Phenomenal Aspects of the Self

  • Majid Davoody BeniEmail author
Part of the New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science book series (NDPCS)


There are different accounts of the phenomenal aspects of the self. This chapter reviews three important accounts of the self. These are the Integrated Information Theory of consciousness (IIT), the resting-state-based theory of consciousness, and the Free Energy Principle (FEP)-based theory of (self-)consciousness. Firstly, I argue that all of these theories can be construed along the lines of SR. Moreover, I argue that because these theories could be related together in a meaningful way, together they form a comprehensive structural account of consciousness. I also present a structural account of intentionality. In this way, the chapter indicates that phenomenal aspects of the self could be construed along the lines of structural realism and in harmony with the structural realist theory of the self.


Integrated Information Theory of consciousness Resting-state-based theory of consciousness Free-energy-based theory of consciousness Counterfactual depth Temporal depth Structural realist theory of consciousness Structural realist theory of intentionality 


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© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of History, Philosophy, and Religious StudiesNazarbayev UniversityNur-Sultan cityKazakhstan
  2. 2.The Amirkabir University of TechnologyTehranIran

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