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Stipulating Investors’ Obligations in Investment Agreements as a Suitable Regulatory Approach to Prevent and Remedy Anti-Competitive Behaviour?

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International Investment Law and Competition Law

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Abstract

This chapter approaches the regulatory option of integrating provisions of competition law into the normative structure of international investment agreements (IIAs). Grounded in the growing trend to include investors’ obligations in the new generation of IIAs, the analysis attempts to assess the feasibility and potential benefits of this regulatory approach as a means to prevent and remedy anti-competitive behaviour by foreign investors. By identifying three main types of obligations currently integrated into agreements, including direct obligations, indirect obligations, and commitments to corporate social responsibility, the chapter pushes forward the proposition of including obligations aimed at promoting and protecting market competition. The similarities between the policy aims of competition law and international investment law, among them the protection of human rights and the environment, the promotion of core labour and social standards as well as the prevention of corruption, create an opening for cooperation. Further legitimizing the integration between the two spheres, foreign investors have the potential to interfere with the free play of market forces and thus contravene the aims pursued by competition policy. The chapter illustrates the potential applicability and extension of incorporating investors’ obligations designed to prevent and remedy anti-competitive behaviour into IIAs. The chapter concludes by addressing the underlying burdens of enforcement and implementation with regard to any inclusion of such obligations for the investors.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    UNCTAD (1997), pp. 123 et seq.

  2. 2.

    Tamada (2015), p. 2.

  3. 3.

    Miles (2010), pp. 295 et seq.; Lavranos (2016), pp. 309 et seq.; Puig and Shaffer (2018), p. 361, Roberts (2018), pp. 411 et seq.

  4. 4.

    UNCTAD (2017a), pp. 119 et seq.

  5. 5.

    Tietje (2009), p. 461.

  6. 6.

    Butler and Subedi (2017), pp. 46 et seq.

  7. 7.

    Tietje and Crow (2017), pp. 107 et seq.; Peters (2016), p. 339.

  8. 8.

    UNCTAD (2018) p. 88.

  9. 9.

    Salacuse (2015), pp. 124 et seq.

  10. 10.

    Dolzer and Schreuer (2012), p. 25 (“BITs give guarantees to investors but do not normally address obligations of investors.”); Muchlinski (2017), p. 367; Mbengue and Schacherer (2018), pp. 558 et seq.; as well as UNCTAD (2017b), p. 61 (“Most IIAs are asymmetrical in that they set out obligations only for States and not for investors.”).

  11. 11.

    ISO Advisory Group on Social Responsibility (2004), para. 1.

  12. 12.

    On the chartered trading corporations as predecessors of modern transnational enterprises, see Carlos and Nicholas (1988), pp. 399 et seq.

  13. 13.

    Metcalf (1994), p. 19.

  14. 14.

    Salacuse (1985), p. 1008; Muchlinski (2010), pp. 28 et seq.

  15. 15.

    UNCTAD (2001), p. 5.

  16. 16.

    Clapham (2006), Alston (2005), pp. 3 et seq.; Nowrot (1999), pp. 579 et seq.; Noortmann et al. (2015), d’Aspremont (2011), Klabbers (2003), pp. 351 et seq.

  17. 17.

    Concerning the importance of NGOs as a contributing factor to the current policy shift in investment law see Muchlinski (2011), pp. 33 et seq.

  18. 18.

    The text of the IISD Model Agreement is for example available under: http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment_model_int_agreement.pdf. All references to websites in this contribution have been last accessed on 26 Nov 2018.

  19. 19.

    See for example, Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty (2016) available under: http://www.dea.gov.in/sites/default/files/ModelBIT_Annex_0.pdf.

  20. 20.

    UNCTAD (2018) World Investment Report 2018, Investment and New Industrial Policies, p. 88.

  21. 21.

    Investment Agreement for the COMESA Common Investment Area of 22/23 May 2007, http://vi.unctad.org/files/wksp/iiawksp08/docs/wednesday/Exercise%20Materials/invagreecomesa.pdf.

  22. 22.

    Southern African Development Community (SADC), Agreement Amending Annex 1 (Co-operation on Investment) of the Protocol on Finance and Investment, as signed by the Heads of State or Government of SADC Member States in the Kingdom of Swaziland on 31 August 2016, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/treaty/3383.

  23. 23.

    Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments between the Argentine Republic and the State of Qatar of 6 November 2016, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/treaty/3706.

  24. 24.

    Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Supplementary Act A/SA.3/12/08 Adopting Community Rules on Investment and the Modalities for their Implementation with ECOWAS of 19 December 2008, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/treaty/3547.

  25. 25.

    ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work of 18 June 1998 (Annex revised 15 June 2010), https://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/textdeclaration/lang%2D%2Den/index.htm.

  26. 26.

