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Representativeness

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Part of the book series: Advances in Group Decision and Negotiation ((AGDN,volume 9))

Abstract

A referendum paradox occurs when a collective decision by a majority in a representative body contradicts the majority opinion in the electorate at large. We discuss this paradox as an introduction to the problems of constructing optimally representative committees. Two important studies are reviewed and the notion of a Condorcet committee introduced. We also deal with power distribution in committees vis-à-vis the electorate at large.

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References

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Correspondence to Adiel Teixeira de Almeida .

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de Almeida, A.T., Morais, D.C., Nurmi, H. (2019). Representativeness. In: Systems, Procedures and Voting Rules in Context . Advances in Group Decision and Negotiation, vol 9. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30955-8_10

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