Abstract
Over the last century, suicidal thoughts have usually been examined under the magnifying glass of psychologists, psychiatrists, and moralists, as a pathological phenomenon of misjudgment or failure of judgment abilities. This approach, according to Jean Améry (1912–1978), is subordinate to the logic of life, while the suicidal mind is altered by the anti-logic of death. What is the anti-logic of death? Is it a logic at all? What is its relation to death and to voluntary death? This chapter aims to investigate the meaning of the anti-logic of death and its role in Améry’s line of reasoning. I argue that a proper understanding of the role of anti-logic uncovers the way in which Améry’s reasoning is aimed to expose the absurd rebellion embodied by voluntary death.
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Notes
- 1.
All references refer to the above text unless otherwise stated.
- 2.
The book form of On Suicide, based on a series of radio broadcasts which was delivered by Améry in 1976, after an unsuccessful suicide attempt two years earlier (1974). Two years later (1978), Améry succeeded to accomplish his Voluntary death.
- 3.
As much as my offered exegetic might indicate the need for a re-examination of some liberal beliefs in regard to freedom, autonomy, and rationality, I will not address these issues directly here, for my aim in this chapter is to clarify Améry’s anti-logic of death and indicate its applicability to the current philosophical study of suicidality.
- 4.
As Gallagher points out, “one does not have to know or be aware of this brain processes and an ecologically embedded body, in order to have an experience that still counts as a self-experience” (2000, p. 15). I am aware of the fact that I am using Gallagher’s terms (minimal and narrative self) quite tolerantly, yet I think it could be useful for the sake of the argument that I am attempting to posit. As far as it might turn out to be a valuable question later on, I am not getting to the question of whether the minimal self is bound (still implicitly perhaps) in the most basic sense with interpersonal relations or not (see for example: Zahavi, D. 2007, 2017; Brinck, I., Reddy, V., & Zahavi, D. 2017), for it seems that Améry himself is undecided on the matter (e.g., pp. 59–122 regarding the question of undeniable belonging vs. existential loneliness).
- 5.
By Ontological Vulnerability, I refer namely to the first of the three sources in the taxonomy developed by Mackenzie et al. (2014): inherent vulnerability, which is ‘intrinsic to the human condition’; situational vulnerability, which is ‘context specific’; and finally, pathogenic vulnerability, which stems from abuse, oppression, and injustice. These sources may appear according to Mackenzie et al. in two states: dispositional vulnerability and occurrent vulnerability (pp. 7–9).
- 6.
- 7.
By using the word Construct, I refer to the sense of agency as a conceptual entity, an explanatory variable, which is not directly observable and whose existence depends upon the subject’s mind. In other words, it is a psycho-subjective (personal as well as collective) interpretation of physical objects in the world.
- 8.
This superficial definition will suffice at the moment for the sake of my argument, but it is important to note that there is a rich field of writing that seeks to philosophically analyze and define death. For further reading, see Bradley, Feldman, and Johansson (eds., 2013) and Luper (2009). It is also needless to say that there are of course philosophical traditions that undermine this assumption (for example, Buddhist reincarnation, or to a certain extent, the religious concept of paradise).
- 9.
Death as such, in its inaccessibility, is an anonymous death and, therefore, it opposes the Heideggerian concept of death as one’s own possibility or as Dasein’s authentic existence. To some extent, it mirrors Maurice Blanchot’s conception of death as it appears in The Space of Literature (1982).
- 10.
- 11.
Although there are different definitions and interpretations of the absurd, I will refer here the to the absurd mostly as it characterized by Camus (1955) and Nagel (1971)—a kind of necessary relationship between people and the world resulting from the ‘act of attention’ (Camus 1955, p. 43) or intentionality.
- 12.
See Wittgenstein, L. (1958 Part II, §xi).
- 13.
That is why ‘reality’, for Améry, is always a human reality that is dynamic and influenced by the relationship of interdependence between the subject and the other. It follows that any self-determination regarding ‘being’ is impossible: ‘It is what it is not and is not what it is’ (Sartre 1992, p. 112).
- 14.
