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Beyond the Usual Debate

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Abstract

W+S sector reforms often need to repair the damage of ill-conceived decentralization. Urban W+S specialists seem to have less influence in sanitation development strategies than public health officers. Unnecessary competition hinders the development of an enabling sanitation framework in the water sector and leads to contradicting definitions of sustainable access to safe W+S. Some of these adopted on the highest level breach in the urban setting minimum requirements of human rights. The shift from piped (utility) services to improved sources in towns is hailed as a success although more people have to consume contaminated water. Success is fictitious and two myths are busted: Community systems are an option for urban low-income areas and the hundreds of thousands small scale informal service providers can be regulated. A formalization of services through the involvement of utilities, a pillar of modern reforms, is the appropriate move to end the ‘urban water and sanitation divide’ which discriminates the poor. To up-scale adequate access for the urban poor it is necessary to distinguish between first and last mile development and operation. Because this is unknown to so many donors and national decision makers, access in the low-income areas are unsatisfying in most of the low-income countries.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Kenya 2015, own experience.

  2. 2.

    Own experience in Zambia in 1999.

  3. 3.

    Own observations in Kenya with devolution of water and sanitation to the counties according to the constitution 2010.

  4. 4.

    ‘It was during the MMD (Chiluba) rule in 1994 and Kaunda’s UNIP party was no longer in power but had strong party structures in peri-urban areas. We did not know that the people we were working with belonged to the former ruling party UNIP when we were introducing the first water kiosks. These people were political leaders (Kaunda Branch Chairmen) and their interest was to manage the kiosks. Secondly before the introduction of water kiosks in Chipata water was free and with the kiosks water was to be paid for. The political leaders’ interest or money they collected was for their benefit (personal benefits) as most of them are not employed. The ruling party MMD in Chipata complained to State House and the donor was asked to explain why they were working with the opposition and not the ruling party’ (expert interview, Zambia, 10.2015).

  5. 5.

    According to Pauschert et al. (2012: 20): ‘ISPs adapt their services and service level to the needs of their customers such as individual paying procedures, flexible supply hours, delivery to the doorstep, etc.’ and ‘Measured by availability and customer service orientation. Many ISPs perform better than public utility’. However, there is no evidence about these statements in the report.

  6. 6.

    Rouse (2013: 6).

  7. 7.

    The expression commercial (oriented) utility refers to public utilities, which have obtained a certain autonomy from national or local administrations (civil service) and have the potential to follow a policy of cost recovery.

  8. 8.

    E.g. the number of towns under CUs started with 55 in 2005/6 and increased gradually to 72 in 2008/9, to 76 in 2011/12 and to 90 in 2014 (Sector performance reports of NWASCO, Zambia).

  9. 9.

    Own experience in 2000 and 2001.

  10. 10.

    Own experience in 2005 and 2006.

  11. 11.

    It should be noted that in the meantime Zambia has transferred the responsibilities of water and sanitation service provision on national level from the MoLGH to a newly established ministry for water and sanitation.

  12. 12.

    The national sanitation policy was later adopted by an inter-ministerial structure and not only by the Ministry of Health. This defused the confrontation between the health and the water sector. Own observations in 1990–1991.

  13. 13.

    Own experience in 2006.

  14. 14.

    In addition, the new National Sanitation Policy in Kenya (2016–2030: 97) carries this dispute about funds forwards in demanding that the funds provided to the Water Services Trust Fund (a water sector institution promoting onsite sanitation successfully since many years through the utilities) shall be transferred to a Trust Fund to be created under the MoH: ‘This policy has however, proposed the offloading of the sanitation financing function of the WSTF to the National Sanitation Fund (NASF)’.

  15. 15.

    E.g. National Sanitation Policy 2007 of Kenya.

  16. 16.

    E.g. the Kenyan sanitation policy of 2016 issued by the MoH indicates that the previous policy (2007, chapter 5.9.) discouraged sanitation subsidies. The orientation of the new policy has little changed in this regards of subsidies for household sanitation facilities and proposes only limited subsidies (‘kept to a minimum’) for the households living in extreme poverty.

  17. 17.

