Development of EU Competition Law Enforcement from an Historical Perspective: A Call for Harmonisation from the EU

Malinauskaite, Jurgita

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-30233-7_4

Jurgita Malinauskaite^2,3

674 Accesses

Abstract

The seeds of changes for competition enforcement were scattered in the 1990s by the fall of the Soviet Union and the re-emergence of the Eastern European countries back onto the European map. The CEE countries left behind socialism and expressed an interest in joining the EU. This expansion has meant not only challenges for the CEE countries in meeting the EU standards but also vice versa the EU had to prepare for the acceptance of these new Member States and ensure that the EU working mechanism would not be stalled. In the context of competition law enforcement, the major reforms were undertaken which involved a shift from centralisation towards decentralisation. Even though the debate about a better use of national competition administrations began in the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the reformation of the antitrust enforcement happened in 2004 with Regulation 1/2003 opening the door to decentralisation and sowing the seeds for current enforcement harmonisation. While it freed up resources and allowed the Commission to focus on the most serious infringements, the NCAs became like the Commission’s agents with the enforcement of EU competition law increasingly taking place at a national level. Initially, the NCA were free to enforce EU substantive competition law according to their national procedural laws. Yet, pursuant to recent reforms, the Member States will have to adhere to some minimum procedural rules and standards set by the EU. This chapter takes the reader through a history by reviewing EU harmonisation attempts related to competition law enforcement and procedural issues, which can be placed into four development stages ranging from the first enforcement Regulation 17/62, via the modernisation Regulation 1/2003 and finishing with the two recent directives (i.e. the Antirust Damages Directive and the ECN+ Directive).

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Notes

1.
Gerber (2008), p. 1237.
2.
Ehlermann (1996), p. 90.
3.
Around 85% of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU infringements are decided by the NCAs. See the statistics provided by the European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/statistics.html (accessed 10 December 2018).
4.
Directive 2014/104/EU.
5.
Directive (EU) 2019/1.
6.
Nicoll and Salmon (2001), p. 3.
7.
Nicoll and Salmon (2001), p. 4. For further discussion on the root of the European integration, see Nicoll and Salmon (2001), Ch. 1.
8.
For further reading, see Mayne (1970), Ch. 8–10. Also, see Swann (1984), Ch. 1.
9.
Goyder (1998), pp. 16–18.
10.
Goyder (2003), pp. 18–19.
11.
Art. 2(8) of the Treaty of Rome.
12.
Gerber (1998), p. 343.
13.
For further reading, see Gerber (1998), Ch. 9.
14.
Roney and Budd (1998), p. 3.
15.
Mayhew (1998), p. 179.
16.
Hall and Danta (2000), p. 3.
17.
Novotna (2007).
18.
For further reading, see Pettai (2003), pp. 1–13.
19.
Ehlermann (1996), p. 89.
20.
Mayhew (1998), p. 191.
21.
See, for instance, Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy (2013). Similar approach was taken in the Baltic countries, see Malinauskaite (2010).
22.
Kaputa et al. (2016), pp. 109–122.
23.
Case C-52/09, para 20 TeliaSonera. Case C-280/08 para 230 Deutsche Telecom, C-49/07 para 51 MOTOE – the Treaty of Lisbon has not changed anything in this regard.
24.
Recital 9 of the Directive 2014/104/EU.
25.
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, Explanatory memorandum, SWD(2013) 203 final, para 3.2.
26.
Ibid. Proposal, para 2.
27.
Roger et al. (2018), Ch. 19.
28.
In this case the CJEU relied on the principle of sincere cooperation, where it referred that “applying the principle of cooperation laid down in Article [4(3) TEU] it is the national courts which are entrusted with ensuring the legal protection which citizens derive from the direct effect of the provisions of [Union] law.” Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz and others v Landwirtschaftskammer fur das Saarland [1976] ECR 1989, p. 5. Article 4(3) TEU requires Member States to “take all appropriate measure [‥] to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from actions taken by the institutions of the Union”. The principle of sincere cooperation does not specifically address the question of procedures or remedies, nevertheless, it provided a legal basis for the principles of equivalence and efficiency relied upon by the CJEU. This provision was previously used to develop the other constitutional principles, inter alia, the principles of supremacy, direct effect, and state liability. This has been also confirmed in Comet, Case 45/76 [1976] ECR 2043, para. 13.
