What Today’s Serious Cyber Attacks on Cars Tell Us: Consequences for Automotive Security and Dependability

  • Markus ZoppeltEmail author
  • Ramin Tavakoli Kolagari
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11842)


Highly connected with the environment via various interfaces, cars have been the focus of malicious cyber attacks for years. These attacks are becoming an increasing burden for a society with growing vehicle autonomization: they are the sword of Damocles of future mobility. Therefore, research is particularly active in the area of vehicle IT security, and in part also in the area of dependability, in order to develop effective countermeasures and to maintain a minimum of one step ahead of hackers. This paper examines the known state-of-the-art security and dependability measures based on a detailed and systematic analysis of published cyber attacks on automotive software systems. The sobering result of the analysis of the cyber attacks with the model-based technique SAM (Security Abstraction Model) and a categorization of the examined attacks in relation to the known security and dependability measures is that most countermeasures against cyber attacks are hardly effective. They either are not applicable to the underlying problem or take effect too late; the intruder has already gained access to a substantial part of the vehicle when the countermeasures apply. The paper is thus contributing to an understanding of the gaps that exist today in the area of vehicle security and dependability and concludes concrete research challenges.


Automotive security Automotive system architecture Dependability Model-driven engineering methodologies 



This work is funded by the Bavarian State Ministry of Science and the Arts in the framework of the Centre Digitisation.Bavaria (ZD.B).

M.Z. was supported by the BayWISS Consortium Digitization.


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Nuremberg Institute of TechnologyNurembergGermany

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