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Online Voting in Ontario Municipal Elections: A Conflict of Legal Principles and Technology?

  • Anthony Cardillo
  • Nicholas Akinyokun
  • Aleksander EssexEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11759)

Abstract

This paper presents the first comprehensive study of the use of online voting technology in the province of Ontario, Canada. Despite having one of the largest concentrations of online voters globally, its use is not governed by any federal or provincial standards. This has left many municipalities to make decisions largely in isolation, relying on for-profit vendors to set their own bar for cybersecurity and public accountability. This study presents important observations about online voting use in the 2018 Ontario municipal election and questions whether the legal principles are being met by the technology deployed in practice.

Notes

Acknowledgments

We are grateful to a many individuals in Ontario and beyond for important insights on technology, policy and law. Special thanks to Jane Buchanan. See the full version of the complete list of acknowledgments.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Anthony Cardillo
    • 1
  • Nicholas Akinyokun
    • 2
  • Aleksander Essex
    • 1
    Email author
  1. 1.Department of Electrical and Computer EngineeringWestern UniversityLondonCanada
  2. 2.School of Computing and Information SystemsThe University of MelbourneMelbourneAustralia

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