    ONEA in Burkina Faso promoted 10,000 to 15,000 urban sanitation facilities annually for almost 2 decades (ONEA annual reports, e.g. 2001: 17).

  18. 18.

    E.g. the sanitation policy 2007 in Kenya provides special acknowledgements to the WHO, Unicef and WSP/WB for their contributions in its elaboration.

  19. 19.

    Hemson et al. (2008: 25).

  20. 20.

    Own observation in Kenya.

  21. 21.

    As it was done in Kenya with the executive order number 2, 2013 and previously in Burkina Faso with the sanitation policy.

  22. 22.

    In this case cholera.

  23. 23.

    Smith (2002: 921).

  24. 24.

    Start of the science of water bacteriology with publications by von Fritsch in 1880 and von Theodor Escherich in 1886 according to Kabler et al. (1964: 58).

  25. 25.

    Grabow et al. (1996: 199).

  26. 26.

    http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/mdg1/en/ (last visited 05.2015).

  27. 27.

    The method of measuring residual chlorine (free chlorine 0.2–0.3 mg per liter for instance) can partly replace bacteriological testing (colony counts, presence of Escherichia coli and coliform organisms) which is more elaborate to carry out.

  28. 28.

    Water sources used by provider and distribution outlets used by consumers.

  29. 29.

    Koch’s remarks in 1893 indicated already that the state shall be responsible to control/ensure the safety of drinking water, refer to Exner (2015).

  30. 30.

    For example, a family with five members (two parents and three children), a family member (often woman or child) would have to carry home 100 kg of water daily from a water kiosk.

  31. 31.

    Esrey et al. (1991: 609).

  32. 32.

    Clasen et al. (2014: 645), the improvement of coverage with toilets in the rural setting has no impact on health measured according to child mortality and 7-day diarrhoea in children younger than 5 years.

  33. 33.

    Tilley et al. (2014: 21).

  34. 34.

    http://www.who.int/topics/sanitation/en/ (last visited 04.2015). Some definitions of safe sanitation go beyond this and include personal and domestic hygiene, dishwashing, cooking, domestic and industrial solid waste and effluents.

  35. 35.

    http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/wastewater/wwuvol2intro.pdf (last visited 04.2015).

  36. 36.

    http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/npdes/Municipalities-and-Wastewater-Treatment-Plants.cfm (last visited 04.2015).

  37. 37.

    WHO (1997).

  38. 38.

    According to WSTF (2012: 67, 71), Kenya, it is estimated that 75% of the latrines are emptied manually and only 14% by specialised services (local authorities, private companies and utilities). Only 8% of the sludge is disposed at the treatment plant or drained into the utility system. 37% don’t know where the sludge is disposed and 55% is dumped or drained somewhere else.

  39. 39.

    E.g. Peepoo toilet http://www.peepoople.com/peepoo/start-thinking-peepoo/ (last visited 05.2017).

  40. 40.

    This diverts the attention of the utilities concerning accountability from the consumers and underserved towards politicians or civil servants of ministries.

  41. 41.

    Nickson and Franceys (2003: 32).

  42. 42.

    According to MajiData, www.majidata.go.ke (last visited 05.2017), the population in the LIAs represents around 40% of the total population to be served with urban water and sanitation systems in Kenya, as indicated by WASREB in its annual reports.

  43. 43.

    Chakava et al. (2014: 108) state, ‘A study in Nairobi’s low income settlements… Results showed 42% of respondent depend on boreholes within 100 m of households…Water tariffs and quality standards were not enforced…with the average price for consumers (around US$/m3) over ten times the national approved lifeline tariff for piped water and recorded Escherichia coli counts and fluorite levels up to 214/100 ml and 9.4 mg/l respectively, [were] significantly over WHO standards.’ Investigating the long term implication, this paper concludes that ‘…the overall water supply demand shortfall could be greater and last longer than anticipated with consequential impact on access by the poor to adequate water quantities.’

  44. 44.

    E.g. ‘water mafia in Dheli’, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-33671836 (last visited 07.2016).

  45. 45.

    Referring to the cases mentioned in this work for Uganda, India and Kenya.

  46. 46.

