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The Structural Realist Theory of the Self

  • Majid Davoody BeniEmail author
Chapter
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Part of the New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science book series (NDPCS)

Abstract

The chapter spells out the structural realist theory of the self (SRS). It builds upon what I said in Chaps.  2 and  3 to suggest that SRS can account for the issue of underdetermination of metaphysics of selfhood by the diversity of neuroscientific theories, without succumbing to the orthodox substantivalist theory of the self. SRS enables us to reconcile conflicting philosophical implications of diverse theories of the self. Thus SRS defends a modest form of realism about the self.

Keywords

Structural realist theory of the self Informational structure Embodied structures Cortical midline structure Free Energy Principle 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of History, Philosophy, and Religious StudiesNazarbayev UniversityNur-Sultan cityKazakhstan
  2. 2.The Amirkabir University of TechnologyTehranIran

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