Abstract
The chapter compares Aristotelian naturalism with other kinds of naturalism, and discusses the reasons for and against classifying a philosophical view as ‘naturalistic’. The main kinds of naturalism in theoretical philosophy conceive ‘nature’ or ‘the natural’ either as a realm (metaphysical naturalism) or methodologically (scientia mensura naturalism, semantic naturalism). Aristotelian naturalism, on the other hand, conceives nature (physis) as a thing’s essence. In invoking human nature, Aristotelian naturalists refer to the nature of things, rather than to the things of nature. The final part of the chapter describes tensions that arise from the Aristotelian naturalists’ exploiting the ambiguity of the term ‘nature’.
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Notes
- 1.
For example, two pertinent papers distinguish the following forms of naturalism: aposteriori, cooperative, eliminative, expansive, integrative, metaphysical, methodological, moderate, ontological, radical, reductive, reformist, restricted, revolutionary, scientific, scientistic, and unrestricted naturalism. See Haack (1993) and Koppelberg (1996).
- 2.
The full citation reads: “The world is as natural science says it is, insofar as natural science is right”. The added clause expresses a fallibilistic proviso that distinguishes Quine’s naturalism from ideological scientism. Science according to Quine is not a collection of true statements or theories, but rather the systematic, open-ended, and self-correcting pursuit of truth.
- 3.
This standpoint is exemplified in the work of Stephen Stich and Arthur Fine. On this, see Keil (2003), 265–7.
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- 5.
Here Nussbaum refers to passages from the Nicomachean Ethics (1159a and 1166a).
- 6.
This nominalistic perspective of kind essences corresponds to the ‘linguistic doctrine of necessity’ advanced by some logical empiricists. According to this view, all statements about essential characteristics are analytic.
- 7.
Philosophers have adopted different positions on the question of what constitutes the second nature of humans. For McDowell, it is our character as formed through reason, for Gehlen it is culture, for Cicero, Aquinas, and Hegel it is habit.
- 8.
Michael Thompson, whom Foot cites here, calls such statements “natural-historical judgments”. The sum of all true natural-history statements about a species describes its ‘life-form’. See Thompson (2008), 63–82.
- 9.
To be precise: “we are biologically so constituted that we cannot but develop and exercise the capacity for rational normative activity” (Rabbås 2015, 107).
- 10.
“The source of error is to think as if we had a choice whether to perform the human ergon or not, that is, be rational (a zōon logikon). Although it is true that humans are special in that they perform their ergon intentionally, this does not mean that what they intentionally do is to opt for (enter, take up) the human ergon […]” (Rabbås 2015, 107).
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- 12.
It is doubtful, however, whether Aristotle himself was a virtue ethicist avant la lettre. The Nicomachean Ethics contains an annotated catalog of virtues, but for good reason ethical theories which identify eudaemonia as the highest good and then specify means for attaining that good, have been called ‘teleological’ (see Rapp2010, 28). Equally questionable is whether Aristotle was an Aristotelian naturalist à la Foot and Hursthouse. Rapp concludes: “Compared to such positions, Aristotle’s explicit references to human nature play a methodologically limited role and, furthermore, provide only a general framework. Besides, Aristotle nowhere in his ethical works endeavors to spell out the needs of human life, unlike Nussbaum or Hursthouse,” (Rapp2010, 30).
- 13.
“Aristotle’s claim is: If we exercise that which distinguishes humans, our reason [...], and if we do so in an excellent way (i.e. in accordance with the virtues of character and of intellect), then we are happy” (Primavesi and Rapp 2016, 97).
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Keil, G. (2020). Metaphysical, Scientific, Semantic and Aristotelian Naturalism. In: Hähnel, M. (eds) Aristotelian Naturalism. Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, vol 8. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37576-8_4
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