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Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review pp 203–229Cite as

A Principled Approach to Judicial Deference for Hong Kong

Part of the Ius Comparatum - Global Studies in Comparative Law book series (GSCL,volume 39)

Abstract

This chapter outlines the approach to deference that Hong Kong courts adopt, evaluates whether such approach is justified, and proposes an approach that should be adopted in light of Hong Kong’s unique constitutional and institutional landscape.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The literature on deference is voluminous. See, e.g., part II of Kavanagh (2009); Kavanagh (2010); Young (2009); part II of King (2012); Rivers (2006); Brady (2012); Hunt (2003), p. 337; Jowell (2003), p. 67. For critiques of deference, see Allan (2006); Allan (2011).

  2. 2.

    See, e.g., Chan (2010); Chan (2011); Wong (2018); Yap (2018).

  3. 3.

    Cf., Chan and Lim (2015), pp. 17.065–17.073; Yap (2007).

  4. 4.

    Chan (2016); Chan (2018).

  5. 5.

    I am non-committal concerning which other jurisdictions share these assumptions and legal principles, but tentatively consider Canada and Israel to be plausible candidates.

  6. 6.

    HKSAR v. Ma Wai Kwan David and others [1997] HKCA 652; [1997] HKLRD 761; [1997] 2 HKC 315.

  7. 7.

    Ng Ka Ling and another v. The Director of Immigration [1999] HKCFA 72; [1999] 1 HKLRD 315; (1999) 2 HKCFAR 4; [1999] 1 HKC 291.

  8. 8.

    Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Issues Relating to the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by Universal Suffrage and on the Method for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2016.

  9. 9.

    Chan (2016), p. 854.

  10. 10.

    See section 3 of this article.

  11. 11.

    See the debate between Hunt and Jowell on whether the U.K. courts should defer on the grounds of democratic legitimacy since the entry into force of the Human Rights Act 1998: Hunt (2003); Jowell (2003).

  12. 12.

    Chan (2016), p. 851; Chan (2013b), pp. 5–6. See also Elliott (2010), p. 264; Elliott (2015), pp. 61, 70–71.

  13. 13.

    Chan (2018), pp. 55–56.

  14. 14.

    [2016] HKCFA 66; [2016] 6 HKC 58.

  15. 15.

    Ibid at [70]–[80].

  16. 16.

    Ibid at [108]–[113].

  17. 17.

    Ibid at [115].

  18. 18.

    Ibid at [114]–[117].

  19. 19.

    Ibid at [118].

  20. 20.

    Ibid at [119]–[122].

  21. 21.

    Ibid at [129].

  22. 22.

    Ibid at [123], citing Lords Reed and Toulson JJSC in R (Lumsdon) v Legal Services Board [2016] AC 697 at [44].

  23. 23.

    Ibid at [83]–[88].

  24. 24.

    Ibid [85], citing McLachlin J in RJR-MacDonald Inc v A-G of Canada [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199.

  25. 25.

    Ibid at [86], citing Lord Sumption JSC in R (Lord Carlile of Berriew) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] AC 945 at [34].

  26. 26.

    Ibid at [130]. For more on the debate over whether proportionality is a substantive requirement only or a procedural requirement as well, see, e.g., Kavanagh (2014).

  27. 27.

    [2012] HKCFA 34; [2012] 2 HKC 413.

  28. 28.

    Ibid at [76]–[81].

  29. 29.

    Ibid at [71]–[75].

  30. 30.

    Ibid at [79].

  31. 31.

    [2013] HKCFA 107; [2014] 1 HKC 518.

  32. 32.

    [2012] HKCA 79; [2012] 4 HKC 180.

  33. 33.

    Gurung Deu Kumari v Director of Immigration [2010] 5 HKLRD 219 at [20] at [54]. For a recent case in which the court explains its approach to deference on immigration issues, see BI v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKLRD 520.

  34. 34.

    Ubamaka Edward Wilson v Secretary for Security [2012] 15 HKCFAR 743; [2013] 2 HKC 75.

  35. 35.

    [2018] HKCFA 28.

  36. 36.

    Ibid at [87]. For an excellent analysis of the Court of Appeal’s judgment, see Wong (2018).

  37. 37.

    Ibid at [108].

  38. 38.

    [2017] HKCFA 44; [2017] 5 HKC 242.

  39. 39.

    Ibid at [42].

  40. 40.

    Ibid at [41].

  41. 41.

    Wong Chi Fung v Secretary for Justice [2016] HKCFI 1047; [2016] 3 HKLRD 835.

  42. 42.

    Leung Lai Kwok Yvonne v Chief Secretary for Administration [2015] HKCFI 929.

  43. 43.

    [2009] HKCFI 172.

  44. 44.

    Another example is Nkokwo v HKSAR Government [2016] 5 HKLRD 126 at [33].