29.
Case C-453/99, para 29.
30.
Case C-603/10 Pelati. When national procedural rules make the exercise of the European right impossible in practice, means that the ‘restrictive’ national procedural rule must be set aside. In Comet v Produktschap voor Siergewassen (Case 45/76), the court also held that the remedy to deal with a breach of Union law should be no less effective than that available to protect a right derived from national law and should not make it impossible in practice to obtain relief.
31.
Art. 4 of the Directive 2014/104/EU.
32.
Case C-213/89 The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others [1990] ECR I-2433.
33.
Whereas the Oxford Dictionary defines the word “autonomy” as “the ability to act and make decisions without being controlled by anyone else”. For further reading, see Bobek (2011).
34.
In this context, Bobek relied on what Prechal aptly called the “Rewe/Simmenthal contradiction”. The initial deferential approach, which would favour equivalence and which was announced in Rewe, is still part of the same test. Yet, the intrusive Simmenthal effectiveness vision was also added and gradually expanded: from impossibility to difficulty. For further reading, see Prechal (1998), p. 687. Bobek (2011).
35.
‘Uniformity’ of EU competition law technically includes national legislation in so far as it overlaps with Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.
36.
For instance, Regulation 1/2003 refers to the notions of ‘effective’, ‘effectively’, or ‘effectiveness’ 19 times.
37.
Article 1(1) of the Directive sets out the first goal of the Directive: strengthening the right to compensation to ensure more effective private enforcement actions. This aim reflects the jurisprudence of the CJEU that created an EU right to damages in the seminal Courage and Manfredi decisions. Directive 2014/104/EU.
38.
Directive 2014/104/EU refers to the notions of ‘effective’, ‘effectively’, or ‘effectiveness’ 40 times.
39.
Recital 6 of the Directive 2014/104/EU.
40.
Directive (EU) 1/2019.
41.
For instance, the Directive (EU) 1/2019 refers to the notions of ‘effective’, ‘effectively’, or ‘effectiveness’ 92 times.
42.
See Case C-432/05 Unibet (London) Ltd. EU:C:2007:163, namely paras 42–43.
43.
Wils (2017), p. 80.
44.
European Parliament. Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. Collective Redress in Antitrust. Study. IP/A/ECON/ST/2011-19 PE 475.120 June 2012.
45.
For instance, in comparison while in the Directive (EU) 1/2019 the notion of ‘effective’ is mentioned 92 times, ‘efficient’/‘efficiently’ is referred to only 3 times.
46.
Explanatory memorandum, at para 3.3.
47.
Jones and Sufrin (2016), p. 887.
48.
Directive 2014/104/EU.
49.
Based on the ECN+ Directive (EU) 1/2019.
50.
Buch-Hansen and Wigger (2011), p. 50.
51.
Gerber (1998), p. 263.
52.
Buch-Hansen and Wigger (2011), p. 50.
53.
Historical events in the European Integration process (1945–2014). Available at: https://www.cvce.eu/en/recherche/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff Accessed 20 June 2018.
54.
Title II, Chapter 2, section 2 of the unofficial English translation of the Spaak Report provided that “[when the elimination of a distortion calls for the harmonization of legal regulations in the different countries, the European Commission will propose the necessary decision, which will be taken only by unanimous vote of Member States during the first stage, and by a qualified majority thereafter. If agreement cannot be reached, and if there is a distortion effect, the Commission will have to grant to the interested State the benefit of a safeguard clause”. Information Service, High Authority of the European Commission, June 1956.
55.
Council Regulation No 17 [1962] OJ 13/204.
56.
For further discussion, see Schweitzer (2011), Deringer (1963), pp. 30–40.
57.
Pace and Seidel (2013), p. 71.
58.
Art. 9(1) of Regulation 17/62. Although there were requests to share this monopoly with national competition authorities, this was strictly rejected (i.e. by the Bundeskartellamt and the German government). For further discussion, see Ehlermann (1996), p. 90.
59.
Art. 9(3) of Regulation 17/62.
60.
In Germany, this applied only to horizontal agreements, whereas vertical restrictions were subject to abuse control (Missbrauchskontrolle) except for resale price maintenance, which was per se prohibited.
61.
