The Twenty-first Century: The Epoch of Advanced Missile Systems and Growing Vulnerabilities

Frigoli, Matteo

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-28285-1_2

The Twenty-first Century: The Epoch of Advanced Missile Systems and Growing Vulnerabilities

Matteo Frigoli³

Chapter
First Online: 12 March 2020

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Abstract

The XXI century have been a broad turnaround for global security in which interstate relationships have been heavily affected by fast-paced military technological developments to which the policy-making process has not kept the pace with. The international security scenario is now degraded due to the inaction of States in front of the new developments in tactical and strategic warfare technologies.

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Notes

1.
See, for example, the US Nuclear Posture Review (US DOD 2018); see also the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (Russian Federation 2015),
2.
Ibid.
3.
The Midcourse phase of an ICBM is the longest portion of flight lasting about 75% of all the flight. In this phase the munitions have separated from the booster and are flying un-powered. This phase offers the largest time window in which track and intercept the incoming warhead (Evers et al. 2015). See also Cepek (2005).
4.
See Regan and Anandakrishnan (1993). The early portion of the midcourse phase, after the booster burns out but before the warhead is deployed, is sometimes called the ascent or early-ascent phase. See (Congressional Budget Office 2004).
5.
Noteworthy, once the warhead reenters from outer space, it would be greatly slowed down by the Earth’s atmosphere. It is estimated that an average ICBM warhead would travel at more than 3 km/s (approximately Mach 8) at impact point (Wilkening 2004, p. 1; Congressional Budget Office 2004, p. x.).
6.
OTH radars are a type of radar systems which use the ionosphere to refract outgoing radar waves and return signals, enabling the system to detect and track targets that would otherwise be hidden by the curvature of the earth. See Air Combat Command (2012).
7.
An average ICBM can accelerate the RV to orbital velocities (about 7 km/s or Mach 20). Nevertheless, once the RV reenters from outer space it would be greatly slowed down by the Earth’s atmosphere. It is estimated that an average ICBM RV would travel at more than 3 km/s (approximately Mach 8) at impact point (Mallik 2004, p. 110).
8.
Boost phase is the portion of flight immediately after launch when the booster accelerates to lift the munitions into the air. It lasts roughly 3–5 min for a long-range missile and as little as 1–2 min for a short-range missile (Chen and Speyer 2008, p. 1).
9.
In the HTV-2 DARPA experiment, the glider detached from the rocket after 270 s.
10.
In the pull-up phase, the HGV will orient itself upwards using small thrusters and will enter in the gliding phase by using the lift force generated by its shape (Acton 2015, p. 194).
11.
See on this subject (Schelling 1970, p. 180).
12.
Note: Ballistic missiles could reach orbital velocities. See on this (Podvig 2006, pp. 83–85).
13.
See also Russia’s Poseidon Thermonuclear Torpedo Is No Aircraft-Carrier Killer, available at https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia%E2%80%99s-poseidon-thermonuclear-torpedo-no-aircraft-carrier-killer-40242
14.
A system capable of disrupting, damaging, or destroying spacecraft in orbit from positions on land, sea, air, or space. (Chapman 2008, p. 370)+.
15.
The North Korean missile Nodong and the Pakistani missile Ghauri, both derived from SCUDs, could be used to attack satellites (Deblois et al. 2004, pp. 60–61; Hays et al. 2014, p. 73).
16.
On the contestable nature of conventional deterrence see (Wirtz 2018).
17.
Indeed, if both opponents are willing to accept a mutual exchange of low-yield nuclear strikes, the one who would then find himself at a disadvantage could prefer to escalate.
18.
For a detailed list of Autonomous Weapon System see Scharre (2018).
19.
The Russian Uran-9 autonomous tank is expected to wait hidden for enemy forces to be in the nearing before engaging. See Scharre (2018).

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Matteo Frigoli

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Università degli Studi dell’Insubria, Como, Italy
Maurizio Martellini
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Ralf Trapp

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Frigoli, M. (2020). The Twenty-first Century: The Epoch of Advanced Missile Systems and Growing Vulnerabilities. In: Martellini, M., Trapp, R. (eds) 21st Century Prometheus. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28285-1_2

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