Abstract
Sometimes the members of the committee or small group are more interested in avoiding particular outcomes than in reaching their own favourite ones. In such circumstances the sequential voting by veto provides an a priori plausible decision making method. We outline the method and discuss its main properties.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsNotes
- 1.
For a discussion on Zermelo’s game-theoretic work, see Schwalbe and Walker (2001).
References
Felsenthal, D., & Machover, M. (1992). Sequential voting by veto: Making the Mueller-Moulin algorithm more versatile. Theory and Decision, 33, 223–240.
Hamburger, H. (1979). Games as models of social phenomena. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
McKelvey, R. D., & Niemi, R. G. (1978). A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures. Journal of Economic Theory, 18, 1–22.
Moulin, H. (1983). Strategy and social choice. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Mueller, D. C. (1978). Voting by veto. Journal of Public Economics, 10, 57–75.
Mueller, D. C. (2003). Public choice III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schwalbe, U., & Walker, P. (2001). Zermelo and the early history of game theory. Games and Economic Behavior, 34, 123–137.
Yuval, F. (2002). Sophisticated voting under the sequential voting by veto. Theory and Decision, 53, 343–369.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
de Almeida, A.T., Morais, D.C., Nurmi, H. (2019). Sequential Voting by Veto. In: Systems, Procedures and Voting Rules in Context . Advances in Group Decision and Negotiation, vol 9. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30955-8_6
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30955-8_6
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-30954-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-30955-8
eBook Packages: Mathematics and StatisticsMathematics and Statistics (R0)