  45. 45.

    [2009] HKCA 316; [2009] 6 HKC 77.

  46. 46.

    Chan and de Londras (forthcoming-b).

  47. 47.

    [2002] HKCFA 46; [2002] 3 HKC 146.

  48. 48.

    [2010] HKCFI 827; [2010] 6 HKC 359.

  49. 49.

    [2013] HKCFA 39; [2013] 3 HKC 375.

  50. 50.

    Ibid at [85]–[112]. See also Leung Chun Kwong v Secretary for the Civil Service and another [2018] HKCA 318; [2018] 3 HKLRD 84 esp at [101]–[111], [128].

  51. 51.

    Ibid at [66].

  52. 52.

    Ibid at [25]–[26]. See Chan et al. (forthcoming).

  53. 53.

    Ibid at [116].

  54. 54.

    Hunt (2003).

  55. 55.

    Lim and Chan (2019), pp. 106–109.

  56. 56.

    See Hunt (2003); Young (2009), p. 554; Kavanagh (2010), p. 222; Chan (2010), pp. 3–7.

  57. 57.

    Hunt (2003); Young (2009), p. 554; Kavanagh (2010), p. 222; King (2008), p. 409.

  58. 58.

    A prominent exception is Allan (see, e.g., Allan TRS [2006] Human rights and judicial review: a critique of “due deference.” CLJ 65:671), who objects to any attempt to treat deference as an independent doctrine.

  59. 59.

    See, e.g., A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56; [2005] 2 A.C. 68 (known as the Belmarsh case), wherein the court carefully scrutinised whether a measure is rationally connected to the propounded purpose—an issue of logic and facts that the court is capable of assessing—even though the decision concerned national security.

  60. 60.

    Elliott (2015), pp. 76–81.

  61. 61.

    Elliott suggests that, in general, the standard of review in rights adjudication should be determined by the importance of the value affected by the decision, whereas the degree of weight afforded the decision-maker’s views on whether the standard is satisfied should be determined by the court’s institutional and constitutional competence in adjudicating the issue. See Ibid at pp. 76–81.

  62. 62.

    On why the fourth limb is needed, see, e.g., Barak (2012), ch 12.

  63. 63.

    Hysan Development, at [136].

  64. 64.

    Cf., Elliott (2010), pp. 278–280. See also Chan (2019), pp. 267–278.

  65. 65.

    Chan (2010), p. 5. See also Brady (2012).

  66. 66.

    Foley (2008), ch 8; Chan (2011), pp. 17–19.

  67. 67.

    Chan (2013a), p. 603.

  68. 68.

    Ibid at 598, section 2.

  69. 69.

    Ibid at 598, section 3. See also Brady (2012), pp. 114–117.

  70. 70.

    Chan (2013a), p. 598, section 3.

  71. 71.

    Young (2009), pp. 565–566.

  72. 72.

    Chan (2010), pp. 5–7.

  73. 73.

    Ibid; see also Brady (2012), pp. 107–113.

  74. 74.

    Chan (2010), pp. 5–7.

  75. 75.

    See the “biased sampling argument” in Lai (2015), section 3.3.2.

  76. 76.

    [1999] HKCFA 10; [2000] 1 HKC 117.

  77. 77.

    [2017] HKCFA 59; [2017] 6 HKC 33.

  78. 78.

    That the executive and legislature in Hong Kong are not sensitive to the protection of minority rights is not disputed. The reluctance of both branches to introduce anti-discrimination legislation for sexual minorities is a case in point.

  79. 79.

    Article 23 of the Basic Law mandates that the HKSAR government enact laws on its own to prohibit several national security offences. See Fu et al. (2005) and Chan and de Londras (forthcoming-a).

  80. 80.

    See, e.g., de Londras (2011), pp. 230–279; Kavanagh (2011), p. 172.

  81. 81.

    Chan (2013a), p. 615. See also Chan and de Londras (forthcoming-b).

  82. 82.

    Chan (2013a), p. 598, section 3.

  83. 83.

    Chan and de Londras (forthcoming-b).

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Acknowledgements

This project is funded by the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong (RGC Ref No. 759613).

I thank Francis Chung, Stephanie Leung, Philip Mak, and Allison Wong for their helpful research assistance, and participants at the session on “Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review” at the 2018 Congress of International Academy of Comparative Law for their comments. Special thanks to Francis Chung for his untiring assistance and support throughout the project on deference. All errors are my own.

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  1. Department of Law, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China

    Cora Chan

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  1. School of Law, City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong

    Guobin Zhu

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Chan, C. (2019). A Principled Approach to Judicial Deference for Hong Kong. In: Zhu, G. (eds) Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review. Ius Comparatum - Global Studies in Comparative Law, vol 39. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31539-9_10

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