Belgium and the Netherlands had opted for a system of controlling abuses. See, the Belgian Law of 20 May 1960 on protection against the abuse of economic power, and the Dutch Law of 28 June 1956. The Belgian and the Dutch laws allowed illegal agreements to be penalised only from the date on which the infringement was recorded by the competition authority. Only German and French law were based, like the then Community law, on the prohibition principle, although German law had introduced an authorisation system for agreements between competitors (GWB (Restriction of Competition Act) of 27 July 1957), whilst French law had set up a system of directly applicable exception (French Order No 45-1483 of 30 June 1945). Commission (1999), p. 8, at para 18. Many Member States lacked a proper competition law and enforcement regime until the 1980s or even late 1990s. See Cseres (2010), pp. 7–44. Ehlermann (1996), p. 537, 540.
62.
Goyder (1998), p. 447.
63.
See Commission (1999). Also see Ehlermann (2000), p. 537, 540.
64.
Pace and Seidel (2013), p. 82.
65.
Preamble, EEC Council Regulation No 17 first Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, OJ 013, 21/02/1962, pp. 0204–0211.
66.
Case 127/73 BRT v. SABAM I [1974] ECR p. 51 et seq. at para 16.
67.
Commission (1999), p. 5, at para 8.
68.
McGowan and Wilks (1995).
69.
In order to deal with this problem, the Commission had in the majority of cases refrained from taking a formal decision and instead issued the so-called comfort letters which were an informal measure not provided for in Regulation 17. Comfort letters were issued directly by the Directorate General for Competition (DG Comp) stating that the file was closed since no troublesome restrictions were apparent.
70.
Commission (1999), para. 25.
71.
For instance, in 1965, the Council enacted Regulation 19/65 and empowered the Commission to issue regulations that exempt categories of restrictive practices (so-called block exemptions) for types of agreements which by their nature qualify for an exemption pursuant to Article 101(3). In order to clarify the application of the block exemptions, the Commission has, furthermore, issued numerous notices and guidelines, including Notice on minor importance (de minimis Notice) that set quantitative thresholds below which also horizontal restraints are assumed to have a negligible effect on competition. The first de minimis Notice was published in 1970 ([1970]OJ C64/1), i.e. shortly after the CJEU’s judgment in Völk, where the court held that “an agreement falls outside the prohibition in Article [101] when it has only an insignificant effect on the markets”. Case 5/69 Völk v. Vervaecke [1969] ECR 295, at para. 5/7.
72.
Montag (1998), p. 164. Cf. also Kingston (2001), p. 342. Ehlermann (1995), pp. 454–460, 457.
73.
Commission (1999), para 34.
74.
In the Automec II case the General Court allowed the Commission to set enforcement priorities and referred complainants back to the NCAs or national courts arguing that the matter could effectively be handled at national level, in particular in cases where the effects, albeit not being de minimis, were essentially limited to the territory of a single Member State. Case T-24/90 Automec v. Commission (Automec II) [1992] ECR II-2223, at paras. 87–96.
75.
Case T-201/11 Si.mobil telekomunikacijske storitve d.d. v European Commission, [2014].
76.
Commission (1999).
77.
Commission (1999), summary.
78.
There were some arguments raised during the consultation that Article 101(3) did not fulfil the general criteria for direct effect (i.e. it is not sufficiently clear and precise and unconditional). This is because it “presupposes complex economic analysis, which courts are unable to carry out”. Commission (2000), at para 3.2.
79.
Commission (2000).
80.
Holmes (2000), p. 54.
81.
Speech of Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan to the EC Chamber of Commerce in New York on 26 March 1990.
82.
For further reading, see Malinauskaite (2010).
83.
Glenn (2003), p. 216; Novotna (2007).
84.
Burrows (1996), p. 311. Note: the text highlights were added.
85.
Van Miert (1995).
86.
The Europe Agreements with Poland and Hungary were signed in December 1991, with Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Romania, and Slovakia in October 1993, with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in June 1995, and with Slovenia in 1996. The EU had Association Agreements with Malta since 1971 and Cyprus since 1973.
87.
Cseres (2010), p. 5.
88.
White Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165, 2.4.2008.
89.
Geradin and Henry (2005).
90.
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, which joined the EU on 1st May 2004.
91.
The Czech Republic , Estonia , Hungary , Latvia , Lithuania , Poland , Slovakia , and Slovenia .
92.
Nicolaides (2002), pp. 16–21.
93.
