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To Be Many or Not to Be, Grounds for a Structural Realist Account of the Self

  • Majid Davoody BeniEmail author
Chapter
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Part of the New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science book series (NDPCS)

Abstract

This chapter aims to show that the problem of metaphysical underdetermination, which has been introduced in the context of modern physics in the previous chapter, also arises in the field of philosophy of cognitive science. To be more precise, I show that the theoretical diversity that haunts neuroscientific accounts of the self leads to rival philosophical accounts of the self, for example, eliminativism and pluralism. The scientifically informed accounts of the self defy substantivalism. I argue that to defend a realist theory of the self, we must overcome the problem of metaphysical underdetermination, preferably without smuggling in substantivalism through the backdoor.

Keywords

Pattern theory Self-model Eliminativism Pluralism Metaphysical underdetermination 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of History, Philosophy, and Religious StudiesNazarbayev UniversityNur-Sultan cityKazakhstan
  2. 2.The Amirkabir University of TechnologyTehranIran

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