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Artificial Intelligence and Legal Tech: Challenges to the Rule of Law

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Regulating Artificial Intelligence

Abstract

Artificial intelligence is shaping our social lives. It is also affecting the process of law-making and the application of law—coined by the term ‘legal tech’. Accordingly, law-as-we-know-it is about to change beyond recognition. Basic tenets of the law, such as accountability, fairness, non-discrimination, autonomy, due process and—above all—the rule of law are at risk. However, so far, little has been said about regulating legal tech, for which there is obviously considerable demand. In this article, it is suggested that we reinvent the rule of law and graft it onto technology by developing the right standards, setting the right defaults and translating fundamental legal principles into hardware and software. In short, ‘legal protection by design’ is needed and its implementation must be required by law—attributing liability where necessary. This would reconcile legal tech with the rule of law.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Weizenbaum (1976), p. 115.

  2. 2.

    Isensee (1990), p. 52.

  3. 3.

    Eidenmüller (2017); Hartzog (2018), p. 76.

  4. 4.

    Lessing (2006), p. 3.

  5. 5.

    Hildebrandt (2018), p. 35.

  6. 6.

    Grupp (2014), p. 660.

  7. 7.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algorithm.

  8. 8.

    Sharma et al. (2018), p. 479.

  9. 9.

    Schmidt (2016), § 1, para 2.

  10. 10.

    Gartner IT Glossary (2018).

  11. 11.

    Medina (2015), p. 1005.

  12. 12.

    Government Office for Science (UK) (2016), p. 5.

  13. 13.

    Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Behaviour (2011).

  14. 14.

    Frese (2015), p. 2090; Hoffmann-Riem (2017), p. 3; Mainzer (2016), p. 3; Stiemerling (2015), p. 765.

  15. 15.

    Pfeifer (2018).

  16. 16.

    Frese (2015), p. 2090; Stiemerling (2015), p. 765.

  17. 17.

    Szabo (1994).

  18. 18.

    Frese (2015), p. 2092.

  19. 19.

    Legal Technology Journal, Smart Contracts (2017).

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    Grupp (2014), p. 660; Shackelford and Raymond (2014), p. 615.

  21. 21.

    Regulation (EU) No 524/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council of 21 May 2013.

  22. 22.

    Chowdhry (2016).

  23. 23.

    Aletras et al. (2016).

  24. 24.

    For an overview on AI and Law Enforcement see also Rademacher, paras 3–12.

  25. 25.

    Brown v BCA Trading Ltd [2016] EWHC 1464 (Ch) (17 May 2016).

  26. 26.

    Rademacher (2017), p. 366.

  27. 27.

    Angwin et al. (2016) and Dressel and Farid (2018).

  28. 28.

    Pasquale (2017).

  29. 29.

    Pasquale (2017).

  30. 30.

    Kleinberg et al. (2017), p. 2.

  31. 31.

    Kleinberg et al. (2017).

  32. 32.

    Susskind (2013).

  33. 33.

    Wagner (2018), pp. 2–3.

  34. 34.

    Bostrom (2014); Goertzel (2015), p. 55; La Diega (2018), paras 10 et seq.

  35. 35.

    Stevens (2017).

  36. 36.

    Wischmeyer (2018), p. 3.

  37. 37.

    Tobschall and Kempe (2017), p. 10.

  38. 38.

    Wagner (2018), p. 3.

  39. 39.

    Eidenmüller (2017).

  40. 40.

    See Buchholtz (2017), p. 956.

  41. 41.

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  42. 42.

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  45. 45.

    Hoffmann-Riem (2016a), pp. 80 et seq.; Kotzur (2014), § 260 para 23.

  46. 46.

    La Diega (2018), para 11.

  47. 47.

    Hoffmann-Riem (2017), p. 26.

  48. 48.

    Ehlers (2015), § 3 para 102; Hoffmann-Riem (2016b), p. 5.

  49. 49.

    Ehlers (2015), § 3 para 102.

  50. 50.

    Bryde (2015), p. 129; Hoffmann-Riem (2016b), pp. 12 et seq.

  51. 51.

    Hoffmann-Riem (2017), pp. 28–29.

  52. 52.

    Kranzberg (1986), p. 547.

  53. 53.

    Martini (2017), p. 1018; Rademacher (2017), p. 389.

  54. 54.

    Wischmeyer (2018), p. 3.

  55. 55.

    Wischmeyer (2018), p. 13.

  56. 56.

    Wischmeyer (2018), p. 3.

  57. 57.

    Grupp (2014), p. 664.

  58. 58.

    Goethe (2008), p. 256.

  59. 59.

    Weber (2002), p. 826.

  60. 60.

    Jandach (1993), pp. 105–106.

  61. 61.

    La Diega (2018), para 11.

  62. 62.

    Engel (2014), p. 1097.

  63. 63.

    Kotsoglou (2014), p. 455; La Diega (2018), para 11; Pfeifer (2018).

  64. 64.

