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When Is a Semi-honest Secure Multiparty Computation Valuable?

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Decision and Game Theory for Security (GameSec 2019)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 11836))

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Abstract

Secure Multiparty Computation protocols secure under the malicious model provide a strong guarantee of privacy and correctness. The semi-honest model provides what appears to be a much weaker guarantee, requiring parties to follow the protocol correctly. We show that for all but a small class of problems, those in the non-cooperatively computable class, the correctness guarantee of the malicious protocol effectively requires semi-honest parties as well. This suggests a wider utility than previously thought for semi-honest protocols.

This work was partially supported by a grant from the Northrop-Grumman Cybersecurity Research Consortium.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, 47907, USA

    Radhika Bhargava & Chris Clifton

Authors
  1. Radhika Bhargava
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  2. Chris Clifton
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Correspondence to Radhika Bhargava or Chris Clifton .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

    Tansu Alpcan

  2. Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO, USA

    Yevgeniy Vorobeychik

  3. University of Maryland, College Park, College Park, MD, USA

    John S. Baras

  4. KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden

    György Dán

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Bhargava, R., Clifton, C. (2019). When Is a Semi-honest Secure Multiparty Computation Valuable?. In: Alpcan, T., Vorobeychik, Y., Baras, J., Dán, G. (eds) Decision and Game Theory for Security. GameSec 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11836. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32430-8_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32430-8_4

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-32429-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-32430-8

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