Abstract
Some contemporary Western scholars in the field of Chinese philosophy, such as Chad Hansen, maintain that there are essential differences between the syntax of Classical Chinese and that of Western languages. They think, for example, there are no concept of a sentence and no that-clause in classical Chinese. Hansen argues that, without this kind of expression, ancient Chinese thinkers were probably unable to form similar sentences that express sentential beliefs and semantic truth as exist in Western philosophy; instead, they could only express term-beliefs and pragmatic acceptability by using a combination of names or series of names. Although Classical Chinese lacks an equivalent to the expression of that-construction, this phenomenon is not restricted to the Chinese language. Neither Latin nor Old English permit this form of sentence construction. In this chapter, I will demonstrate that that-construction of Modem English evolved from Middle English via a process of grammaticalization (i.e., from demonstrative as referring term to complementizer as functional word). Before grammaticalization, to express propositional attitudes, like those expressed by that-sentences in Modem English, Old English used a kind of compound sentence with paratactic structure. Sentences of both constructions are functionally equivalent in expressing propositional attitudes. I will argue that, in Classical Chinese, there exists a similar syntactical construction that is functionally equivalent to that-construction. One of the aims of this chapter is also to provide clear evidence from ancient Chinese texts to show that ancient Chinese thinkers had sufficient linguistic tools to express abstract ideas, including propositional attitudes, semantic truth and logical reasoning.
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Notes
- 1.
In this chapter, most of the quotations from ancient texts can be found in http://ctext.org of Chinese Text Project, edited by Dr. Donald Sturgeon, and the translations by James Legge can also be found in http://ctext.org. Besides, all other translations without acknowledgement are made by myself.
- 2.
Guo Xiliang 郭錫良 has mentioned a case in the Huainanzi 淮南子 about the difference between two kinds of function words, the assertive use and the informative use of function words. That is: “To support with hand and to take with hand, to thank and to give way, to be old and advanced, to promise and to finish something, ye and yi, are separated with a thousand miles.” (Shuolin Xun 說林訓) (Discourse on Forests) (扶之與提, 謝之與讓, 故之與先, 諾之與已, 也之與矣, 相去千里。) Guo’s explanation is that: Although both “ye” 也 and “yi” 矣 belong to the mood of statement, the former is used to make assertive statement while the latter is used to make informative statement. See Guo 1989: 74.
- 3.
The following quotations translated by me are added with my explications in the square brackets.
- 4.
According to this passage, the term “ming” 名 is used with both narrow and broad senses. In the narrow sense, it means the same as “name;” in the broad sense, it also includes the meaning of “description” or “being stated” In Chinese, the latter is called “cheng” 稱.
- 5.
It is well-known that Hansen’s “mass-noun hypothesis” together with his theses of “no concept of sentence-belief” and “no concept of semantic truth” in classical Chinese (Hansen 1983, 1985, 1992, 1993) are the most influential and controversial views in the academia and it seems that he never gives up these theses.
- 6.
See the biography of Xu Fang 徐防傳 in Biographies of Tang, Zhang, Xu, Zhang and Hu 鄧張徐張胡列傳, recorded in Fan Ye’s 范曄, Hou Han Shu 後漢書 (the Book of Later Han). Refer to the Chinese Text Project on http://ctext.org.
- 7.
Ames and Hall claim that: “The tendency of classical Chinese philosophers to be concerned with the ordering of names is a consequence of the dominance of the noun function. The striking claim that classical Chinese doesn’t depend upon sentences and propositions for the expression of semantic content entails the consequence that all Chinese words are names, and that compound terms, phrases, and sentences are strings of names. This consequence, in turn, requires that one appreciate the lack of interest on the part of the early Chinese in questions of ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ Words, as names, may be judged appropriate or inappropriate; only propositions may, in the strict sense, be true or false” (Hall and Ames 1987:298–9). They also assert that: “Classical Chinese may be uncongenial to development of univocal propositions for this reason. Without such propositions, semantic notions of truth are ultimately untenable” (Hall and Ames 1995: 230). In contrast, Graham demonstrates that: “Hall and Ames seem in the quoted passage to imply that a Chinese sequence cannot be a sentence or a propositional utterance expressing a truth unless it has subject-predicate form. On this Aristotelian principle one would have to agree that no truths were ever spoken in China, for even a verbal sentence with a subject is not conveniently analysed in subject-predicate form” (Graham 1989: 394). So I think Ames and Hall take side with Hansen to hold the theses of “no concept of sentence-belief” and “no concept of semantic truth.” Here, thank you for one of the readers reminding me to provide evidence to demonstrate the disagreement about the view of sentences and truth in ancient China.