    Kotsoglou (2014), p. 453.

  65. 65.

    Engel (2014), p. 1098; Kotsoglou (2014), pp. 453–454.

  66. 66.

    La Diega (2018), para 11.

  67. 67.

    Engel (2014), p. 1097.

  68. 68.

    Kotsoglou (2014), p. 454.

  69. 69.

    Buchholtz (2017), p. 958.

  70. 70.

    Boehme-Neßler (2017), p. 3034.

  71. 71.

    Medina (2015), p. 1018.

  72. 72.

    Wischmeyer (2018), pp. 17–18.

  73. 73.

    Eisenstein (2005); Goody (1986); Hildebrandt (2018), pp. 12–35; Ong (1982).

  74. 74.

    Schmidt (2016), § 1 para 1 ff.

  75. 75.

    O’Hara (2017), p. 101.

  76. 76.

    For details see La Diega (2018), para 31 ff.

  77. 77.

    Porter (1995).

  78. 78.

    Kitchin (2017), p. 18.

  79. 79.

    Montfort et al. (2012), p. 3.

  80. 80.

    Pasquale (2017), p. 5.

  81. 81.

    La Diega (2018), para 18.

  82. 82.

    Kitchin (2017), p. 18.

  83. 83.

    Weizenbaum (1976), p. 115.

  84. 84.

    Hoffmann-Riem (2017), p. 31; see Wischmeyer, paras 3 et seq.

  85. 85.

    https://www.dictionary.com/browse/rule-of-law.

  86. 86.

    Hildebrandt (2015), p. 10.

  87. 87.

    La Diega (2018).

  88. 88.

    State of Wisconsin v. Eric Loomis, 7. 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016).

  89. 89.

    Eric Loomis v. State of Wisconsin No. 16-6387.

  90. 90.

    La Diega (2018), para 117.

  91. 91.

    Martini (2017), p. 1018.

  92. 92.

    Hoffmann-Riem (2017), p. 36.

  93. 93.

    Cf. Marsch and Rademacher, paras 15–18.

  94. 94.

    Bundesverfassungsgericht 1 BvR 209, 269/83 ‘Volkszählung’ (15 October 1983), BVerfGE 65, p. 1.

  95. 95.

    See also Marsch, paras 20–28.

  96. 96.

    Cf. Wischmeyer, paras 3 et seq.

  97. 97.

    Altman (2015).

  98. 98.

    Goodman and Flaxman (2017).

  99. 99.

    Cf. Tischbirek, paras 3–13.

  100. 100.

    Angwin et al. (2016).

  101. 101.

    Dressel and Farid (2018).

  102. 102.

    Goodman and Flaxman (2017).

  103. 103.

    La Diega (2018), para 116.

  104. 104.

    Martini (2017), p. 1018.

  105. 105.

    See Tischbirek, para 25.

  106. 106.

    Scherzberg (2004), p. 226.

  107. 107.

    Hildebrandt (2017), p. 308.

  108. 108.

    See Hartzog (2018), pp. 8, 21 et seq.

  109. 109.

    Hartzog (2018), pp. 5 et seq.

  110. 110.

    Hartzog (2018), pp. 11–12.

  111. 111.

    See also Hartzog (2018), pp. 86 et seq.

  112. 112.

    Hartzog (2018), p. 6.

  113. 113.

    Wischmeyer (2018), p. 22.

  114. 114.

    Kuner (2012), p. 1.

  115. 115.

    Martini (2017), p. 1020; cf. Wischmeyer, para 46.

  116. 116.

    Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2018), p. 21.

  117. 117.

    Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2018), pp. 9–10.

  118. 118.

    Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2018), p. 10.

  119. 119.

    Hoffmann-Riem (2017), p. 36.

  120. 120.

    Martini (2017), p. 1020; see Wischmeyer, para 25.

  121. 121.

    Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier (2013), pp. 179 et seq.

  122. 122.

    Martini (2017), p. 1020.

  123. 123.

    Martini (2017), p. 1021.

  124. 124.

    Martini (2017), p. 1021.

  125. 125.

    Stevens (2017); see Wischmeyer, para 41.

  126. 126.

    Goodman and Flaxman (2017).

  127. 127.

    Shackelford and Raymond (2014), p. 633.

  128. 128.

    Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986), p. XV.

  129. 129.

    Martini (2017), p. 1021.

  130. 130.

    Blind (2012), p. 391; Martini (2017), p. 1025.

  131. 131.

    Hildebrandt (2017), p. 311.

  132. 132.

    Medina (2015), p. 1018.

  133. 133.

    Medina (2015), p. 1018.

  134. 134.

    Medina (2015), p. 1018.

  135. 135.

    See Hartzog (2018), p. 9.

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Buchholtz, G. (2020). Artificial Intelligence and Legal Tech: Challenges to the Rule of Law. In: Wischmeyer, T., Rademacher, T. (eds) Regulating Artificial Intelligence. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32361-5_8

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