    ‘Officials say 30% of Pakistan city’s water supply is wasted or stolen, worsening an already chronic shortage… armed gangs ... controlled part of the water supply in … Karachi… illegal water stations operate tapping into underground pipelines owned by the state... denying poor residents much needed water. Water traders with 30 to 40 tankers reportedly earn as much as $16,000 a day. Of the total amount of water stolen, over 70 percent is reportedly sold to big business… the leaders of this ‘underwater world’ are still operating … illegal dealers said powerful and well-connected individuals are to blame for the continued illegal practice.’ (Johnston N, Aljazeera). http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/09/karachi-water-mafia-sucking-city-pipelines-dry-150910062202773.html (last visited 09.2015).

  47. 47.

    Refer also to the Kericho case in Kenya mentioned in this work.

  48. 48.

    In 2015 WASREB carried out an exercise in 15 towns to delimitate the service areas of utilities according to population density and instructed the consultant to identify the small-scale informal service providers with the utility. The result was that no one could confirm that the list of informal providers was complete and none of the informal providers returned the questionnaire to the utility (own observation 2015).

  49. 49.

    Ayalew et al. (2014: 124).

  50. 50.

    Ayalew et al. (2014: 123).

  51. 51.

    In this case the ‘public outlets’ are household connections with the approval by the utility to sell water, which must be considered as neighbourhood sales.

  52. 52.

    Gillian Nantume, Daily Monitor (29th December 2015), Urban poor pay expensively for cheap water, ‘A 20-litre jerry can of water costs Shs 44.7 according to the NSWC tariffs for domestic consumption. For public consumption, the tariff of those who sell water to others is Shs27.5 per 20 l jerry can. At the boutique [water kiosk], I use two jerry cans of water a day, which cost Shs800 each in the rainy season, and between Shs1000 and Shs1500 in the dry season, says Nabasa.’ (1997). http://www.monitor.co.ug/Business/Prosper/Urban-poor-pay-expensively-cheap-water/688616-3012400-j9uix0z/index.html (last visited 12.2016).

  53. 53.

    As indicated in the GIZ (2012: 20) study on informal small-scale service providers in Tanzania, the disadvantages of ISPs are: (1) ‘High Tariffs’ – ‘On average households in LIAs, which receive water from ISP pay 13-times the price than they would if they receive water from a household connection; and still pay three times the price than they would, if they receive water from a kiosk. (2) ‘Water quality standards cannot be guaranteed’ – ‘Water quality delivered by ISPs is usually unknown and untested.’ (3) Lack of customer rights in case the operator is not performing well. (4) ‘ISPs cannot guarantee sustainable access.’ (5) The operator may deny any customer access to services at any time without giving a reason or a customer an opportunity to appeal. Hence, ‘ISPs do not comply with the central principles of the human right to water.’

  54. 54.

    Ayalew et al. (2014: 125, 126, 127).

  55. 55.

    Roughly estimated around 2.000–5.000 in the country.

  56. 56.

    Ayalew et al. (2014: 125) describes a best practice example of the Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority, which achieved a ‘…total municipal system…’ but indicates that such a system is hardly feasible in Africa. This is one example of how experts can underestimate the potential of sector reforms in Africa (e.g. Burkina Faso) and are willing to consider Africa as a sort of laboratory where untested and unfeasible options can be introduced.

  57. 57.

    The instruction by the minister of Local Government and Housing initiated by NWASCO, the regulator, to merge the Water Trusts with the utility of Lusaka was fought off by MPs, which were mobilized by some representatives from the LIAs in 2008 (own experience).

  58. 58.

    Ayalew et al. (2014: 110).

  59. 59.

    As Ayalew et al. are pointing out in the same investigation.

  60. 60.

    A well-designed sanitation concept for sterilization and composting of human faeces but less convincing when people have to use it in the slums as an everyday toilet under the conditions of sharing rooms (infringement on privacy and dignity). In addition, the challenge to dispose of urine without access to a toilet seems to remain unsolved. Also other questions seem to remain unanswered such as affordability for a household in the slums with five members in the family for instance and a comparison of long term costs of such solutions with the provision of a safe latrine. http://www.peepoople.com/peepoo/start-thinking-peepoo/ (last visited 05.2017).