Initially, the Member States explicitly retained the discretion to apply stricter national unilateral conduct rules. They had argued that it was not always clear that abusive unilateral conduct affected trade between Member States and that, in some instances, national provisions relating to abusive conduct were clearer and more appropriate for specific national circumstances. Some authorities also expressed that their national laws on unilateral conduct were structured in such a way to serve dual roles (i.e. to remedy abusive conduct, and also to regulate certain sectors such as telecommunications). For further discussion, see Geradin and Kerf (2003).
94.
Proposal for a Council Regulation on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. 2000/C 365 E/28, p. 7.
95.
Ibid, p. 8.
96.
However, this convergence rule, does not apply for unilateral conduct, national merger control laws, or national law that predominantly pursue an objective different from that pursued by Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.
97.
Case C-344/98 Masterfoods Ltd and HB Ice Cream Ltd ECLI:EU:C:2000:689.
98.
Art. 11(4) of Regulation 1/2003.
99.
See, e.g., Décision n° 07-D-22 du 5 juillet 2007 relative à de pratiques mises en œuvre dans le secteur de la distribution des produits pharmaceutiques, in which the French Conseil de la Concurrence took the level of competition between wholesalers as a relevant factor when deciding whether to oblige a non-dominant company to supply new wholesalers with products. See also, the Italian Competition Authority’s decision of June 15, 2006, Case A364—Merck/Principi Attivi, in Bull. 23/2005, in which the authority did not follow the EU precedents of Magill and IMS.
100.
Art. 10 of Regulation 1/2003. Confirmed in Case C-0375/09 Prezes Urzedu Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentow v. Tele 2 Polska sp. z o.o., devenue Netia SA [2011] ECR.
101.
Sauter (2016), p. 55.
102.
For instance, pursuant to Article 18 of Regulation 1/2003 the Commission’s power to obtained information was strengthened; it has obtained an interview power under Article 19; and its power to inspect has been extended to non-business premises.
103.
They were Commission Regulation 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty OJ L 123 of 27.4.2004, pp. 18–24; Commission Notice on cooperation within the network of competition authorities OJ C 101 of 27.4.2004, pp. 43–53; Commission Notice on the co-operation between the Commission and the courts of the EU Member States in the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC OJ C 101 of 27.4.2004, pp. 54–64; Commission Notice on the handling of complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty OJ C 101 of 27.4.2004, pp. 65–77; Commission Notice on informal guidance relating to novel questions concerning Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty that arise in individual cases (guidance letters) OJ C 101 of 27.4.2004, pp. 78–80; Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty OJ C 101 of 27.4.2004, pp. 81–96; Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, OJ C 101 of 27.4.2004, pp. 97–118.
104.
The Notice on Co-operation between the National Courts and the Commission in applying Articles 85 and 86 EEC [now Article 101 and 102 TFEU] [1993] OJ C39/6; and the Notice on Co-operation between the National Competition Authorities and the Commission handling cases falling within the scope of Articles 85 and 86 EEC [1997] OJ C313/3.
105.
Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty OJ C 101 of 27.4.2004, pp. 81–96.
106.
Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, OJ C 101 of 27.4.2004, pp. 97–118.
107.
Commission Notice on cooperation within the network of competition authorities OJ C 101 of 27.4.2004, pp. 43–53; Commission Notice on the co-operation between the Commission and the courts of the EU Member States in the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC OJ C 101 of 27.4.2004, pp. 54–64.
108.
Gauer et al. (2004).
109.
OJ C 101 of 27.4.2004, pp. 43–53.
110.
The Network is organised in such a way that to obtain information contained in a leniency application, the authority has to sign a declaration that it will not use the information transmitted or any other information received thereafter to impose sanctions on the leniency applicant.
111.
Further discussion will be provided in Sect. 4.5.1.
112.
No. 99/0027, 1999, para 7.
113.
Nicolaides (2002), pp. 16–21.
114.
Botta et al. (2015), pp. 1247–1275. Malinauskaite (2016), pp. 19–52.
115.
Malinauskaite (2016), pp. 19–52.
116.
Under Article 44 of Regulation 1/2003 the Commission was obliged to report to the European Parliament and the Council on its functioning after 5 years of application.
117.
Commission Staff Working Paper (2009), at para 197.
118.
Commission Staff Working Paper (2009), at paras 201–202.
119.
