Abstract
Card-based cryptography provides simple and practicable protocols for performing secure multi-party computation (MPC) with just a deck of cards. For the sake of simplicity, this is often done using cards with only two symbols, e.g.,
and
. Within this paper, we target the setting where all cards carry distinct symbols, catering for use-cases with commonly available standard decks and a weaker indistinguishability assumption. As of yet, the literature provides for only three protocols and no proofs for non-trivial lower bounds on the number of cards. As such complex proofs (handling very large combinatorial state spaces) tend to be involved and error-prone, we propose using formal verification for finding protocols and proving lower bounds. In this paper, we employ the technique of software bounded model checking (SBMC), which reduces the problem to a bounded state space, which is automatically searched exhaustively using a SAT solver as a backend.
Our contribution is twofold: (a) We identify two protocols for converting between different bit encodings with overlapping bases, and then show them to be card-minimal. This completes the picture of tight lower bounds on the number of cards with respect to runtime behavior and shuffle properties of conversion protocols. For computing
, we show that there is no protocol with finite runtime using four cards with distinguishable symbols and fixed output encoding, and give a four-card protocol with an expected finite runtime using only random cuts. (b) We provide a general translation of proofs for lower bounds to a bounded model checking framework for automatically finding card- and length-minimal protocols and to give additional confidence in lower bounds. We apply this to validate our method and, as an example, confirm our new
protocol to have a shortest run for protocols using this number of cards.
Keywords
- Secure multiparty computation
- Card-based cryptography
- Formal verification
- Bounded model checking
- Standard decks
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- 1.
This is known as the “dating problem”.
- 2.
Alice and Bob in the story might, e.g., use \(7\), \(8\), \(9\), \(10\) and a queen with any symbol.
- 3.
As an example, in a Duplicate Bridge tournament, one might prove that all sessions are handed the same cards, eliminating the need of a trusted dealer (no pun intended).
- 4.
Actually, the distribution does not matter, as long as \(\Pr [I = i] > 0\) for all
. - 5.
In order to keep the execution times still manageable for our experiments, we bound this amount by the (arguably quite reasonable) number 8.
- 6.
The program is available under https://github.com/mi-ki/cardCryptoVerification.
- 7.
In case of the decks being a subset of
, we may use usual permutation notation. We require that if
maps \(x\) to \(y\), the cardinalities of \(x\) and \(y\) are equal in the deck.
.
, we may use usual permutation notation. We require that if
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Appendix: Further Protocols
Appendix: Further Protocols
This appendix contains the 8-card
protocol of [M16] (Fig. 9) and a second four-card protocol which uses a number of 4.5 shuffles in expectation, which are, however, non-closed and hence, more impractical to implement, cf. Fig. 10.
The eight-card finite-runtime
protocol of [M16], with
and uniform-closed shuffles. Output is in basis \(\{5,6\}\) or \(\{7,8\}\), each with probability 1/2.
A four-card Las Vegas
protocol with deck
and uniform shuffles. Note that
and
. The output is in one of the bases \(\{1,3\}, \{1,4\}, \{2,3\}, \{3,4\}\), determined by the position of the final state in the tree, and can be converted as needed.
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Koch, A., Schrempp, M., Kirsten, M. (2019). Card-Based Cryptography Meets Formal Verification. In: Galbraith, S., Moriai, S. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2019. ASIACRYPT 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11921. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34578-5_18
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