are some mixed findings regarding the causal influence of these thinking styles on political attitudes. Moreover, there is no approach that combines findings from these two theoretical approaches. In this chapter, after summarizing relevant findings in the literature, we discuss the strengths and weaknesses of both theoretical approaches and the boundary conditions of the effects in question.


Analytical Intuitive Abstract Concrete Thinking styles Political attitudes 


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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Yaşar UniversityIzmirTurkey
  2. 2.Kadir Has UniversityIstanbulTurkey
  3. 3.Boğaziçi UniversityIstanbulTurkey

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