Abstract
This chapter asserts that the main obstacle to striking a grand bargain between China and the US over their competing order-building projects is the ontological insecurity each of them is facing. Built on a socially constructed discourse and narrative that the territories were a historically undisputable part of China until France and Japan invaded them, territorial irredentism is essential for contemporary China to validate its national identity as a re-emerging East Asian power. The US believes that its national identity as a liberal hegemon is threatened by a revisionist, non-liberal China. To preserve the rules-based liberal order is crucial for it to keep its national identity intact. To make its order-building legitimate, China must act and speak in accordance with publicly accepted norms and rules. This would require China to be committed to contemporary international norms and rules rather than to the vaguely defined historic rights and the unsubstantiated nine-dash-line map.
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Notes
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Heritage, A., Lee, P.K. (2020). Conclusions: A Sino-American Grand Bargain to Settle the Disputes?. In: Order, Contestation and Ontological Security-Seeking in the South China Sea. Governance, Security and Development. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34807-6_7
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