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The Cyprus Conflict Through the Lens of Securitization Processes

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Part of the book series: Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies ((RCS))

Abstract

This chapter brings together the securitization and conflict-related theoretical work presented in Chapters 1 and 2 respectively, along with the historical and sociopolitical context of the conflict as analyzed in the historical synopsis of the case study (Chapter 3) and provides the empirical support for the theoretical arguments as developed in the previous chapter. Specifically, it presents two of the most important pivotal events, namely the Turkish invasion in 1974 and the Annan Plan of 2004, and the impact they had in the development of the different modes of securitization as explained in Chapter 4. Furthermore, it presents the impact a deeply securitized environment has on the societal context and how the latter influences the perpetuation of the former. The evidence relies primarily on publicly available public opinion polls, as well as surveys, interviews and roundtables conducted for the purpose of this research.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For the official positions on the Cyprus problem (re-iterating what was mentioned above) of the five Parliamentary Parties, almost four decades after the pivotal event, see ‘AKEL’s position on the Cyprus Problem’, National Council 15–17 February 2012, available at www.akel.org.cy [accessed February 20, 2013]; ‘Speech by Nicos Anastasiades’ (former President of DISY), Parliament, February 24, 2012, available at www.disy.org.cy [accessed February 28, 2012]; ‘DIKO - Pancyprian Tactical Conference: Principles Framework and Political Goals’, March 14, 2009, available at www.diko.org.cy [accessed February 28, 2012]; ‘EDEK - 12th Pancyprian Tactical Conference: The Cyprus Problem; Strategy change now’, May 5 and 6, 2012, available at www.edek.org.cy [accessed February 28, 2012]; ‘Green Party positions in National Council’ September 14, 2010, www.available at www.greenpartycy.com [accessed February 28, 2012].

  2. 2.

    ‘Και αν παρελπίδα βγει κάτι από τις συνομιλίες νομίζω ότι θα είναι τρισχειρότερο από το Σχέδιο Ανάν’ (Sky 2011, my translation).

  3. 3.

    ‘Δεν πιστεύω ότι είναι δυνατόν να έρθει ένα ουσιωδώς καλύτερο Σχέδιο μπροστά μας’ (Apopsi 2009, my translation).

  4. 4.

    Personal interview (2009), with Mr. Michalakis Adamides, former Director of the Kronos Press Agency, in charge of 80% of the distribution of the local press in Cyprus.

  5. 5.

    The elections for a new Archbishop are ‘irregular’ events as they only take place when an Archbishop passes away. Indicative of how rare such elections are is the fact that since the Cyprus independence in 1960 and until the period under examination there have been only two elections—the first in 1977 and the second in 2006.

  6. 6.

    In Cyprus there are no television channels dedicated to news (e.g. like CNN or BBC). However, the four major local channels (CYBC1, OMEGA, SIGMA, ANT1 and Capital TV)—which are also free and available in all the RoC-controlled areas—dedicate on a daily basis approximately 2 hours on covering the news.

  7. 7.

    The original Greek text (October 2, 2018): “Είναι καλά γνωστό πως η ελληνοκυπριακή πλευρά αποδέχθηκε έναν οδυνηρό, αλλά αναγκαίο συμβιβασμό, με τη μετεξέλιξη της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας σε διζωνική, δικοινοτική Ομοσπονδία, πάντα υπό τον όρο ότι το σύνολο των πολιτών, Ελληνοκυπρίων και Τουρκοκυπρίων, θα απολαμβάνουν των βασικών ελευθεριών και ανθρωπίνων δικαιωμάτων που το ίδιο το Σύνταγμα της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας προνοεί” (my translation). Available at https://omegalive.com.cy/ptd-lysh-toy-kypriakoy-mporei-na-yparksei-mono-me-th-dhmioyrgia-enos-pragmatika-aneksarthtoy-kratoys.html [accessed October 2, 2018].

  8. 8.

    The original Greek text (March 21, 2012): “Αποτελεί γενική παραδοχή ότι η διζωνική δικοινοτική ομοσπονδία είναι ο οδυνηρός συμβιβασμός της ελληνοκυπριακής πλευράς” Available at http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/Embassies/Embassy_Athens.nsf/All/AA4EAF8188C7BEADC22579C900340BCE?OpenDocument [accessed May 23, 2012].

  9. 9.

    Personal interviews: DISY (May 4, 2011); DIKO (May 10, 2011), EVROKO (May 12, 2011) and EDEK (May 12, 2011). The interviewees wished to maintain their anonymity.

  10. 10.

    «Λόγω του ότι δεν έχουμε εμπιστοσύνη ούτε στην Τουρκία, ούτε και στο εξαρτώμενο από αυτήν κατοχικό καθεστώς, ότι μπορούν να συναινέσουν και να συνεργαστούν στη διαμόρφωση μια σωστής διαδικασίας και μιας σωστής βάσης στην οποία να περιλαμβάνεται το σύνολο των αποφάσεων και των ψηφισμάτων των αποφάσεων του Ο.Η.Ε. και όχι επιλεκτικά κάποια από αυτά για αυτό ακριβώς τον λόγο ως ΕΔΕΚ δώσαμε στην τελευταία συνεδρίαση του Εθνικού […].» full text available at EDEK FaceBook page at https://www.facebook.com/edek1969/photos/δηλωσεισ-προεδρου-κσεδεκ-μαρινου-σιζοπουλου-και-του-προεδρου-του-δηκο-νικολα-παπ/2341997592539108/ [accessed January 10, 2019].

