Abstract
In the context of argumentation, the concepts of gu 故 (reason) and li 理 (principle) are often mentioned by ancient Chinese thinkers, especially in the Mozi and Xunzi. These two concepts are crucial for making arguments and for checking whether an argument is acceptable or fallacious. To form a reason for an argument which is based on an appropriate principle, both Mozi and Xunzi stress that one has to check whether the relevant terms in the argument are of the some lei 類 (class/kind). In this chapter, I will explain the intimate relation among these three concepts and, in contrast to A. C. Graham and Chad Hansen’s view, I will argue that lei is better interpreted as class than kind in a logical context.
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Notes
- 1.
One of the readers thinks that: “Kong Yingda is cited as saying that gu connects the former and latter ci. But the examples are explicated as presenting causal relations.” So, the reader judges that there may be a confusion. However, I think, there is a debate in contemporary Western philosophy on “causal relata.” On the one hand, following David Hume’s view, Donald Davidson (1967) argues that the relata are events which should be understood as unstructured particulars or objects. On the other hand, Jaegwon Kim (1976) understands events that are the basic causal relata to be instantiations of properties by objects at certain times; D. H. Mellor (1995) takes causes and effects to be facts, which are the truth-makers of true contingent sentences.
In our ordinary language, when we say that: “This short circuit caused this fire,” it can be explained as “a caused b” and thus, following Hume or Davidson, the relata can be treated as two events as particulars expressed by two (individual) terms. If we say that: “The fact that there was a short circuit caused it to be the case that there was a fire,” it can be explained as “P caused Q” or “P thus Q” and thus, following Kim or Mellor, the relata can be treated as two events as facts expressed by two propositions or sentences.
So, when one says that: “Event a causes event b,” it is a singular statement expressing a causal relation between two events as objects. If we use “gu” (or “thus”) to express this relation, we could use “P” (a sentence symbol) to stand for “there is an event a” and “Q” (another sentence symbol) for “there is an event b” and use “gu” (or “thus”) to connect these two sentences in “P, thus Q” or “P, gu Q” as exemplified in the following example:
(C2) Women give up their work of spinning and weaving and engage in literary grace, thus people will be cold. Men get off their job of tilling and planting and engage in engraving, thus people will be starved. (Mozi VI: 7)
As argued by Donald Davidson, an event is expressed by a term as an individual or object, not by a sentence as a fact. We can say that “event a causes event b,” but we cannot say that “event a, thus event b.” It is because “gu” (or “thus” as a sentential connective) is used to connect propositions or sentences, not terms of individuals or objects.
Moreover, in using the sentential connective “gu” to connect two sentences, the relata of the connection may be about the causal relation of the happenings of both a cause and an effect, or about the logical relation (say, sufficient or necessary condition) of the happenings of two events which are without causal relation. (For example, in “If you pass the exam I will give you a present.” the promise in the conditional sentence is about the sufficient condition of the antecedent for the consequent. But this logical condition is not causal.)
Based on the above explanation, I think there is no confusion in connecting sentences or propositions with gu for causal relation if the causal relata or the logical relata in all my examples are ci (sentences or propositions) of facts and not terms of individuals or objects.
- 2.
Donald Davidson thinks that “the primary reason for an action is its cause.” So, explanation in terms of reasons can be understood as a species of causal explanation. See Davidson (1963: 686).
- 3.
The detail argument about this passage can be found in Fung (2007: 524–5).
- 4.
Please refer to Chap. 13 of this volume for a detailed description of the four different concepts of “sameness” and the four different concepts of “difference.”
- 5.
Some incomparable examples mentioned by Later Mohists are: “Which is longer, a piece of wood or a night? Which do you have more of, knowledge or grain? Which is the most valuable, aristocratic rank, one’s own parents, right conduct, a price? ….” (木與夜孰長?智與粟孰多?爵、親、行、賈四者孰貴?…) (Explanation II 6) (Graham1978: 357) Other examples can be found in Canon and Explanation II: 2 (Graham1978: 349).
- 6.
A model of a sentence (form) S is an interpretation of S which can make S true or false. For example, if S has the form (∀x)(Fx→Gx) and Fx and Gx are interpreted as “… is a man” and “… is an animal” respectively, the sentence “Every man is an animal” or “Whoever is a man is an animal” is a true interpretation or true model of S. If Fx and Gx are interpreted as “… is a man” and “… is a monkey” respectively, the sentence “Every man is a monkey” or “Whoever is a man is a monkey” is not a true interpretation or true model of S. Since a particular model or interpretation of an argument form can be true for the premise(s) and false for the conclusion, it can be used as a counter example to prove the invalidity of an argument. However, a limited number of models normally cannot be used to prove the validity of an argument and its form in the language of predicate logic though a counter example has not been found. Detailed information about model theory can be found in Hodges2009.
- 7.
If an argument “A├ B” is valid or “A logically implies B,” it means that the assertion of the conditional sentence (A→B) is true or that the sentence “A materially implies B” is true.
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Fung, Ym. (2020). Reason (Gu 故) and Principle (Li 理). In: Fung, Ym. (eds) Dao Companion to Chinese Philosophy of Logic. Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy, vol 12. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29033-7_11
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