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International conference on Model-Based Reasoning

MBR 2018: Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology pp 55–68Cite as

A Pragmatic Model of Justification Based on “Material Inference” for Social Epistemology

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Part of the book series: Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics ((SAPERE,volume 49))

Abstract

Social epistemology presents different theories about the status of shared knowledge, but only some of them retain a fruitful relation with classical epistemology. The aim of my contribution is to present a pragmatic model which is, on the one side, related to the classical concepts of “truth” and “justification”, while, on the other side, addressing to a fundamentally “social” structure for the justification of knowledge. The shift from formal semantics to pragmatics is based on a notion of “material inference” embedding commitments implicit in the use of language, that favors the recognition of the social source of shared knowledge.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Evidence is a fundamental notion in the ambit of epistemology and classically refers to the the individual mental states and processes that enable the subject to grasp knowledge in a reliable sense. Beyond the classical philosophy of mind, we can consider knowledge as related to the use of ordinary language, so that it depends from competent speakers who undertake suitable roles in discursive situations. So, evidence depends on the correct use of language to be tested in interactive contexts. But, “social evidence” does not only entails the use of ordinary language from the part of competent speakers, it strongly depends on testimony, namely on the use we make of what is transmitted on social contexts. Testimony is at the center of a lively debate in social epistemology which gives rise to different perspectives (Goldman 2015).

  2. 2.

    In this case we derive shared knowledge from the processes and states that enable individuals to create, accept and recognize the norms and institutions they create in suitable social contexts. There are several interesting perspectives related to the debate on Collective Intentionality as a capacity that produces shared knowledge and social evidence.

  3. 3.

    The functioning of scorekeeping in a language game has been presented by David Lewis (Lewis 1983). Brandon inherits the model but he changes it according to an original account of the inferential structure of conceptual content and its relevance for social interaction. The result of Lewis’ model is useful to understand the context dependence of ordinary conversation and this option helps us to grasp in plausible way the nature of the content in the game of giving and asking for reasons (to use the Sellarsian expression).

  4. 4.

    Brandom moves from classical thought which generally intends the paradigmatic cognitive act as classifying, i.e. taking something particular as being of some general kind. This conception that originates in Aristotle’s prior Analytics, was common to everyone thinking about concepts and consciousness in the modern period up to Kant.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Lorenzo Magnani and the participants to the MBR18-Spain for their fruitful comments. I am grateful to Matthieu Fontaine and the reviewers for their careful work and patience.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Philosophy, Pontifical Lateran University, Vatican City, Italy

    Raffaela Giovagnoli

Authors
  1. Raffaela Giovagnoli
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Correspondence to Raffaela Giovagnoli .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of Seville, Seville, Spain

    Ángel Nepomuceno-Fernández

  2. Department of Humanities, Philosophy Section, and Computational Philosophy Laboratory, University of Pavia, Pavia, Italy

    Lorenzo Magnani

  3. Department of Spanish Language, Linguistics and Theory of Literature, University of Seville, Seville, Spain

    Francisco J. Salguero-Lamillar

  4. Department of Philosophy, Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of Seville, Seville, Spain

    Cristina Barés-Gómez

  5. Centre for Philosophy of Science of the University of Lisbon, University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal

    Matthieu Fontaine

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Giovagnoli, R. (2019). A Pragmatic Model of Justification Based on “Material Inference” for Social Epistemology. In: Nepomuceno-Fernández, Á., Magnani, L., Salguero-Lamillar, F., Barés-Gómez, C., Fontaine, M. (eds) Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. MBR 2018. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 49. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32722-4_4

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