Art. 35 of Regulation 1/2003 provides that “Member States shall designate the competition authority or authorities responsible for the application of Articles [101 and 102 TFEU] in such a way that the provisions of this regulation are effectively complied with”.
120.
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives (2014).
121.
Ibid.
122.
In the case of Societe Stenuit v. France, Decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), February 27, 1992, Series A no.232-A, the court did not object to the finding of the European Commission of Human Rights that competition proceedings were criminal for the purposes of the treaty and defendants in competition proceedings should be afforded all rights provided for by the European Convention. The court endorsed and re-affirmed this finding in the case of Jussila v. Finland, Decision of the European Court of Human Rights, November 23, 2006, App. No. 73053/01.
123.
While not always in agreement with the ECtHR, the CJEU has also confirmed that the Commission must act with “sound administration” when handling cases. This principle includes the obligation for the Commission to adopt decisions within a reasonable time after conducting procedures (SCK and FNK v. Commission, Joined Cases T-213/95 and T-18/96, 1997, E.C.R. II-1739, paras. 55 and 56), to act with due diligence and good faith (Volkswagen AG v. EC Commission, Case T-62/98, 2000, E.C.R. II2707, paras. 269–270), and to conduct a thorough and impartial examination (Schlusselverlag JS Moser v. Commission, Case C-170/02 P, 2003 E.C.R. I-9889, para. 29).
124.
Para 100 of the White paper refers that the system of direct applicability will enable victims of antitrust infringements to obtain compensation of damages. Commission (1999). While not binding, Recital 7 of Regulation 1/2003 states that national courts protect the subjective rights under Union law, for example, by awarding damages to the victims of infringements.
125.
Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan v Courage Ltd and Others. ECLI:EU:C:2001:465.
126.
Joined cases C-295-298/04. Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA. ECLI:EU:C:2006:461.
127.
Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer v. Bundeskartelamt. ECLI:EU:C:2011:389.
128.
Case C-536/11 Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v. Donau Chemie AG. ECLI:EU:C:2013:366.
129.
The Pfleiderer and Donau balancing exercise were developed further in National Grid Electricity Transmission ([2013] EWHC 822), which consisted of two principles, such as legitimate expectations and proportionality. It assessed whether ordering disclosure would increase the exposure to liability of the leniency applicants, compared to the liability of the non-cooperating parties; and whether disclosure is proportionate, by taking into account the difficulty of obtaining information from other sources and the relevance of the leniency material.
130.
First comparative study of national legal systems in the context of damages actions was the so-called Ashurst Report. Waelbroeck et al. (2004).
131.
Waelbroeck et al. (2004), p. 1.
132.
Green Paper—Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2005) 672, 19.12.2005.
133.
White Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165, 2.4.2008.
134.
Commission Staff Working Paper, Annex to the Green Paper, ‘Damages Actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules’ COM(2005) 672.
135.
Commission Staff Working Paper, Annex to the Green Paper, ‘Damages Actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules’ COM(2005) 672, para 1.2.
136.
See, White paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165, 2.4.2008; Commission staff working paper accompanying the White paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules SEC(2008) 404, 2.4.2008; Commission staff working document accompanying document to the White paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules—Impact assessment SEC(2008) 405, 2.4.2008.
137.
Commission Staff Working Document impact assessment Report Damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust rules SWD(2013) 203 final.
138.
See White Paper and Commission Staff Working Document impact assessment Report Damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust rules SWD(2013) 203 final, para 16.
139.
See, for instance, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union COM(2013) 404, 11.6.2013; Directive 2014/104/EU.
140.
Morais (2011).
141.
There were other legislative instruments discussed, such as a regulation, or the mix of regulation and directive. Yet, a directive came out as a winner. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union. COM(2013) 404, 11.6.2013.
142.
Impact assessment Report SWD(2013) 203 final.
143.
Directive 2014/104/EU.
144.
Lombardi (2014).
145.
Directive 2014/104/EU.
146.
For further discussion, see Cauffman and Philipsen (2014). Some scholars, such as Peyer, argue that the Directive fails to strike a balance between private enforcement and public enforcement to the detriment of both. With its overprotection of public enforcement, it fails to deliver effective compensation for victims. Peyer (2015).
147.
Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under Union Law 2013/396/EU. OJ L 201, 26.7.2013, pp. 60–65.
148.
Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 2013/C 167/07.
149.