However, there are two reservations that should be noted in this context: (1) the vast majority of Pessimists aim to eventually find reasons to oppose suicide. Some, like Schopenhauer and Rousseau, come to a solution of celibacy and reduction, while others like Camus offer more involved solutions, sometimes even political (see Dienstag 2009, p. 103); and (2) for the most part, Améry’s own voluntary death is attributable more to his notion of human freedom and less to pessimism. Nonetheless, as my analysis suggests, it seems plausible that it is the latter that produces the former.
- 15.
Échec is the French equivalent of “check” in the game of Chess. That is the declaration of a defeat that can put an end to the game. However, in the context that Améry uses it, this is a declaration of self-defeat. Therefore, Améry’s emphasis of Échec is decided upon by the subject and not by society, although it is the second authority that may ‘Define the condition under which person’s vital situation can be designated as Échec’ (p. 45).
- 16.
As Améry himself was well aware, Échec is a more common and conspicuous threat than death (p. 42), whether as a failure in life (e.g., bankruptcy, dismissal, or divorce), or whether as a failure of life (because eventually all lives are submissions to death, or because fundamental loneliness is irrefutable [pp. 114–115]). Thus, For the most part, the Échec does not lead to extreme conclusions such as voluntary death , and even if it does, it is usually a momentary, fleeting notion. It is only the ‘affected person [who] experiences in its full inexorability’ (ibid.). What then does ‘affected’ refer to here? My guess is that Améry refers here to the affect of the anti-logic of death which was activated by the ‘first blow’.
- 17.
Ratcliffe refers to a traumatic experience, which was certainly present in Améry’s life (although Améry refuses to refer to himself as ‘traumatized’, but rather as having experienced a ‘spiritual and psychic condition [which] corresponds completely to reality’ (Améry, 1980, p. 99)), as well as to victims of all kinds of abuse, which according to many studies on the subject, constitute a large percentage of suicides. However, the criterion for traumatic experience can be as broad as it can be narrow and limited. Here, I am applying it broadly. Further exploration should address Ratcliffe’s notion that modification occurs at the pre-intentioned structure as well. Clarifying this issue can potentially support the thesis that death inclination is deeply involved in life instincts.
- 18.
Plutchik R (2001). To be honest, for Plutchik and his successors, Eros does not constitute an ‘emotion’. However, for the sake of my argument, the distinction is not important.
- 19.
As with Eros, words fail to fully capture it, yet, it is interesting to note though that the functions of both Eros and Disgust are to preserve life; nonetheless, in extreme cases, they act against the organism itself in a kind of autoimmune attack. Should we conclude that such cases indicate pathology? I would like to argue that they do not, and the explanation for this is closely related to how one might think of death inclinations.
- 20.
Self-disgust is a fairly common matter in Western society, and, to a certain extent, everyone is likely to have experienced some level of it (whether from binge eating, from an unnecessary cigarette, or from the image staring at us from the mirror).
- 21.
Inclination toward death [Todesneigung] is the term that Améry uses to distinguish his exegetics from Freud`s Todestrieb. Nevertheless, it seems to me that the analysis suggested by Améry is somewhat problematic and insufficient. First, because although Améry quotes Freud using the term Todestrieb as ‘Death instinct’ (pp. 73–75), it is important to notice that Freud himself insists that it is a drive [der Trieb], and not an instinct [der Instinkt]. The second reason is that, to some extent, his interpretive proposal seems to already exist in Freud scripts.
- 22.
See Bernstein (2011, pp. 398–399). It is worth noticing here that through an analysis of psychosis and interpersonally induced trauma, Ratcliffe conceives a disruption of the pre-reflective ‘trust’ that guides everyday perceptions. If interpersonal relations affect the integrity of intentionality (i.e., the basic experience of being in one kind of intentional state rather than in another), then it is not only significance that undergoes a change, but also the affective bodily and interpersonal expectations that tacitly guide our own encounters of others and the world. Therefore, the experiential precondition itself is claimed to be relational.
- 23.
See Dienstag (2009).
- 24.
I find Windt’s definition for suicidality very useful here: suicidality as an ‘open texture’ event with a ‘weak’ family-resemblance criterion (1981, p. 40).
- 25.