- 8.
Here, Hansen seems to treat ci as strings of words including sentences though he translates ci as phrases.
- 9.
- 10.
Hansen does not only claim that there is no concept of belief in ancient Chinese philosophy or theories of language, but also claims that there is no linguistic device or construction in ancient Chinese to express clauses of “believes that.” So he stresses that: “No single character or conventional string of ancient Chinese corresponds in a straightforward way to ‘believes that’ or ‘belief that.’ No string or structure is equivalent to the word ‘believe’ or ‘belief’ in the formal sense that it takes sentences or propositions as its object” (Hansen 1985: 501). But I think this view is not right. As I shall argue below, there are some devices in classical Chinese which are functionally equivalent to that-clauses and similar to those devices in Old English.
- 11.
A detailed discussion on gapping phenomena can be found in Ross1967.
- 12.
As indicated by Frank Palmer, the traditional grammars do not successfully provide a kind of definition for “sentence.” Instead, “we are taught at school to recognize sentences through practice, not by a set of rules” (Palmer 1971: 71). It means that what we learn to identify a sentence is an operative concept of a sentence.
- 13.
Davidson’sparatactic analysis is not only theoretically appropriate, but also in accordance with the development of the Present English from the Old English and Middle English. As indicated by many historical linguists of English, the complementizer (or subordinating conjunction) “that” is derived from the demonstrative (pronoun) “pæt” through a process of grammaticalization. See Williams1975: 248. In Chinese language, there is also a similar kind of grammaticalization or xu hua 虛化 (de-substantiation).
- 14.
In Chomskian linguistic, a trace is what is left behind in a position in which the moved constituent appeared at some deep level of syntax or some point in the derivation before surface syntax. For example, in saying “you like drinking tea,” there is a constituent appeared in the object position of the surface structure. But, in saying “what do you like eating t?” there is a moved constituent appeared in the deep structure which can be marked by t.
- 15.
A zero subordinate conjunction (or complementizer) occurs in English in sentences like “I know Ø he likes swimming,” in which the zero conjunction plays the role of the subordinate conjunction that in its non-zero from: “I know that he likes swimming.”
- 16.
The anaphoric (referring) term is called an anaphor. For example, in the sentence: “the music stopped and that upset everyone,” the demonstrative pronoun that is an anaphor which refers back to its antecedent sentence.
- 17.
In addition to this kind of grammaticalization from demonstrative pronoun to subordinate complementizer (i.e., from substantive word for anaphoric or cataphoric reference to function word for subordinate conjunction), there is another kind of grammaticalization from demonstrative pronoun to conditional complementizer (i.e., from substantive word for anaphoric or cataphoric reference to function word for conditional conjunction). A detailed argument with concrete examples can be found in Hung2010: 317–8.
- 18.
For example, the following English sentence uses a that-clause to express an indirect discourse: “Julia says that she is a good student.” Instead, the samesaying in Latin is expressed in accusative cum infinitive structure: “Iūlia dīcit sē bonam discipulam esse.” (literal translation: “Julia says herself to be a good student.”) Sē here is an accusative reflexive pronoun referring back to the subject of the main verb, i.e., Iūlia; esse is the infinitive “to be.” In classical Chinese, we can find that a similar kind of grammatical device is usually used in indirect discourse, and thus used to express that-beliefs. This point can be found in Parsons2008: 216.
- 19.
In generative linguistics, the motivation for a PRO subject comes from the grammatical of a sentence like “Peter asked Billk [PROk to sleep],” where the subject of the infinitival to-clause, though not overtly expressed, is understood to be controlled by an argument (i.e. an expression or syntactic element in a sentence that serves to complete the meaning of the verb.) of the main clause.
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Fung, Ym. (2020). Sentences (Ci 辭, Ju 句) and Propositional Attitudes. In: Fung, Ym. (eds) Dao Companion to Chinese Philosophy of Logic. Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy, vol 12. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29033-7_4
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