See, Van Den Bergh (2013), p. 20; Wardhaugh (2014), pp. 1–23; Cseres (2010).
150.
Carnegie v Household International Inc 376F 3d 656 at 661 (CA7 2004).
151.
Italianer (2013).
152.
Green paper on consumer collective redress, COM/2008/0794 final.
153.
Ibid, paras 20–60.
154.
European Commission, ‘Commission Work Programme 2010: A Time to Act’, COM (2010) 135, 31 March 2010.
155.
Wardhaugh (2014).
156.
European Parliament Directorate-General for Internal Affairs Collective Redress in Antitrust (Brussels: EU Publications, June 2012). Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201206/20120613ATT46782/20120613ATT46782EN.pdf Accessed 15 May 2019; European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs Report on ‘Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress’ (2011/2089(INI)) A7-0012/2012 (12 January 2012). Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-2012-0012+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN#_part1_def8 Accessed 15 May 2019.
157.
Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes et al. 564 U. S. xxx (2011), as quoted in the European Parliament Committee (2012) Ibid.
158.
For instance, in the 2005 Green Paper on actions in antitrust matters, the Commission identified six main obstacles to private redress, one of which was ‘the lack of effective collective redress mechanisms, especially for consumers and small and medium enterprises’.
159.
Directive 2014/104/EU.
160.
The Commission’s Recommendation on common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under EU law, 11 June 2013, 2013/396/EU.
161.
European Commission Press Release ‘Commission recommends Member States to have collective redress mechanisms in place to ensure effective access to justice’ IP/13/524 (11 June 2013). Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-524_en.htm Accessed 20 April 2019.
162.
Other fields include consumer protection, environment protection, protection of personal data, financial services legislation and investor protection.
163.
At para 3.4. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions ‘Towards a European horizontal framework for collective redress’, COM(2013) 401 final. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2013/EN/1-2013-401-EN-F1-1.Pdf Accessed 20 June 2019.
164.
Stadler (2011), pp. 172–173.
165.
In 2005 the German Federal Cartel Office (“Bundeskartellamt”), discarded the idea of opt-out class actions because it would restrict the right to a hearing and to violate the principle that the party is the master of its own case (right of disposition).
166.
Poisson and Fléchet (2012), p. 166.
167.
Directive 2014/104/EU.
168.
COM(2016) 710 final.
169.
Some Member States may have more than one NCA (during the time of writing, the UK is still officially the Member State of the EU).
170.
A soft approach has been employed. For instance, in 2012 the Commission published a detailed (277 pages) Manual on procedures in the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Antitrust Manual of Procedures. Internal DG Competition working documents on procedures for the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. March 2012.
171.
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives (2014).
172.
Commission Staff Working Document SWD (2014) 230—Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003 SWD(2014) 230/2; Commission Staff Working Document SWD (2014) 231—Enhancing competition enforcement by the Member States’ competition authorities: institutional and procedural issues SWD(2014) 231/2.
173.
Opinion, European Economic and Social Committee, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market COM(2017) 142 final—2017/0063 (COD).
174.
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives (2014).
175.
See Opinions of 28 September 2016 and 9 December 2016 available at: http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/?fuseaction=ia. Accessed 20 May 2019. Also see, Annex I of the Impact Assessment Report Impact assessment, SWD(2017) 114.
176.
Impact assessment, SWD(2017) 114.
177.
Impact assessment, SWD(2017) 114, p. 13.
178.
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market. COM(2017) 142 final.
179.
The Commission Work Programme (2017). COM(2016) 710 final.
180.
Croatian Competition Authority, Annual report 2017.
181.
Article 34(1) of the Directive (EU) 2019/1.
182.
The EESC proposed that consideration should be given to the content of civil and administrative law being governed by means of a regulation, with the Member States retaining full autonomy with regard to criminal legislation.
183.
Case C-429/07 Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/P/kantoor P v X BV EU:C:2009:359, at para. 36 (emphasis added).
184.
Art 5 of the Regulation 1/2003.
185.
As stated in Case C-68/88 Commission v Greece EU:C:1989:339, at paras 10–11.
186.
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives (2014), at paras 71–76.
187.
Commission Staff Working Document. Enhancing competition enforcement by the Member States’ competition authorities: institutional and procedural issues. SWD(2014) 231/2, at paras 68–71.
188.
This tool will be further explored in Sect. 4.5.1.
189.
European Competition Authorities (2008).
