Abstract
In this chapter I introduce the terminology and concepts that are crucial for the development of my arguments in the book and discuss how the two key elements of my discussion, namely perception and cognition, can be kept apart in a mental processing system. In the overarching argumentative line of this book, which revolves around the cognitive penetrability of perceptual experience, keeping perception and cognition apart is a fundamental requirement. If perception and cognition cannot be separated, an issue immediately arises for the possibility of asking questions about their interactions. The structure of the chapter is as follows: Sect. 1.1 outlines the main theoretical commitments that form the backdrop of the discussion in this book. Section 1.2 is devoted to terminological clarifications and conceptual stage-setting. Section 1.3 explores how a clear-cut distinction between perception and cognition may be drawn.
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Notes
- 1.
This may be due to the selectivity of some important components of the subject’s cognitive system (e.g. some specific neuronal populations) toward changes in the environment that are relative to the subject’s point of view. This feature has led some authors (Prinz 2012) to claim that these components are good candidates for the neural correlates of conscious experience.
- 2.
- 3.
In fact I only adopt some of the concepts of CTM, such as “information processing”, since I find them to be commonplace in cognitive science and easy to follow and understand. I hold that, given that the present arguments are inspired by and anchored in neurophysiology, if it will turn out that the true account of the mind is not a computational one, most of the present discussion will be translatable into the terminology of the better theory.
- 4.
Later, it will become clear that the “level” at which information is stored is relevant for the debate about cognitive penetrability.
- 5.
This is the traditional definition of knowledge famously criticized by Gettier (1963).
- 6.
Although, on closer inspection, this is not sufficient for perception. See the discussion of perception and action below.
- 7.
- 8.
Where the function allows to specify the content of the representation (Shea et al. 2018).
- 9.
This does not mean that there are no external causes of those representations. External objects and states of affairs are causally linked to the patterns of neural activation in the brain that correspond to them.
- 10.
For example, one might think that representations in the human brain are just recurring patterns of neural activation (Prinz 2012).
- 11.
The zombie argument is supposed to show that phenomenality is irreducible to the physical domain. As I said, I do not subscribe to this conclusion and endorse a physicalist view of the mind. I cannot discuss the argument here. I only note that a problem with the argument is that although exact physical duplicates of human beings without phenomenality might be logically possible, they could be nomologically impossible in our world. Thus, there could be some as yet undiscovered physical features of human systems that underlie and explain phenomenality. Nevertheless, the idea is useful to elucidate the distinction between perception and perceptual phenomenal experience.
- 12.
In Marchi and Newen (2016), we discuss this topic and argue for a processing approach to consciousness.
- 13.
On this point, Searle (2015) argues that some representational states lack the indexicality of here and now that is an intrinsic feature of perception.
- 14.
- 15.
As will become clear during the course of this chapter, this is not an obvious point. In a hierarchical processing system, it might be important to ask if and how processes high up in the hierarchy might influence processes at lower levels, even if all such processes are of the same kind.
- 16.
The term is borrowed from Pylyshyn’s (1999) discussion of the same topic. His view will be addressed later in this section.
- 17.
It should be noted that the distinction I am interested in at this point is the one between perceptual and cognitive processing. It could still be maintained, for example, that perception and cognition may differ at the level of phenomenology and not at the level of processing, but issues of cognitive penetrability are primarily about the processes that underlie cognition and those that underlie perception. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this point and highlighting the need for clarification.
- 18.
Note that this is a different usage of the notion of continuity. In the continuity view, “continuous” means that there is no difference in kind between information processing or representations at early stages of the hierarchy compared to later stages. This holds even if each level of the hierarchy is considered to be a separate discrete step. In the case of analog representations, on the other hand, “continuous” identifies a kind of informational encoding for perceptual processing that differentiates it from other processes in the brain. Unfortunately, the specificity of the terminology used in the literature does not allow for the employment of a different notion.
- 19.
- 20.
According to Pylyshyn, there may be other encapsulated domains like motor-control functions (Pylyshyn 1999), but they are not pertinent to the present discussion.
- 21.
Although Pylyshyn’s discussion is limited to vision, if one has reason to posit a similar encapsulated functional unit for the other sensory modalities, the distinction may be extended to those modalities.
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Marchi, F. (2020). A Play with Two Characters. In: The Attentional Shaping of Perceptual Experience. Studies in Brain and Mind, vol 16. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33558-8_1
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