  61. 61.

    The contribution of funds by the private sector (in the case of PPP) in water and sanitation service provision is very limited compared to the funds needed in the sector for infrastructure development. In Senegal for instance, according to Brocklehurst and Janssen (2004: 19–21, 44, 45), the asset holder had to struggle to raise just 20 Million USD private capital and could only do so in selling moveable equipment for the same amount to the private operator.

  62. 62.

    http://www.yourdictionary.com/apartheid (last visited 05.2018).

  63. 63.

    Own observations in Ivory Coast 2001 and Kenya 2013. In the latter case a director in the ministry endorsed (in writing) the establishment of independent small scale community systems through an international NGO in the LIAs situated in the service area of the Nairobi water company until 2013.

  64. 64.

    Ayalew et al. (2014: 125), Schiffler (2015: 161–167).

  65. 65.

    E.g. Lusaka, Zambia.

  66. 66.

    E.g. one of the members of the Board of Directors of the (licensed) utility, called Oloolaiser, serving Ongata Rongai, which is part of greater Nairobi, is an informal service provider active in the service area of the utility. He is supplying water from a borehole (single water source) situated in a densely populated area without water treatment facilities. He holds a water abstraction permit from the Water Resource Management Authority. However, he has no license from Wasreb, the water services regulator. The contract signed with the utility is not authorized by Wasreb. The informal service providers are not obliged to report or fulfil any regulatory obligations. Hence, he is operating illegally and there is no documentation on the quality of water and tariff charged to the customers. The networks of the Oloolaiser water company and this informal provider (as others) do not overlap in Ongata Rongai. There is no indication that Oloolaiser intends to extend its network to the areas of the informal service providers operating within its service area. As a member of the BoDs of the utility the informal service provider will most likely be able to secure that such extension by the utility into his area will not take place (own observation, Nairobi, 2016).

  67. 67.

    Alayew et al. (2014: 125).

  68. 68.

    Refer also to the Nigerian case mentioned before.

  69. 69.

    Community systems in this work means a group of people in the LIAs own/operate a water supply system. This has to be distinguished from a ‘municipal system’ or utility.

  70. 70.

    E.g. refer to the example of Chingola, Copperbelt in Zambia.

  71. 71.

    Many informal small-scale providers are known for their ‘spaghetti’ pipes, which are pipes placed unarranged on or buried near the surface.

  72. 72.

    In this work, the expression of last mile infrastructure is used for the part of the utility systems with small diameter pipes leading into the LIAs serving primarily shared facilities/low-cost technologies (water kiosks and yard taps). Often, these small diameter networks branch off from networks which serve household connections in the middle and high income areas and are designed to accommodate a further densification of connections. However, such (last mile) extensions are also used to establish mixed systems (shared facilities and a limited number of household connections) in the LIAs.

  73. 73.

    At the beginning of the 1990, a donor promoted household connections for free in a low income area in Cotonou, Benin. After around 2 years of project completion many dwellers were disconnected for non-payment of the water bill. Being asked about the present situation, they explained that for them it is worse than it was before because the public stand posts (water kiosks) have been dismantled with the promotion of household connections for all (own experience in 1992).

  74. 74.

    E.g. the Japanese Cooperation JICA and the British Cooperation DFIT (Department of International Development), UK, in Lusaka, which channelled the funds for investments through the international NGO, CARE International.

  75. 75.

    As often promoted by WSP/WB, but hardly proven to be of advantage to the consumers and the utilities. Refer also to Sect. 3.4.

  76. 76.

    Mosley (1987: 170).

  77. 77.

    To halve by 2015 (from 1990 levels) the proportion of the population without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation.

  78. 78.

    Water quality, use of safe sanitation installation and safe sanitation chain.

  79. 79.

