Abstract
We discuss the problem of selecting a decision rule in the simplest possible setting involving dichotomous choice situations. The starting point is individual utility maximization under two types of cost-constraints: one resulting from the collectivity making decisions against the interests of the generic individual and the other associated with resources that are needed to garner enough support for the passage of motions that are in the individual’s interest. Our point of departure is the classic decision making calculus envisaged by Buchanan and Tullock.
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Notes
- 1.
The Pareto criterion amounts to the following requirement on choices regarding any pair of alternatives X and Y: if all individuals strictly prefer alternative X to alternative Y, then Y is not elected.
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de Almeida, A.T., Morais, D.C., Nurmi, H. (2019). Calculus of Consent. In: Systems, Procedures and Voting Rules in Context . Advances in Group Decision and Negotiation, vol 9. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30955-8_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30955-8_2
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