    Reciprocal Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement between Morocco and Nigeria of 3 December 2016, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/treaty/3711.

  27. 27.

    Muchlinski (2008), pp. 37 et seq.

  28. 28.

    García-Bolívar (2009), p. 484 (“It seems that the most difficult task would be to devise the enforcement mechanisms for those obligations […]”).

  29. 29.

    Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States and the European Union and its Member States, reprinted in: Official Journal of the European Union, No. L 289/I/3 of 30 October 2008.

  30. 30.

    Agreement between Japan and Myanmar for the Liberalization, Promotion and Protection of Investment of 15 December 2013, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/105/treaty/2155.

  31. 31.

    On this perception see also already also UNCTAD (2011), pp. 119–120; Hepburn and Kuuya (2011), pp. 601 et seq.

  32. 32.

    On the functions and importance of preambles for treaty interpretation, see for example ICJ, Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia v. Malaysia), Judgment (17 December 2002), ICJ Reports 2002, 625, p. 652, para. 51); Gardiner (2015), pp. 205 et seq.; Dörr and Schmalenbach (2018), Article 31, para. 49; Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, 20 August 2007, para. 7.4.4.

  33. 33.

    Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments of 24 March 2013, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/42/treaty/990.

  34. 34.

    The text of the agreement is available under: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/treaty/3633.

  35. 35.

    Agreement between Canada and Mongolia for the Promotion and Protection of Investments of 8 September 2016, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/35/treaty/3698.

  36. 36.

    Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Government of the Republic of Singapore of 4 November 2016, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/treaty/3705.

  37. 37.

    Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER Plus) of 14 June 2017, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-concluded-but-not-in-force/pacer/pacer-plus-full-text/.

  38. 38.

    For the text of this agreement and its annexes see the information under: https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-concluded-but-not-in-force/cptpp/comprehensive-and-progressive-agreement-for-trans-pacific-partnership-text/.

  39. 39.

    The text of the agreement is available under: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/mostRecent/treaty/3717.

  40. 40.

    The text of the protocol is available under: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/treaty/3772.

  41. 41.

    The text of the agreement is available under: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/mostRecent/treaty/3815.

  42. 42.

    See also, e.g., UNCTAD (2011), p. 120 (“such clauses nevertheless serve to flag the importance of CSR in investor–State relations, which may also influence the interpretation of IIA clauses by tribunals in investor–State dispute settlement cases, and create linkages between IIAs and international CSR standards”); as well as UNCTAD (2017b), pp. 62–63.

  43. 43.

    On the goals pursued by competition law see Lowenfeld (2008), p. 419, 456; Khan et al., Article 101 TFEU, in: Geiger et al. (2015), para. 1; OECD Secretariat, A Policy Framework for Investment: Competition Policy, 2005, pp. 2 et seq.

  44. 44.

    OECD Secretariat (2005), A Policy Framework for Investment: Competition Policy.

  45. 45.

    WTO, Communication from the European Community and its Member States, WT/WGTI/W/63 of 12 November 1998, para. 13.

  46. 46.

    Reprinted in: I.L.M. 15 (1976), pp. 969 et seq.; for the text of the updated OECD Guidelines as well as accompanying documents see OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 2011, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/29/48004323.pdf. On the issue of competition law and policy in the OECD Guidelines see Hawk (1977), pp. 241 et seq.

  47. 47.

    Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investment between the Government of the Republic of Austria and the Government of the Republic of Kosovo of 22 January 2010, https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/…/COO_2026_100_2_726968.pdfsig. See also, e.g., Reinisch (2013), p. 21.

  48. 48.

    OJ EU L 11/23 of 14 January 2017.

  49. 49.

    Draft Pan-African Investment Code, African Union Commission, Economic Affairs Department, December 2016, in: United Nations Economic and Social Council, Draft Pan-African Investment Code, UN Doc. E/ECA/CM/50/1, AU/STC/FMEPI/MIN/1(III) of 8 February 2017.

  50. 50.

    The text of the agreement is for example available under: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1684.

  51. 51.

    For a more detailed discussion of these two provisions Jones and Townley (2017), pp. 514 et seq.; Schütze (2018), p. 709 et seq.

  52. 52.

    CJEU, Case 127/73, BRT et al. v. SABAM et al., Judgement of 30 January 1974, para. 16; as well as subsequently for example CJEU, Case C-282/95 P, Guérin Automobiles v. Commission, Judgement of 18 March 1997, para. 39; CJEU, Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Vincenzo Manfredi et al. v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA et al., Judgement of 13 July 2006, para. 39. See also, e.g., Khan et al., Article 101 TFEU, in: Geiger et al. (2015), para. 36; Khan et al., Article 102 TFEU, in: Geiger et al. (2015), para. 2. For a more comprehensive treatment of the concepts of direct applicability and direct effect in EU law see for example Schütze (2018), pp. 76 et seq.