    Der Spiegel, 36/2017:44, Früher war alles schlechter, No. 87: Sauberes Wasser; ‘1980 waren 52% der Weltbevölkerung mit Trinkwasser versorgt, 2015 sind es 92%...Uincef geht davon aus, dass 2015 weltweit etwa 600 Millionen Menschen, also jedem zwölften, nichts anderes übrigblieb, als aus unkontrollierten Quellen zu trinken…Allerdings steigt die globale Zahl derer, die Zugang zu sauberem Trinkwasser haben, weiter an. Seit dem Jahr 1990 ist sie um 2,6 Milliarden Menschen gewachsen…‘It is worthwhile to remember that JMP (WHO and Unicef) published in 2014, that in the year 2013 1.8 Billion people in the world - three times the figure mentioned by the Spiegel based on the Unicef messages -, had to consume contaminated water.

  80. 80.

    Progress on Drinking water and sanitation, 2014 update: 65, WHO and Unicef, JMP website: http://www.wssinfo.org/ (last visited 07.2016).

  81. 81.

    Tubewell/boreholes, protected dug wells, protected springs, rainwater collection, and since the SDGs bottled water, if the secondary source used by the household for cooking and personal hygiene is improved..

  82. 82.

    JMP report (2014: 15).

  83. 83.

    JPM report (2014: 14).

  84. 84.

    JMP report (2015: 43). Refer also to Chap. 1 regarding the JMP report (2017: 3).

  85. 85.

    Joint news release: UNICEF/WHO, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2012/drinking_water_20120306/en/ (last visited 05.2018).

  86. 86.

    Own experience in Kenya and Germany 2017 and 2018.

  87. 87.

    Bain et al. (2014a: 1, b) https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4255778/ (last visited 05.2017).

  88. 88.

    Esrey et al. (1991: 920) Faecal Indicator Bacteria (FIB) used by WHO Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality.

  89. 89.

    Refer also to Chap. 2, with 1.9 billion people having to consume contaminated water in 2015 (JMP report 2017:3).

  90. 90.

    The UN declaration A/C.3/70/L.55/Rev.1 from 18.11.2015, page 3/6, seventh session, Third Committee, Agenda item 72 (b)

    http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/gashc4160.doc.htm (last visited 11.2015).

  91. 91.

    ‘Ensure the availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all’ and at the same time maintaining the acceptability of the use of basic sources in an urban environment, which include ‘…tube well/borehole; protected dug well, protected spring; rainwater,…’ does not solve the monitoring challenge on global level JMP: http://www.wssinfo.org/definitions-methods/watsan-categories (last visited 11.2016).

  92. 92.

    JMP estimates (Updated 2017), Copy of JMP_2017_NGA_Nigeria – Excel, Estimates.

  93. 93.

    According to world stage group, the Vice President of Nigeria declared a state of emergency on urban water and sanitation in October 2017 which can be qualified as a distress call. The article noted that: ‘The Vice President in his opening remarks noted the demand-supply gap in urban water supply resulting from rapid population growth and increasing urbanization. Furthermore: ‘The Minister in his keynote address highlighted the deplorable state of the Nation’s urban water supply and sanitation and decried that 17 years after the approval and implementation of the National Water Supply and Sanitation Policy 2000, the objectives of the policy have not been met due mainly to lack of sufficient commitment on the part of the States.’ https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/wash_sector_nigeria_emergency_technical_guidance_final20161204.pdf (last visited 11.2017). Contrary to this signal (distress call by the Nigerian government), The JMP report 2017, Copy of JMP_2017_NGA_Nigeria – Excel, Estimates, indicate that access to improved water has reached 91,7% in the urban areas, https://washdata.org/ (last visited 11.2017).

  94. 94.

    Germany for instance has recently decided to close water programs in several African countries (e.g. Kenya, Uganda, South Soudan) and shift its attention to education and agriculture.

  95. 95.

    http://www.wssinfo.org/definitions-methods/watsan-categories/ (last visited 04.2015).

  96. 96.

    SDG monitoring is trying to change this by adopting the notion of ‘safely managed’.

  97. 97.

    Schaefer et al. (2007).

  98. 98.

    Refer also to World Bank Brief on Tanzania (2017: 8), WASH Poverty Diagnostic Series, Photograph 1 on the water quality of a community system (Water from Community Source in Morogoro).

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Werchota, R. (2020). Beyond the Usual Debate. In: Empty Buckets and Overflowing Pits. Springer Water. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31383-8_3

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