Abstract
This paper draws a distinction between two different ways of imagining the natural universe and the divine, if anything divine exists, as closed to one another. A ‘pure immanence’ perspective holds that the immanent frame of the universe is not affected by anything outside it, while a ‘pure transcendence’ perspective holds that divine activity towards the world is unilateral, without ontological responsiveness. It then discusses the obstacles that each of these perspectives raises for an account of meaningful personal identity. Pure immanence accounts tend to create a problematic disjunction between one’s experience of oneself as a ‘self’ and the systemic explanations for one’s behavior. Conversely, pure transcendence accounts tend to deny that individual identity really develops through a process that is actively creative, rather than being solely a function of obedience or disobedience towards a fully fleshed-out divine idea of who one is supposed to be. A theological account of personal identity should therefore begin by envisioning a more complex inter-relationship between divine transcendence and the processes immanent to the universe.
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Gonwa, J. (2020). Divine Determination or Dynamic Indeterminacy? Transcendence, Immanence, and the Problem of Personal Identity. In: Fuller, M., Evers, D., Runehov, A., Sæther, KW., Michollet, B. (eds) Issues in Science and Theology: Nature – and Beyond. Issues in Science and Religion: Publications of the European Society for the Study of Science and Theology, vol 5. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31182-7_6
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