  53. 53.

    Charter on a Regime of Multinational Industrial Enterprises in the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States of 21 November 1990, reprinted for example in: UNCTAD (1996), pp. 427 et seq.

  54. 54.

    Desert Line Projects LLC v. Yemen, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17, Award, 6 February 2008, para. 104; see also, e.g., World Duty Free Company Ltd. v. Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, 4 October 2006, paras 138 et seq.; as well as from the literature for example Douglas (2014), pp. 155 et seq.

  55. 55.

    Azinian et al. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2, Award, 1 November 1999, reprinted in: I.L.M. 39 (2000), p. 537, pp. 553 et seq.; see also for example Muchlinski (2006), p. 536 et seq.

  56. 56.

    On the principle of good faith as the basis of these behavioural expectations see Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, 15 April 2009, paras 100, 106 et seq.; Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award, 27 August 2008, para. 144.

  57. 57.

    Nowrot (2010), p. 40.

  58. 58.

    Creek Mining Company v. Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Award, 30 November 2017, Partially Dissenting Opinion of Philippe Sands, paras 4 et seq. See in this connection also Article 23 of the new Dutch Model BIT, adopted by the Dutch government on 19 October 2018 https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c5bb3ed4-08ea-440e-9a77-43deff073842: “Without prejudice to national administrative or criminal law procedures, a Tribunal may, in deciding on the amount of compensation, take into account non-compliance by the investor with its commitments under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.”

  59. 59.

    On counterclaims in international investment arbitration see, e.g., Waibel (2015), pp. 1235 et seq.; Hoffmann (2013), pp. 438 et seq.

  60. 60.

    On the limited number of cases in which the host state acted as claimant in contract-based investor-state arbitration proceedings see, e.g., Toral and Schultz (2010), pp. 589 et seq.; Laborde (2010), p. 97 et seq.

  61. 61.

    Weiler (2004), pp. 437 et seq.

  62. 62.

    On the underlying fundamental issue of providing individuals and groups affected by foreign investments with adequate access to justice, see also Francioni (2009), pp. 71 et seq.

  63. 63.

    See thereto for example Mann (2008), p. 14 (“In the view of this author, such an approach is illusory, given the costs of international arbitration processes in many cases, and the difficulties in mounting such cases before tribunals designed for commercial law purposes rather than enforcement of legislation or obligations against corporations.”).

  64. 64.

    On this provision see also already, e.g., Gazzini (2017), p. 4 (“The final innovation is the provision on the investor liability before the tribunals of the home state, which may have a considerable impact on domestic litigation against investors – especially multinational companies – and help overcome jurisdictional hurdles and most prominently the forum non conveniens doctrine. This can be considered as an important development from the standpoint of the responsible conduct of investments, the redress of wrongful doings and the role of the home state.”); as well as UNCTAD (2017a), p. 63.

  65. 65.

    See also on the stipulation of investor liability in the courts of the host state the provision of Article 17 of the 2008 ECOWAS Supplementary Act: “Investors shall be subject to civil actions for liability in the judicial process of their host State for acts or decisions made in relation to the investment where such acts or decisions lead to significant damage, personal injuries or loss of life in the host State.”

  66. 66.

    SADC Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Template with Commentary (July 2012) Articles 10 et seq. https://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/sadc-model-bit-template-final.pdf. See also, again, concerning the respective stipulation of investor liability in the courts of the host state Article 19(3) of the 2012 SADC Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Template: “In accordance with its applicable domestic law, the Host State, including political subdivisions and officials thereof, private persons, or private organizations, may initiate a civil action in domestic courts against the Investor or Investment for damages arising from an alleged breach of the obligations set out in this Agreement.”

  67. 67.

    OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions of 21 November 1997. http://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm.

  68. 68.

    CJEU, Case C-453/99, Courage Ltd. v. Crehan, Judgement of 20 September 2001, paras 23 et seq.; CJEU, Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Vincenzo Manfredi et al. v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA et al., Judgement of 13 July 2006, paras 56 et seq.

  69. 69.

    Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on Certain Rules Governing Actions for Damages under National Law for Infringements of the Competition Law Provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, OJ EU L 349/1 of 5 December 2014.

  70. 70.

    Komninos (2002), p. 447 et seq.; Reich (2005), p. 35 et seq.; Schütze (2018), pp. 430 et seq.; Jones and Townley (2017), p. 514.

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Nowrot, K., Sipiorski, E. (2020). Stipulating Investors’ Obligations in Investment Agreements as a Suitable Regulatory Approach to Prevent and Remedy Anti-Competitive Behaviour?. In: Fach Gómez, K., Gourgourinis, A., Titi, C. (eds) International Investment Law and Competition Law. European Yearbook of International Economic Law(). Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33916-6_7

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