For example, ‘It is not Being that oppresses me, or Nothingness, or God, or the Absence of God, only society. For it and only it caused the disturbance in my existential balance, which I am trying to oppose with an upright gait. It and only it robbed me of my trust in the world’ (Améry 1980, p. 100).
- 26.
In this sense, Wittgenstein’s distinction seems accurate—indeed, ‘the world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man’ (2018, §6.43).
- 27.
For an updated comprehensive and clear review of psychological and sociological approaches to suicide and suicidality, see Gunn III JF and Lester D (2014).
- 28.
This difference is more than a difference between two language games, to use Wittgenstein’s notion (1958), because the anti-logic of death opposes any common practices, regulation and rules altogether, and as a result it denies the possibility of a game, let alone participation in it. Therefore, to quote Clements, ‘In a real sense, an individual who does not value existence does not value anything at all, and to apply tools of cognitive values to this primary effect is to deny him his validity in a totally arbitrary fashion’ (1980, p. 107).
- 29.
‘Epistemic Ignorance’ is not a lack of knowledge but a lack of utilizing it. Yet, it is not a wholly conscious choice or a ‘not caring’, but rather, it is closer to denial than exclusion or repression. The more it is used, the more it becomes deeper and comprehensive. This is because ignorance as a substantive epistemic practice is not only a ‘defect’ on the part of the ‘knower’ but a structural problem. (For further reading: Tuana 2004; Gilson 2011, 2014).
- 30.
It is important to clarify that the structure of an act/thought in no way implies that it is impulsive. There are, of course, suicides that can be characterized as impulsive (usually among teenagers), but these are not at the heart of the analysis proposed here.
- 31.
Be that as it may, I will not get into the rich, complex discussion over the question of free will that Améry refers to, nor shall I try to explain his position and defend it. I will just mention that, for Améry, freedom is not existential (p. 125). That is, freedom is not a state of pure objective being (as opposed to truth or reason) but an individual, endless process of constant change that is ‘subject to a multi causality that is almost infinite’ (p. 137). That is, one is conditioned (by the logic of life, whether you call it biologics, physics, or neurochemistry facts, or as ‘unity of consciousness and the categories’, or as speaking animal), and yet one experiences one’s self as free (p. 137).
- 32.
Hegel, G.W.F. (1977) Phenomenology of Spirit.
- 33.
To some extent, Améry’s anti-logic of death can be analogous to Blanchot’s Other Night (1982, pp. 162–163), as it refuses any possibility of positive conceptualization. This movement, as Blanchot points out, ‘makes us sense not only its discretion and its essential intimacy but also its profound unreality: death as abyss, not that which founds but the absence and the loss of all foundation’ (1982, p. 153). The endless reflections that reverberate the absolute reveal the non-exclusivity of the logic of life; yet, at the same time, it resists dialectical negation by shattering any possibility of meaning. This superficial comparison to Blanchot raises an important question in regard to Améry’s positive reversal that is embodied in voluntary death .
- 34.
This point, used and articulated by the ‘Two States View’ advocates, as Cowley argued, contends that the concept of rationality is essentially future-oriented; since the suicidal subject has no future after suicide, it makes no sense to call suicide rational or irrational (2006, p. 497) or, as Devine claimed: ‘We are dealing, that is, not with a situation concerning which rational men will exhibit a range of estimates, but with a situation in which one man’s estimate is as good as another, because what is being done is a comparison with an unknown quality’ (1980, p. 139).
- 35.
It is more likely that facing the anti-logic of death may lead one to ‘feel no impulse to oppose or stand for anything at all’ (Kulp 2014, p. 126), not even to die. Therefore, Kulp’s own conclusion according to which ‘the ultimate outcome of this logic of death is the lack of the need to do or be anything, is suicide’ (ibid.) seem to be a contradiction. For further discussion on the issue of temporality, narrative and intention in Améry’s writing see: Ben-Shai (2010, 2011).
- 36.
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Lavi, Y. (2019). Between the Logic of Life and the Anti-logic of Death: Reflections on Suicidality in the Wake of Jean Améry. In: Ataria, Y., Kravitz, A., Pitcovski, E. (eds) Jean Améry. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28095-6_14
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