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Bi-level Adversary-Operator Cyberattack Framework and Algorithms for Transmission Networks in Smart Grids

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Optimization, Learning, and Control for Interdependent Complex Networks

Part of the book series: Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing ((AISC,volume 1123))

Abstract

Transmission system is one of the most important assets in secure power delivery. Recent advancements toward automation of smart grids and application of supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems have increased vulnerability of power grids to cyberattacks. Cyberattacks on transmission network, specifically the power transmission lines, are among crucial emerging challenges for the operators. If not identified properly and in a timely fashion, they can cause cascading failures leading to blackouts. This chapter tackles false data injection modeling from the attacker’s perspective. It further develops an algorithm for detection of false data injections in transmission lines. To this end, first, a bi-level mixed integer programming problem is introduced to model the attack scenario, where the attacker can target a transmission line in the system and inject false data in load measurements on targeted buses in the system to overflow the targeted line. Second, the problem is analyzed from the operator’s viewpoint and a detection algorithm is proposed using l 1 norm minimization approach to identify the bad measurement vector in data readings. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed attack model, case studies have been conducted on IEEE 57-bus test system.

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Acknowledgements

This work was under support from Penn State’s Center for Security Research and Education (CSRE) seed grant 2019.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Computing and Information Sciences, Florida International University, Miami, FL, USA

    M. Hadi Amini

  2. Sustainability, Optimization, and Learning for InterDependent Networks Laboratory (solid lab), Florida International University, Miami, FL, USA

    M. Hadi Amini

  3. Electrical Engineering, Architectural Engineering, Penn State University Park, State College, PA, USA

    Javad Khazaei

  4. Mathematics, Penn State Harrisburg, Middletown, PA, USA

    Darius Khezrimotlagh

  5. Electrical and Computer Engineering, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, IL, USA

    Arash Asrari

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  1. M. Hadi Amini
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  2. Javad Khazaei
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Correspondence to M. Hadi Amini .

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  1. School of Computing and Information Sciences, Florida International University, Miami, FL, USA, Sustainability, Optimization, and Learning for InterDependent Networks Laboratory (solid lab), Florida International University, Miami, FL, USA

    M. Hadi Amini

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Amini, M.H., Khazaei, J., Khezrimotlagh, D., Asrari, A. (2020). Bi-level Adversary-Operator Cyberattack Framework and Algorithms for Transmission Networks in Smart Grids. In: Amini, M. (eds) Optimization, Learning, and Control for Interdependent Complex Networks. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 1123. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34094-0_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34094-0_8

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-34093-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-34094-0

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