190.
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives (2014), at para 77.
191.
This is also in line with ECtHR practice where in case of awarding damages differentiation between breaches committed by richer and poorer countries can be justified to reflect differences in the value of money. Dunne (2016), pp. 453–492.
192.
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market. COM(2017) 142 final.
193.
Summary report of the replies to the Commission’s Public Consultation on Empowering the national competition authorities to be more effective enforcers. 2015. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2015_effective_enforcers/Summary_report_of_replies.pdf Accessed 28 June 2019.
194.
Recital 11 of the ECN+ Directive.
195.
For instance, in AkzoNobel NV v Commission (C-97/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2009:536) it has to be shown that the parent company exercises decisive influence over the subsidiary that committed the infringement.
196.
Art. 12–15 of the ECN+ Directive.
197.
Section 6.8.
198.
The German and Italian constitutional courts were particularly active in challenging EU measures on their conformity with their national fundamental rights. See, for instance, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel (Case 11-70; ECLI:EU:C:1970:114); Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA (Case 106/77; ECLI:EU:C:1978:49).
199.
To answer the concerns expressed by some national courts, the CJEU held that fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law whose observance the Court ensures. See Erich Stauder v City of Ulm – Sozialamt (Case 29/69, ECLI:EU:C:1969:57).
200.
For further discussion, see Andreangeli (2008), Beumer (2014), pp. 9–34.
201.
Art 3(1) of the ECN+ Directive.
202.
Art 3(2) of the ECN+ Directive.
203.
Art 4 of the ECN Directive.
204.
Art 5 of the ECN+ Directive.
205.
Arts 6–11 of the ECN+ Directive.
206.
Summary report of the replies to the Commission’s Public Consultation on Empowering the national competition authorities to be more effective enforcers. 2015. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2015_effective_enforcers/Summary_report_of_replies.pdf Accessed 28 June 2019.
207.
Art 10 of the ECN+ Directive. Further discussion will be provided in Chap. 6.
208.
Summary report of the replies to the Commission’s Public Consultation on Empowering the national competition authorities to be more effective enforcers. 2015. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2015_effective_enforcers/Summary_report_of_replies.pdf Accessed 28 June 2019.
209.
Arts 16–22 of the ECN+ Directive.
210.
Further discussion is provided in Chap. 6.
211.
Art 23 of the ECN+ Directive.
212.
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market. COM(2017) 142 final, p. 18.
213.
Arts 28–30 of the ECN+ Directive.
214.
Recitals 15–18, Regulation 1/2003.
215.
Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities OJ C 101 of 27.4.2004.
216.
Kekelekis (2009).
217.
This can be seen via the convergence rule defined in the Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003.
218.
Cseres (2010), pp. 7–44.
219.
Updated figures and information are regularly published on the ECN official website which was set up in April 2006 in order to provide information to the legal and business community and to the citizens. For further information see: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/statistics.html Accessed 10 June 2019.
220.
For instance, in one case, the German and Belgian NCAs both received leniency applications concerning a Europe-wide price-fixing cartel for a certain chemical product. Both authorities investigated and imposed fines. The Belgian authority, who imposed the later fine, questioned whether there was the issue of double jeopardy. Yet, it concluded that it was entitled to impose a fine, because the fine imposed by the German NCA had only taken into account the effect of the cartel in the territory of Germany.
221.
Report on the Monitoring Exercise Carried Out in the Online Hotel Booking Sector by EU Competition (2016). Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/hotel_monitoring_report_en.pdf.
222.
See Dunne (2016).
223.
See, for instance, Frese (2014), p. 245. Dunne (2016), p. 21.
224.
Idot (2001), p. 18.
225.
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives (2014).
226.
According to Art 15(3) of Regulation 1/2003 not only the Commission but also the NCAs can submit observations to national courts as amicus curiae.
227.
The European Commission official website: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/antitrust.html Accessed 20 May 2019.
228.
Ibid.
229.
The EU official website: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/training.html Accessed 25 June 2019.
230.
Wils (2013).
231.
Note: this was not a sole reason.
232.
The transposition period has not yet expired.

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Jurgita Malinauskaite
Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania
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Malinauskaite, J. (2020). Development of EU Competition Law Enforcement from an Historical Perspective: A Call for Harmonisation from the EU. In: Harmonisation of EU Competition Law Enforcement. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30233-7_4

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