Abstract
This chapter explores if and to what extent self-feeling can go wrong. Notably, self-feeling cannot err in the awareness of mere existence. Whenever we have a self-feeling, this already entails our awareness that we exist. However, self-feelings can be called inappropriate based on the way they shape the overall experience of our individual lives. An appropriate self-feeling must display a middle way between being open to alternatives (criterion 1) and being stable over time (criterion 3). Also, appropriate self-feelings must enable openness to other people as people (criterion 2). In addition to these criteria coming from Ratcliffe’s theory of existential feelings, the philosophy of short-term, object-oriented emotions has additional criteria to offer for what they count as appropriate or inappropriate. First, the appropriateness of self-feelings can be evaluated with a look at its biological effects (criterion 4). Second, inappropriate self-feelings can harm our social fitness (criterion 5). Third, self-feelings need to display a certain amount of consistency with other mental states (criterion 6). Overall, six imperfect criteria are presented to evaluate the appropriateness of self-feelings. Importantly, there is no decisive, ultimate criterion to assess a particular self-feeling. All discussed criteria have their shortcomings. Nonetheless, in sum they can provide some guidance.
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Notes
- 1.
Ratcliffe works with the distinction pathological/non-pathological rather than appropriate/inappropriate. Since the project of this book is decisively not restricted to the psychiatric, clinical context, the latter distinction is preferred. To avoid overcomplexities, pathological and inappropriate (and non-pathological and appropriate, respectively) are treated to mean roughly the same. Thereby, we remain ignorant of the fact that there might be appropriate existential feelings that are pathological in some sense or inappropriate existential feelings that are not pathological in some sense.
- 2.
Note that the depressed person may assert the proposition “it is possible that things could change in a positive way”. However, this is only an abstract possibility. For the depressed person this proposition does not entail the possibility that things could become better for her own life, that good things could happen to her (Ratcliffe 2015a, chapter 5).
- 3.
Ratcliffe discusses the question concerning the appropriateness of existential feelings in the context of religious or mystic experiences. His claim, however, includes all kinds of existential feelings.
- 4.
However, you might argue that in fact she does not see other people as people. For to see someone as people may include to see the other person as autonomous, self-sufficient creature that could in principle help itself.
- 5.
Note that the idea of a formal object appears already in Heidegger’s account of emotion, albeit in different terminology: “That before which we are afraid, the ‘fearsome’, is always something encountered within the world, either with the kind of being of something at hand or something objectively present or Mitda-sein. […] What is it that belongs to the fearsome as such which is encountered in fearing? What is feared has the character of being threatening” (Heidegger 2006 [1927], p. 140, translated by Stambaugh).
- 6.
See Slaby (2008b, esp. chapter 8) for a detailed discussion of this challenge. His conclusion is quite similar to the one outlined in this section.
- 7.
- 8.
We cannot enter the many complexities of aesthetic judgement here. Yet, one of the classics in this field, Immanuel Kant (1974 [1790], §§ 6–9), seems to support the critique of radical subjectivism put forward here.
- 9.
There are many competing attempts to find the right path such as “dispositionalism”, “fitting attitude analysis” or “no priority view”. See Deonna and Teroni (2012) for an introduction.
- 10.
Granted, there are other possible reactions, such as freezing in fear, that might be regarded as less useful. However, freezing in fear is not totally counterproductive. First, it leads to high alertness and adrenaline release, too. This might help to find the right reaction after the initial shock. Second, motionlessness can indeed be a good strategy against predators, since running away might stimulate their chasing instincts.
- 11.
And not Australian, notably.
- 12.
- 13.
Compare Robert Frank (1988) for a contemporary version of the Aristotelian view.
- 14.
Helm takes this term from Taylor (1985, p. 48).
- 15.
In his later book (2015a, chapter 3) Ratcliffe explores the relationship between depression and bodily changes in more detail. He modifies his position and challenges the distinction between psychological and somatic illness in general. He argues that in most cases of pathology there are both psychological and somatic aspects. Thus, he may question the line of argument taken here because it still builds to some extent on this distinction. However, even if he is right this would not refute the criterion of biological function. If every biological malfunction coincides with psychological malfunction and vice versa, then biological malfunction is a valid criterion for detecting psychological malfunction, i.e. pathological existential feelings. In this view, if there is a pathological existential feeling, there will be biological malfunction, too. Accordingly, if there is no biological malfunction, there cannot be psychological malfunction and thus no pathological existential feeling.
- 16.
- 17.
Notably, an existential feeling that is appropriate in one society (e.g. a collectivistic/interdependent one) may be perfectly appropriate in another society (e.g. an individualistic/independent one).
- 18.
Although this is a fascinating philosophical issue we obviously cannot go into more detail here.
- 19.
Take the Austrian examples of Jack Unterweger or Josef Fritzl.
- 20.
Compare in Sect. 2 of chapter “Appropriateness and Inappropriateness in Self-Interpretation” below for more examples of appropriate self-feelings and inconsistent other mental states. These cases are called self-deception in this book.
- 21.
- 22.
The situation seems to be similar in extreme cases of meditation where some people report complete self-loss (Fasching 2008). However, even these experiences of self-loss are experiences that are had by someone. A person who reports these experiences obviously has the awareness that these experiences are had by her. Otherwise she could not report them. As a consequence, even these cases involve a basic self-consciousness that is warranted by self-feeling. A similar response can be given to defenders of a No-Self-Theory (Metzinger 2003, 2009, 2011; Siderits 2011) who claim self-consciousness to be a construction.
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Kreuch, G. (2019). Appropriateness of Self-Feeling. In: Self-Feeling. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 107. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30789-9_12
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