Abstract
Monotonicity is a property of the consequence relation of classical logic, which has been questioned for a range of reasons, some of which we overview. Default logic, which is a non-monotonic logic, was introduced to model defeasible conclusions that may be justified by default rules. In this paper, we scrutinize certain features of non-monotonicity of a consequence relation to legitimize it. The logic of first-degree entailments, which makes more distinctions than 2-valued logics does is especially suitable as the base logic for a system of default logic, because the applicability of default rules depends on the absence of formulas from a theory. We define two notions of extensions with default rules and illustrate their use by some standard as well as new examples.
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Bimbó, K. (2019). Default Rules in the Logic of First-Degree Entailments. In: Omori, H., Wansing, H. (eds) New Essays on Belnap-Dunn Logic. Synthese Library, vol 418. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31136-0_9
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