Abstract
Previous experiments in tacit coordination games hinted that some people are more successful in achieving coordination than others, although the variability in this ability has not yet been examined before. With that in mind, the overarching aim of our study is to model and describe the variability in human decision-making behavior in the context of tacit coordination games. To do so we first conducted a large-scale experiment to collect behavioral data, modeled the decision-making behavior, and characterize their observed variability. We then used the proposed model by predicting the individual coordination ability of a player based on its constructed strategic profile model and demonstrated that there is a direct and significant relationship between the player’s model and its coordination ability. Understanding the differences in individual’s tacit coordination abilities as well as their unique strategic profiles will allow us to better predict human’s behavior in tacit coordination scenarios and consequently construct better algorithms for human-machine interactions.
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Notes
- 1.
Quoting Binmore ([2], p. 262), “The equilibrium selection problem is perhaps the greatest challenge facing modern game theory”.
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Mizrahi, D., Laufer, I., Zuckerman, I. (2019). Modeling Individual Tacit Coordination Abilities. In: Liang, P., Goel, V., Shan, C. (eds) Brain Informatics. BI 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11976. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37078-7_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37078-7_4
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