  11. 11.

    http://www.typos.com.cy/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=98162 [accessed March 4, 2011].

  12. 12.

    http://www.sigmalive.com/simerini/politics/interviews/88240 [accessed June 2, 2011].

  13. 13.

    http://www.mavronikolas.net/ [accessed July 5, 2011].

  14. 14.

    http://sigmalive.com/news/politics/156559 [accessed June 3, 2011].

  15. 15.

    The full text is available (in Greek) at https://democraticparty.org.cy/oi-pronoies-toy-plaisioy-gkoyterez-den-tha-odigisoyn-se-viosimi-kai-leitoyrgiki-lysi-eythygrammismeni-me-tin-idiotita-tis-kyproy-os-kratos-melos-tis-ee/ [accessed January 3, 2019].

  16. 16.

    Indicative examples by the four last Presidents of the RoC.

  17. 17.

    See for example the EU’s phraseology “The negotiations between the two Cypriot Communities aim at reaching a fair, comprehensive and viable settlement of the Cyprus issue […].” EU Commission Available at https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-52_en.htm [accessed March 20, 2017].

  18. 18.

    The speech is available at http://www.tassospapadopoulos.com/easyconsole.cfm/id/46 [accessed December 7, 2016].

  19. 19.

    In the respective television ad, the helmet and the ‘No to Turkish guarantees’ was the same, but in the very end of the ad, there is a voice saying ‘what do the others say’? This advertisement is available at http://www.diko.org.cy/easyconsole.cfm/id/192 [accessed July 6, 2010].

  20. 20.

    At the time, the vast majority of Cypriots (81%) believed that the place of religion in their society is very important. It must be noted that Cyprus was ranked 1st among all EU member states, with the average being at only 46% (Eurobarometer 2006, available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_highlights_en.pdf [accessed September 23, 2008]). Similarly, a 2010 study noted that 88% of Cypriots believe in God, compared to the EU average of 51% (Eurobarometer 2010). See also, a 2009 opinion poll, which indicates that 45% of Greek Cypriots trust the Church completely or very much. They trust it more than any other institution including the RoC government (39%), the courts (43%), National Guard (36%), police (30%) and political parties (13%) (Cyprus2015, December 2009).

  21. 21.

    Simerini, November 7, 2003.

  22. 22.

    Simerini, December 18, 2003.

  23. 23.

    Phileleftheros, August 22, 2018.

  24. 24.

    Phileleftheros, February 27, 2007.

  25. 25.

    Simerini, May 25, 2007.

  26. 26.

    The specific Commission was created by Turkish Cypriot authorities for Greek Cypriots who would like to sell their properties in the areas not controlled by the Republic. As expected it has become a big area of contention among the Greek Cypriot community as any individuals who apply for compensation are seen as non-patriots who sell out ‘our occupied lands to the enemy’.

  27. 27.

    Simerini, July 6, 2007.

  28. 28.

    Phileleftheros, September 26, 2007.

  29. 29.

    Politis, September 21, 2008.

  30. 30.

    Personal interview [March 14, 2011].

  31. 31.

    Aristos Michaelides, Phileleftheros, December 3, 2010.

  32. 32.

    Personal interview [March 15, 2011].

  33. 33.

    The focus group was conducted with written permission from the school, and all students participated voluntarily and in the presence of two of their teachers.

  34. 34.

    Past DISY percentages in elections previous to the 2004 referenda were as followed: (i) 1996—Parliamentary elections 34.5%; (ii) 1998—Presidential elections 40%; (iii) 2001—Parliamentary elections 34%; (iv) 2003—Presidential elections 39%.

  35. 35.

    This position has been reiterated in the press but also noted in a private interview with author (May 12, 2011).

  36. 36.

    Rotating presidency refers to scenario where the presidency will be rotated between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

  37. 37.

    See e.g. Mr. Evagorou (AKEL spokesman) position http://www.sigmalive.com/news/politics/383937 [accessed June 10, 2011].

  38. 38.

    See e.g. Mr. Pourgourides (DISY spokesman) position http://www.sigmalive.com/news/politics/242793 [accessed June 10, 2011].

  39. 39.

    See http://www.sigmalive.com/news/politics/381137 [accessed June 10, 2011].

  40. 40.

    It is worth noting that by examining the positions and reactions of the four aforementioned parties (DISY, AKEL, DIKO and EDEK) at the time, circa 2011, one covers almost the entire spectrum of elite positions on the Problem. Indicatively the four parties received, in the 2011 parliamentary elections, 92% of the votes out of the 97% valid votes (http://www.kyproekloges.com/).

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Adamides, C. (2020). The Cyprus Conflict Through the Lens of Securitization Processes. In: Securitization and Desecuritization Processes in Protracted Conflicts. Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies. Palgrave Pivot, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33200-6_5

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