Skip to main content

Trade

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Stars with Stripes
  • 434 Accesses

Abstract

The failure to conclude a US-EU free trade deal was a strategic error. The environment in Europe was never going to be easy; the US and the EU committed multiple errors of communication and strategy. It is highly unlikely that any significant transatlantic free trade deal can be struck during the Trump administration. While it is also highly unlikely that a future administration can simply restart negotiations where they left off under the Obama administration, there are many valuable lessons to be learned from the TTIP failure. Both sides need greater realism about what can be achieved. Rather than attacking the EU and undermining the international rules-based trading order, the US should be working more intensively with the EU to reform the WTO and address the challenges that China poses. Shunning multilateralism for bilateral trade deals and unilateral trade sanctions (even on allies) harms US interests over the longer term.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 34.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 44.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 44.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    “Attitudes Toward Global Trade and TTIP in Germany and the United States,” Bertelsmann Foundation, August 2016, p. 7.

  2. 2.

    In reality, this dichotomy is wildly overstated by the critics of the US approach. In the United States, precaution is built into our risk assessment and risk management activities. It is reflected in our practice of adapting regulations based on the experience gained in implementing them and on new evidence that becomes available.

  3. 3.

    “Support in Principle for US-EU Trade Pact,” Pew Research Center (in association with the Bertelsmann Foundation), April 9, 2014, p. 14.

  4. 4.

    Martin Greive and Marc Nelle, “Der Deutsche Aufstand Gegen den Vertrag Mit Amerika,” Die Welt, April 25, 2016.

  5. 5.

    Hazel Sheffield, “TTIP ‘Must Include Human Rights,’ Jeremy Corbyn Tells Cameron,” The Independent, February 22, 2016.

  6. 6.

    Anti-TTIP event at Conway Hall in London, October 8, 2015.

  7. 7.

    Remarks by US Trade Representative Michael Froman on the United States, the European Union, and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, September 30, 2013.

  8. 8.

    Amcham EU, The Transatlantic Economy 2019. See also Daniel Hamilton, Creating a North Atlantic Marketplace for Jobs and Growth, Center for Transatlantic Studies, 2018.

  9. 9.

    Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment Report on the future of EU-US trade relations, March 12, 2013.

  10. 10.

    Fredrik Erixon and Matthias Bauer, “A Transatlantic Zero Agreement: Estimating the Gains from Transatlantic Free Trade in Goods,” European Centre for International Political Economy, Occasion Paper 4/2010.

  11. 11.

    Shawn Donnan, “Maine Lobster Claws Itself Back from EU Ban,” Financial Times, October 14, 2016.

  12. 12.

    The EU later claimed that it had always made clear that full duty elimination would not be possible for the most sensitive agricultural tariff lines, especially those relating to beef, poultry and pork. But the report states that “the goal of the agreement should be to eliminate all duties on bilateral trade…”.

  13. 13.

    The US list contained maritime transportation; gambling and betting; social services; and minority affairs. The EU list contained over 200 exceptions. The EU disputed the US characterization by arguing that many of the exceptions were maintained by individual member states (not across the EU) and were economically insignificant.

  14. 14.

    The European Commission, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: The Economic Analysis Explained, September 2013.

  15. 15.

    “Coming and Going,” The Economist, October 1, 2016.

  16. 16.

    Jim Kessler and Jay Chittooran, “Night and Day: Post-NAFTA Trade Deals Yield Steady Surpluses,” Third Way, April 2016.

  17. 17.

    Michael Froman, “The Geopolitical Stakes of America’s Trade Policy,” Foreign Policy, February 17, 2015.

  18. 18.

    Fred Lothar Melchior, “US-Botschafter am Schleifblock,” Rheinische Post, March 8, 2016.

  19. 19.

    Olaf Preuss, “Warum der Mittelstand auf das umstrittene TTIP setzt,” Die Welt, June 16, 2016.

  20. 20.

    Inside US Trade, “Under Pressure to Show TTIP Progress, US, EU Focus on Market Access,” April 17, 2014.

  21. 21.

    A European Court of Justice ruling in 2017 found that international agreements addressing investment disputes are of “mixed competence” among the European Commission and the Member States and therefore can only be approved by the European Parliament and 38 national and sub-federal parliaments.

  22. 22.

    Jean-Claude Juncker, “A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change,” Opening Statement in the European Parliament Plenary Session, July 15, 2014.

  23. 23.

    Several US states had introduced laws requiring labeling until they were preempted by the 2016 federal National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Law, establishing a nationwide standard for disclosing the presence of foods and ingredients from GE crops.

  24. 24.

    European Parliament, “Risks and Opportunities for the EU Agri-Food Sector in a Possible EU-US Trade Agreement,” 2014, p. 11. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2014/514007/AGRI_IPOL_STU%282014%29514007_EN.pdf.

  25. 25.

    The EU’s FTA with Canada states that “Each Party shall provide for enforcement by administrative action…to prohibit a person from manufacturing, preparing, packaging, labelling, selling or importing or advertising a food commodity in a manner that is false, misleading or deceptive or is likely to create an erroneous impression regarding its origin.” Article 20.19(4).

  26. 26.

    In the EU FTA with Canada, the names Brie de Meaux, Gouda Holland, Edam Holland, and Mortadella Bologna are protected, but not brie, gouda, edam, or mortadella on their own.

  27. 27.

    Other cheese names include asiago, fontina, gorgonzola, and munster.

  28. 28.

    Daniel Hamilton, “Creating a North Atlantic Marketplace for Growth and Jobs,” Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2018. In 2011, the United States exported $357.4 billion in digitally deliverable services. This represented over 60% of US services exports and about 17% of total US goods and services exports. The United States had a digitally deliverable services trade surplus of $135.5 billion. Jessica Nicholson and Ryan Noonan, “Digital Economy and Cross-Border Trade: The Value of Digitally Deliverable Services,” US Department of Commerce, January 27, 2014.

  29. 29.

    The key US negotiating objectives on electronic commerce under the Obama administration were well summarized by Deputy USTR Richard Holleyman in his “Digital Two Dozen” principles reflected in the Trans-Pacific Agreement.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2020 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Gardner, A.L. (2020). Trade. In: Stars with Stripes. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29966-8_4

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics